


**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Asia**

### ***Southeast Asia***



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# East Asia Southeast Asia

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16 February 1993

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### Paris Accords Blamed for Crime, Responsibility

93SE0094A Phnom Penh KAMPUCHEA in Cambodian  
13 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Kanha Vibol]

[Text] At the time following the peace accords of 23 October 1991 when the people of Cambodia were happily welcoming the peace which they hoped was very near, suddenly there appeared throughout the country many savage and terrifying armed robberies which have created fear and panic in the society.

In Phnom Penh City, armed robbers have greatly increased their activities plundering wealth and committing cold-blooded murders without any hesitation—[some of these actions] appear to be planned [while others] are on the spur of the moment.

Having said this does not mean that the Paris Peace Accords are the cause of all these crimes, but the implementation of these accords has had consequences and makes it appear as if they are the cause of these acts and the cause of trouble and disturbances throughout Phnom Penh.

According to figures provided by the Phnom Penh Police Department, before the accords in 1990, in the capitol there were many burglaries on the average, but very few robberies. However, after the accords in 1991 there were 550 robberies which included 59 armed robberies and robberies involving murder. Furthermore, in 1992, in only the first nine months of the year, there have been 596 robberies including 170 robberies which involved murder and the use of weapons. In particular, in the month of September, there were 43 armed robberies and robberies involving murder including 23 in the second week of the month.

For this reason, there is some validity to the different conclusions. UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] claims that there are robberies like this because there are still weapons. It is true that, if there were no weapons there would be no armed bandits. The State of Cambodia (SOC) has laws which prohibit the use of illegal weapons. Prior to the accords there were many weapons in nearly every location in order to maintain security and discipline, to protect the nation, and to prevent the return of the genocidal regime, but there were very few armed robberies at this time. Now, UNTAC has taken the weapons away from officers and ordinary soldiers who have been demobilized temporarily and gathered them in places under UNTAC control. But armed robberies and murders have become more numerous and more vicious.

Some groups use these robberies to a bad advantage and put the blame on the SOC saying that it lacks the ability to suppress them. But we still remember that when the SOC was in control of its own territory, before the accords, there was no bad situation like this. Now every Cambodian faction is in SOC territory and all of them are seeking peace; there are human rights organizations which assist with human rights problems, there is

UNTAC which is the peace-keeping force and international observers to oversee the implementation of the accords. If we are not mistaken, the problem of the security of the social system is not the problem of the SOC alone, but it is within the jurisdiction of UNTAC which must assist the SOC in this time of conflict.

Who are the perpetrators of these armed robberies?

Responsible agencies inform us that these robbers are people who have been released from jails, soldiers who have been demobilized, people from the camps, people who have returned to the motherland with the refugees, people from this or that Cambodian faction, some people who have been assigned to commit robberies to create disturbances in order to gain advantage from the political propaganda, etc.

The peace accords for Cambodia have given profound hope to the people of Cambodia for peace in the future and can result in the rebuilding of the country. The implementation of the accords will be as effective as the hope for peace. But turning away from the fires of war towards peace is not as easy as walking on a rug.

Before the time when peace comes there is always some unavoidable confusion because hundreds of problems dealing with the war and daily living cannot really be solved. Seventy percent of the soldiers who have been demobilized into civilians have lost the livelihood and the position which they had in the army. Later they encountered social problems involving economic conditions which caused a wide rift between the city and the countryside, between the rich and the poor and resulted in frustration and ill-conceived actions.

The guilty ones who were released from prison are a mixed lot, some are politicians, some are delinquents and vagabonds, some are habitual criminals—robbers and murderers—and have been jailed several times, [and] some are soldiers of every kind who cannot be trusted to have reformed after getting out of prison.

The change of residence and the returnees can create bad people who get involved in activities which they used to do and continue to do in order to create instability in the minds of the people. And there is still the problem of the many weapons which are used illegally. Some other culprits are those who serve party politics and have taken the opportunity to create difficulties for the SOC because it may cause the SOC's influence to diminish.

We firmly believe that every act that is against the law, against the aspirations of the people, and against the current towards peace will be unable to gain victory over the power of peace. The various social phenomena which exist in this time of conflict are not really the fault of any one faction. The main problem is the acceptance of joint responsibility by all the factions by cooperating with UNTAC in order to solve and suppress all these violations. On the military battlefield, we have greatly reduced the bloodshed, but on the battlefield of peace our social system has just begun to find a solution and is stuck in a very complicated and difficult position. Our

main problem is that we must push for the implementation of the accords in order to gain victory according to schedule in order to have a complete peace and easily solve every social problem which arises.

### **Preah Vihear Relations With Thailand, KR Presence**

*93SE0084A Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN  
in Thai 6-12 Dec 92 pp 36-38*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Thai Government has implemented a regional policy of trying to establish friendly relations with neighboring countries. That will help reduce national-level conflicts. Four or five previous governors of Sisaket Province tried to open tours to the Preah Vihear temple. But they failed because of the political problems in Cambodia. Today, the Heng Samrin government is administering the country. But the other three Cambodian factions refuse to work with the government. They have established themselves as independent entities with their own military forces. They have been fighting each other for more than 10 years now.

The problem is that the Cambodian border area opposite Sisaket Province is controlled by the Khmer Rouge. But Phnom Penh government forces are stationed on top of the hill where the Preah Vihear temple is located. We are in contact with the government forces there. But the Khmer Rouge forces have launched attacks on the troops near the Preah Vihear temple and so has not been not safe for tourists to go there.

2d Lieutenant Somchit Chulaphong, the former governor of Sisaket Province and the man who negotiated an agreement to allow people to visit Preah Vihear, talked about those negotiations:

I looked at the problems and realized that to open Preah Vihear, we would have to reach an agreement with both the Heng Samrin government and the Khmer Rouge. I sent Mr. Warong Siriphanit, the district officer in Kantharalak District, to contact the government forces at Preah Vihear. As for the Khmer Rouge, I contacted thahan phran irregular forces with the Suranari Force and asked them to contact the Khmer Rouge. Finally, we were able to open negotiations with Mr. Sok Sam-eng, the Cambodian Government's governor of Preah Vihear Province. After holding talks two-three times, it was agreed that we would cooperate in opening the Preah Vihear temple to tourists. And the military coordinated things with the head of the Khmer Rouge group. But the Khmer Rouge said that they were suffering economic hardships, because China and Russia had stopped providing support. They said that if tourist were allowed to visit Preah Vihear, they wanted a share of the profits so that they could use the money to support their troops.

During the final round of negotiations at the Sisaket provincial administrative headquarters, Mr. Sok Sam-eng, the Cambodian provincial governor, signed a detailed agreement, including the amount of the transit fee to be collected by Cambodia. The fee was set at 60

baht for Thais and Cambodians and 200 baht for foreigners. We suggested that the amount collected be shared equally. We cited the fact that we have to maintain order, provide housing for the tourists, provide parking lots, register those who want to cross the border, establish a clinic, provide water and electricity for the tourists, and so on. The Cambodians would not have to do anything except collect the money.

The Cambodian governor refused to share the transit fees. He claimed that people from all around the world wanted to visit the Preah Vihear temple and that this temple was an asset of Cambodia, not Thailand. And so why should they share the profits! I agreed that this temple complex belonged to Cambodia, but I pointed out that the value of that asset—whether it was worth millions or nothing—did not depend on Cambodia alone. This also depends on Thailand, because if Thailand refuses to allow tourists to pass through Thailand, that ancient temple won't be able to earn any money for Cambodia. But they still refused and complained that this was not fair. They said that this was like buying a bus. They had to invest money to buy the bus and hire a mechanic and driver. They had to buy gasoline. They said that they had to invest a lot of money before they could use the bus to earn money. That was like their ancestors who invested money to build the Preah Vihear temple. I responded by saying that I agreed that they would have to spend that money to put the bus in operation. But I pointed out that even if they bought the bus and spent all that money, it wouldn't do them any good at all if there were no roads for the bus. In the end, they agreed to share the transit fees with us equally. At first, they were going to collect the fees themselves, but we did not trust them and so each side now collects its own share.

After that, the Cambodians wanted to open Preah Vihear as soon as possible, because they needed the income. But we weren't ready, because we had to report this to the Ministry and prepare officials. The Cambodians displayed great boldness. One day, Mr. Sok Sam-eng received an invitation from the governor of Ubon Ratchathani Province, who wanted to talk to him about opening a border trading point with Cambodia in Nam Yun District. When newspaper reporters interviewed him on the issue of tourists visiting Preah Vihear, Mr. Sok told them that we had equivocated and had still not opened the border. He said that even though warnings had been given, we had not done anything. Thus, they had decided to go ahead and open the temple to tourists as soon as possible. They were going to take action alone and would not have any further contact with the governor of Sisaket Province. I was very angry when I read that and felt that they were not sincere. I thought that they were acting too boldly and that they needed to be taught a lesson. Thus, I contacted the thahan phran irregular units stationed at the pass leading to the mountain and in Kantharalak District and asked them to "lock the doors" to Preah Vihear and not allow anyone to enter or leave there unless they had authorization. The next morning, Mr. Sok and his party traveled from Ubon

Ratchathani on their way to Preah Vihear, but they were not allowed to pass. They asked people to allow them to pass, but no one dared let them go on and so they had to return to Ubon Ratchathani. I told them that they shouldn't think that they could open Preah Vihear to tourists all by themselves. Because not even they, let alone tourists, can get there unless the governor of Sisaket Province authorizes this. That created quite an uproar. That night, I received a telephone call from the under secretary of interior, who asked about this. I told him and asked him if I had done something wrong. He assured me that I had not done anything wrong. But for the sake of friendly international relations, he asked me to allow them to return. The next morning, we allowed them to cross the border. In talking about this, I can't help but think about the Pathomkam ceremony during the time of King Naresuan.

After that, we agreed to hold a ceremony to officially open up the Preah Vihear temple to tourists on 6 March 1992. The under secretary of interior (Mr. Anan Anantakun) officiated at the ceremony. All the targets in opening up Preah Vihear to tourists were hit. The province proposed using the money earned from this to develop tourism in the province. The Ministry of Finance granted permission and so provincial administrative organizations were assigned the task of administering things in line with the ministry's recommendations.

The barbed wire gates were opened wide. Tourists from all over the world flocked here in order to see this amazing place, which had been closed for more than a quarter of a century because of the political problems.

This will definitely go down in history. What we know for sure is that concerning the negotiations and behavior of both sides, readers can examine things and arrive at their own conclusion without us having to draw a conclusion here.

#### **SOC Dealings With Thai Police, Minister Chawalit**

##### **Thai Police Sources**

93SE0105A Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 29 Nov 92  
pp 1, 12

[Excerpt] A Police Department news source told NAE0 NA that General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the minister of interior, has relied on his personal relationship with the Heng Samrin faction to ask for its cooperation in solving the problem concerning vehicles being stolen in Thailand and sold in Cambodia. The Heng Samrin faction has promised to help return stolen vehicles. But how many are returned depends on whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that the vehicles in Phnom Penh are the ones that were stolen in Thailand.

The news source said that two police teams will be sent from Thailand to Phnom Penh. The first team will be composed of police officials from the Police Data and Intelligence Operations Center, the Central Investigation Bureau, and the Commissioner's Office of the Police

Provincial 1. They will inspect vehicles in Phnom Penh to determine which vehicles came from Thailand. This will be done by checking registrations. Phnom Penh will cooperate fully. This team will probably be in Cambodia for about a week. As for the other team of police officials, Phnom Penh wants that team to help set up Cambodian police checkpoints.

"The minister of interior has asked the director-general of the Police Department to submit measures that he can discuss with Phnom Penh officials. But those measures will first have to be discussed with the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs before any action is taken, because this is a very delicate matter. Things will have to be considered very carefully in order to prevent criticism."

The news source said that the Heng Samrin government is ready to support this because of its good relations with General Chawalit. Steps must be taken to intercept the large number of vehicles, including cars, pickup trucks, and motorcycles, that have been stolen in Thailand and sold in Cambodia. During the time of the government of General Chatchai Chunhawan, Cambodia took steps to seize vehicles stolen from Thailand. But after that, they couldn't make contact and so they stopped doing that.

In the past, Phnom Penh did not register vehicles from Thailand. But now, many of the vehicles from Thailand are being registered. Thus, the officials from the Thai Police Data and Intelligence Operations Center that go to Phnom Penh will be able to make checks in order to determine which vehicles were stolen from Thailand and have them sent back to Thailand.

"Phnom Penh will allow us to bring the registration numbers and background information on the stolen vehicles and set up checkpoints. We will also have various types of equipment. If it is found that a vehicle was stolen from Thailand, they will immediately seize the vehicle and send it back to us." [passage omitted]

##### **SOC Police Officers To Be Trained by Thais**

93SE0105B Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 2 Dec 92  
p 23

[Text] At 1100 hours on 1 December in conference room 2, Police Department, Police General Sawat Amonwivat, the director-general of the Police Department, and Police General Phongammat Amattayakun, the deputy director-general for suppression, received General Sin Song, the Democratic Kampuchea minister of national security, and 10 senior Cambodian police officers including the director-general of the Police Department and the metropolitan police commissioner. Concerning this meeting, Police Gen. Sawat said that he discussed official matters with the Cambodian minister of national security. They talked about preventing and suppressing crime along the Thai-Cambodian border, particularly the problem of bandits stealing cars and motorcycles and smuggling them into Cambodia. Gen. Sin Song promised that Cambodia will cooperate with Thailand in solving this problem.

Police Gen. Sawat said that Cambodia has never had a vehicle registration law. Thus, vehicles brought in from abroad can be used without having to pass an official inspection. The Cambodian minister of national security said that a new law will be passed to prohibit vehicles with steering wheels on the right side from entering the country. However, Cambodia is administered by a government. We will have to negotiate with the other elements of the government that are not under the control of Gen. Sin Song. "I have established a group of Thai officials to work with Cambodian officials, who have established a team, too. These teams will study the theft of vehicles. Gen. Sin Song has promised that he will talk with those who obtained vehicles stolen from Thailand to ensure that the vehicles are returned to their owners in Thailand."

The director-general of the Police Department said that the Thai Police Department will establish two scholarship funds to enable Cambodian police officials to attend the Sam Phran Police Academy. Cambodian policemen will also be allowed to attend the inspectors and commanders schools. We will study this in greater detail. A reporter asked which units will be sent to work with Cambodian police officials. Police Gen. Sawat said that officials will probably be sent from three units, that is, the Commissioner's Office of the Provincial 2, because that is the unit with jurisdiction in that area, the Border Patrol Police, and the Data Collection Center. They will use modern equipment to track down vehicles stolen from Thailand. At present, we do not know for sure how many vehicles have been stolen. But about 70-80 percent of the vehicles in Cambodia are vehicles with the steering wheel on the right. Our officials are ready to go. We are just waiting for the Ministry of Interior to coordinate things with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### Thai Police General Sawat Comments

93SE0105C Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 2 Dec 92  
pp 1, 10

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Mr. Sin Song, the Cambodian minister of national security, and a team of Cambodian officials including the director-general of the Police Department and the commander of the metropolitan police, who were guests of General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the Thai minister of interior, visited the Thai Police Department on 1 December. There, they were welcomed by Police Gen. Sawat Amonwiwat, the director-general of the Police Department.

In an interview following the meeting, Police Gen. Sawat said that they discussed the crime problem along the Thai-Cambodian border, particularly the theft of vehicles from Thailand, which are then sold in Cambodia. To date, more than 50,000 vehicles have been stolen. Mr. Sin Song promised to cooperate with Thailand in solving this problem. [passage omitted]

Mr. Sin Song promised to cooperate in checking for vehicles stolen from Thailand in the provinces for which he is responsible. Because at present, Cambodia is not governed by a single government. Thus, he cannot monitor things throughout the country.

"Both Thailand and Cambodia have established teams of officials to study various things so that we can cooperate in solving this problem. This includes setting up checkpoints on both the Thai and Cambodian sides of the border. I will send officials to Cambodia to study the details. Besides this, Mr. Sin Song will help return stolen vehicles to Thailand. He will talk with those who own stolen vehicles."

The director-general of the Police Department said that Thailand is ready to cooperate with Cambodia. We will provide one or two scholarships a year so that Cambodian students can attend the Sam Phran Police Academy. But they must have the necessary educational qualifications and be able to speak the Thai language.

Police Gen. Sawat said that officials from three units will be sent to coordinate things with Cambodian officials on this matter. The officials sent will include provincial police officials who are experts on border matters, Border Patrol Police officials, and officials from the Data Collection Center. Computers will be installed in Cambodia so that officials can obtain information and immediately find out to whom the stolen vehicle belongs. Investigations in Vientiane showed that approximately 80 vehicles a day were being smuggled into the country from Thailand.

As for the next step, Gen. Chawalit will coordinate things with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After that, it will be decided which officials to send to Cambodia.

#### Joint Commission To Be Established

93SE0105D Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 2 Dec 92  
pp 1, 20

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The Cambodian minister of national security is prepared to cooperate. Thus, the number of vehicles stolen in Thailand and sold in Cambodia should decline greatly. Cambodia has drafted a new law prohibiting the import of vehicles with right-hand steering. Also, a joint Thai-Cambodian commission will be established to conduct inspections on both sides of the border. Cambodia has never had a law requiring vehicles to be registered. The new law, which is called the Traffic Law, prohibits the import of vehicles with right-hand steering. The Cambodian minister of national security is ready to cooperate by inspecting vehicles at the car dealerships in Cambodia.

The director-general of the Police Department said that based on the talks held today, a joint Thai-Cambodian commission will be established to study the matter of setting up joint checkpoints along the Thai-Cambodian border to prevent and suppress the theft of vehicles. [passage omitted]

Police Gen. Sawat said that he told the Cambodian officials that we are prepared to offer one or two scholarships a year to enable Cambodian police officials to attend our police academy. Besides this, we will provide support in developing their personnel at the level of commanders, superintendents, inspectors, and deputy inspectors. However, we will have to hold talks on the educational qualifications of their police officials. And they must be able to speak the Thai language if they want to attend our schools. [passage omitted]

## POLITICAL

### Habibie's Access to President

93SE0107A Jakarta EDITOR in Indonesian 31 Dec 92  
p 29

[Article by Masduki Baidlawi: "I Do Not Give Special Attention to Habibie"]

[Text] It is no secret that when B.J. Habibie reports to Pak Harto [President Suharto]—whether at Cendana Street or at the Bina Graha—his visit lasts several hours. As a result, some reporters at the State Secretariat made this comment: "There is no point in waiting for completion of a meeting between President Suharto and B.J. Habibie, because we will miss our deadline."

What is it they talk about? According to Makmur Makka, a person close to B.J. Habibie, Habibie always listens carefully to Pak Harto's guidance and frequently makes notes. Habibie does not hesitate to ask what Pak Harto wants, either.

That is true. Nurcholish Madjid, a member of the ICMI [Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals] council of experts, said that before Habibie expressed his willingness take the ICMI leadership Pak Harto was the one who taught him about Islam. Habibie was born in Pare-Pare in 1936.

A book—an anthology, actually—entitled *B.J. Habibie's Half Century* candidly describes the close relationship between the president and this member of his cabinet. In that book, which was edited by Makmur Makka and published in 1986, President Suharto wrote of his personal experience under the heading "Some Notes About Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie."

Clearly, that was a rare thing. Seldom does a president write a piece especially for the memoirs of an assistant of his in the cabinet. In that chapter, Pak Harto related how in 1950 he led from the Diponegoro Division a force called the Mataram Brigade to put down the Andi Azis uprising at Makassar (Ujungpandang). "In the middle of the night, when all brigade staff members were sleeping soundly, children of the Habibie family came to the barracks and, weeping pitifully, said their father was seriously ill. Dr. Irsan (the Mataram Brigade doctor) and I went to the house, which was just across the road," Pak Harto recalled.

With Pak Harto at his side, Dr. Irsan gave immediate assistance; but although man tries, it is God who decides the outcome. Mr. Habibie had suffered a heart attack and could not be helped. He drew his last breath in the presence of Pak Harto, Dr. Irsan, and the family. "I was the one who closed his eyes and said a prayer to God," Pak Harto wrote.

According to Pak Harto, members of the Mataram Brigade had close ties with the Habibie family, and one of the officers, Captain Subono, fell in love with Mrs. Habibie's daughter. "As a result, I, as brigade commander, had a 'parents-in-law' relationship with Mrs.

Habibie." Upon completion of its assignment, the Mataram Brigade returned to Yogya, and the Habibie family moved to Bandung. After studying at the ITB [Bandung Institute of Technology], B.J. Habibie continued his education in Germany.

In 1961, Pak Harto, as first deputy to the KSAD [chief of Army Staff], had opportunity to visit Germany and two other European countries. "I again met Habibie, who had graduated and was diligently studying for his doctorate," Pak Harto said. When the New Order was born, Habibie felt called to serve. He sent that message through his brother-in-law, Subono, who was by then a colonel. Pak Harto recommended that Habibie continue his studies. "I will call you when the time has come," Pak Harto said.

In 1970, Pak Harto again met Habibie in Germany and asked that he prepare to return home. Then, in 1974, Pak Harto summoned him home.

Pak Harto placed extraordinary confidence in him. "Many multiple jobs were entrusted him to him, but those jobs were closely related since they were in the fields of technology and industry," Pak Harto stated. The objective was to guarantee harmonious growth among strategic industries. Therefore, those industries needed to be under one hand from the beginning.

In the book *Suharto: My Thinking, Words, and Actions*, President Suharto acknowledged that some people worried that because of Habibie's brilliance he would influence Pak Harto. "Those people do not know that Habibie always seeks my advice. He spends hours with me when he brings a report because he wants to know my opinions and my philosophy."

Pak Harto declares in the book, "I do not give him special attention. I give the same opportunity to everyone, but, in practice, Habibie is the one who uses the opportunity," Pak Harto said.

### PDI Insistent on Legislative Agenda

93SE0099A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 7 Dec 92  
p 5

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—The Indonesian Democratic Party Faction (F-PDI) says it will persist in its fight for things that are principles during preparation of material for the MPR [People's Consultative Council] General Assembly. The F-PDI says there is absolutely no requirement that all materials must be finalized for analysis by the MPR Working Committee (BP). The task of the BP is merely to prepare materials for the General Assembly and not to resolve all issues.

"It is good if the materials can be entirely finalized, but if not, there is no problem, since they can still be discussed in the General Assembly," said MPR F-PDI Chairman Nico Daryanto in a press conference at PDI DPP [Central Executive Council] Headquarters on Saturday, 6 December. Also present at the press conference were the F-PDI's BP team members Yahya Nasution, Sabam Sirait, Fatimah Achmad, Aberson Marle Sihalo, and Sudaryanto.



Nico denied that the F-PDI had begun to relax the fight for its proposals. The PDI DPP secretary-general emphasized that the faction is maintaining its original positions and continues to give other factions opportunity to examine and understand F-PDI proposals.

#### In Public Interest

Nico said F-PDI proposals, which deal with separate leadership for the DPR [Parliament] and the MPR, presidential and vice presidential elections, and many other things, represent the desires of the people. "In fact, there is a person in the BP who is promoting the idea of limiting the president's term of office," he said as he mentioned the name of an MPR BP member from another faction.

"Therefore, the F-PDI is not going to withdraw its proposal hastily. The faction will first determine the proposal's impact on the overall interests of the public and whether it will hurt the people or not," Nico Daryanto said.

Sabam Sirait pointed out that in the 1973 MPR General Assembly there was not one faction that did not want to limit the president's term of office. Although all the factions agreed that the proposal to limit the president's term was good, they felt the time had not come. The same recommendation was put forth by two foremost national universities, the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University.

"Will history decide whether after 20 years it is still not time? Must we wait until the entire 1945 Generation is gone and we pass on a time bomb to our children and grandchildren?" asked Sabam Sirait. "Although the arena is not an easy one, we will not allow ourselves to be walked over during discussions," Sabam said as he emphasized the faction's consistent position.

MPR BP Deputy Chairman Yahya Nasution denied the charge being made by a certain group that the party's proposal has only an immediate purpose. Yahya said the F-PDI's proposal is not just for the next five or 25 years, but is in the interests of children and grandchildren yet to come.

"Changes in the world usually come from small groups. Although people say, 'It is not time,' the F-PDI believes now is the right time. Whether we like it or not, we cannot deny that the time has come for total regeneration," declared Yahya Nasution. "Big houses do not collapse because of bombs, but because of termites," Nico affirmed.

Yahya acknowledged that the F-PDI had withdrawn its recommendation on separating the leadership of the DPR and the MPR. The withdrawal was made after approval of an F-PDI proposal that the words "accept their oath/promise" be changed to "swear/promise," as used in the MPR Rules of Order. Yahya said it was a "tradeoff" in the process of "give and take." "We would not do that for matters of principle, however," he asserted.

#### For Sake of Rejection

Nico said that although the F-PDI is consistent regarding matters of principle, that does not mean its proposals must be accepted without change. "We are not going to insist that our proposals be received as they are without any change at all. We desire, however, that they not be rejected summarily. There is an impression that as soon as we make a proposal, it is rejected without waiting for the process of deliberation," Nico stated.

Nico said in this connection that voting must always be avoided, because the casting of votes is normally interpreted as the resolution of a failure in deliberation. Therefore, the F-PDI seriously wants to avoid voting. Avoiding voting is not the responsibility of the PDI or PPP [Development Unity Party] alone but of the other factions, too.

To avoid voting, Nico said, all sides must show mutual respect, understand, and tolerance. Tolerance should not come only from the weak side. "Tolerance from the weak side gives the impression of compulsion or repression," declared.

#### Nomination of President

Nico said the name of a presidential candidate will not be discussed until the PDI Leaders Meeting on 11 and 12 January 1993. Nico said what the F-PDI is doing is quite appropriate, since the DPP decision will be made in January, while the president will not be elected until March. By that time, there will be an approximate picture of the next GBHN. Only after that will we seek a person who might be able to implement the GBHN.

"It is up to the Leaders Meeting to decide to renominate Pak Harto [President Suharto] or to choose someone else. The important thing is that the nomination process be conducted democratically," Nico emphasized.

#### Minister Says ICMI Cannot Become Political Party

*93SE0099C Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 7 Dec 92 pp 1, 10*

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—Minister of Home Affairs Rudini emphasized that the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) cannot become a political party like the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) or the Development Unity Party (PPP). He added that the creation of a new political party is not consistent with the spirit behind the creation of the existing parties and the Functional Group [GOLKAR].

The home minister made this statement Saturday, 5 December, in Jakarta in a dialogue with participants in the ICMI Second National Friendship Working Conference (SILAKNAS). The SILAKNAS, attended by 500 representatives of all domestic and foreign ICMI regional organizations, is to continue until Monday, 7 December.

A SILAKNAS participant pointed out that the ICMI was founded with the blessing of President Suharto and is

now two years old. During this short time, the ICMI has expanded faster, and has become bigger, than the sociopolitical organizations.

"Regional organizations (forms of regional executive councils) have been established in all the provinces. In fact, there are 28 regional organizations, since there is a special regional organization in Bogor. The presence of the ICMI has reached even to Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and China. What is your opinion on the possibility that the ICMI, which has become so big in such a short time, will become a political party?" asked a young participant from Jakarta.

The participant also expressed his confidence that because of its rapid growth the ICMI would be sure to win in an election contest against the PDI and the PPP.

#### Not Possible

The home minister answered the question by asking SILAKNAS participants to examine the creation of the two political parties and GOLKAR. He added that he had often explained that expression of a concept or idea should always have three dimensions: the past, the present, and the future.

"Before the three sociopolitical organizations were formed, Indonesia adhered to parliamentary, or liberal, democracy and a multiparty system. We all know the results of that. The Indonesian people were never able to develop. What we had was confusion. Stability of security was hard to manage, let alone political stability. That situation culminated in the G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party] uprising. After the three sociopolitical organizations were established, the problem of security stability was resolved," the home minister said.

He admitted that he did not know the details of discussions leading to the formation of the three sociopolitical organizations, for he was then only a major, and GOLKAR DPP [Central Executive Council] Chairman Wahono was PANGKOSTRAD [Commander of Army Strategic Command]. The home minister said he knew only the history.

After the experience with parliamentary democracy, which culminated in the PKI uprising, the political parties met with the president. Everyone then agreed to a genuine and consistent implementation of Pancasila democracy and the 1945 Constitution and to the total development of each individual.

Varied methods were used. Some groups emphasized spiritual development without neglecting material development. Those groups then reached a consensus on becoming the PPP. Thus, the PPP is not an Islamic party. Nationalistic groups that stressed material development without neglecting the spiritual became the PDI. GOLKAR came about by guarding the balance between material and spiritual development.

"Thus, there were groupings. That being the case, what is the guideline for a new political party? Ignore both aspects?" Moreover, he said, under the present political

system, Indonesia has conducted national development throughout five REPELITA's [Five-Year Development Plans]. Therefore, if you want to change, study that first. Do you want many parties? Do you want confusion like we used to have. Go ahead, but I do not want that. I am also a member of the ICMI," the home minister declared.

He added that the ICMI should remain an organization of intellectuals that produces better concepts for national development than those used in the past.

#### Quality of Human Resources

In his opening message to the SILAKNAS, the home minister emphasized the quality of the Indonesian individual and society, which is the main target of PJPT II [Second Long-Term Development Phase]. This subject was consistent with the theme of the SILAKNAS: "Creating a mission for Muslim intellectuals in preparation for PJPT II."

"The quality of the individual as a human resource needs to be improved. To that end, an atmosphere needs to be created to encourage the active participation of the people, including the ICMI, in management and development," the home minister said.

According to the home minister, the quality of the individual can be measured in physical and nonphysical terms. Physical qualities are clearly observed in physical form, strength, and stamina. Nonphysical qualities are intelligence, emotions, character, and religion. As an organization of intellectuals, the ICMI can play a big role in promoting and developing these nonphysical qualities, the home minister said.

#### Draft of Concepts

Besides speaking at the Second SILAKNAS of ICMI, Minister of Home Affairs Rudini early Saturday also closed the fourth session of the Special School for Staff and Administrative Managers (SESPASUS) of the Department of Home Affairs. In his message there, he again voiced his recommendation that each candidate for regional chief draft a concept of the work program he plans to introduce if he is selected.

"A person can be reappointed as regional chief only if his performance has been truly outstanding." Therefore, he added, DPRD [regional legislature] members must be particular in nominating candidates for regional chief and must listen carefully to the aspirations of the people.

He pointed out that the DPRD's, which have given the impression of not being sensitive to community aspirations and of not doing their work well, must collectively improve their capabilities. To accomplish that, he asked that government, i.e., executive branch, officials work with the DPRD's.

At another point in his remarks, the home minister said he could not say when he would install Hasan Basri Durin and La Ode Kaimoeddin as governors of West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi, respectively, because the presidential decrees have not yet been issued.

### Governor of South Sumatra

When contacted yesterday by KOMPAS, Mohammad Roem, S.H. [Master of Laws], chairman of the Special Committee on Drafting Procedures for Selection of the Governor of South Sulawesi, said 18 candidates have emerged. The names were submitted by youth organizations, the Regional Management Council (DHD), Exponents of '66, cultural leaders, PEPABRI [Armed Forces Veterans Association], religious leaders, the local press, individuals, and selected intellectuals.

The figures receiving the most recommendations were Major General Zainal Basri Palaguna, now PANGDAM [Commander of Military Region Command] VII/Wirabwana, and Drs. Mappaturung Parawansa, now director general for regional development in the Department of Home Affairs.

Roem said that if one wants to group the candidates, those two names are in the top group of recommendations for governor of South Sulawesi. The second group has four names: Prof. Dr. Baharuddin Lopa, S.H. (director general for corrections in the Department of Justice); Prof. Dr. Basri Hasanuddin, M.A., rector of Hasanuddin University, Ujungpandang; Beddu Amang (deputy chief of BULOG [Logistics Board]); and Brigadier General Eteng Amin (deputy governor of South Sulawesi).

The third group has the names of Prof. Dr. Hasan Walinono (director general for primary and secondary education in the Department of Education and Culture); Dr. Radi A. Gani (regent of Wajo); and H.M. Jusuf Kalla, S.E. [Bachelor of Economics] (businessman and chairman of the South Sumatra Chamber of Commerce and Industry).

There are a number of names in the fourth group: Prof. Dr. Fachruddin (former rector of Hasanuddin University); Zainuddin Sikado (director general for air communications); Emir H. Mangaweang (secretary-general of the Department of Information); Brigadier General Bempa Mappangara (speaker of the South Sulawesi DPRD); Andi Syamsu (of the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur); and economist Prof. Burhamzah, M.B.A.

Roem hopes that by 10 December the South Sulawesi DPRD will agree on five candidates for submission to the president through the minister of home affairs.

### Academics Call for Dialogue Among Religions

93SE0099B Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN  
in Indonesian 5 Dec 92 pp 1, 10

[Text] Salatiga—The understanding that there are differences among religions is a pillar of academic religious dialogue. Such a dialogue can be conducted by intellectuals who understand other religions without "a priori" judgments. Without such an understanding, academic religious dialogue will be only in the form of seeking explanations on a case-by-case basis of things that relate to religious life in the community.

That is the gist of statements made in interviews with PEMBARUAN by Willy Toisuta, S.P. [expansion not

given], Ph.D., rector of the Satya Wacana Christian University [UKSW], Salatiga; Dr. Komarudin Hidayat, lecturer at the IAIN [State Islamic Institute], Jakarta; Dr. Nico Dister, lecturer at the Dryarkara Philosophy College, Jakarta; and Drs. Dawam Rahardjo, director of the Institute for Religious and Philosophical Studies, Jakarta. The interviews were conducted during breaks in a seminar entitled "Religion and Society," held from 25 to 29 November on the campus of the Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga.

Willy Toisuta said an academic interreligion dialogue requires integrative approaches and the sharing of ideas found in each religion.

"From the academic aspect, such a dialogue is natural. From the aspect of the current situation in Indonesia, it is something that probably should be developed, but it should not lose its academic character. There must be a serious collective study of religious life," he said.

He acknowledged that the dialogue can have various forms. It can be a publication open to everyone. It can also be regular meetings like this one.

"However, I want the kind of thing propounded by the minister of religion, namely that this forum should not be limited to the study of religion itself or remain just an interreligion dialogue. Although the nature of the forum may not be concretely identified yet, there is certain to be an important place for 'dissemination.' This will produce communication and accurate interpretation. I hope the forum will provide more explanation about basic issues in each religion," he asserted.

The problem, Willy said, is to demonstrate, as the responsibility of faith, a positive role for such dialogue. It takes time, of course. The establishment of a graduate program on religion and society at UKSW is related to this matter. So far, it includes only Protestant and Catholic aspects, but plans call for Islamic involvement. "Thus, this forum is not for the purpose of seeking explanation for cases involving religious life," he said.

### Academic Dialogue

Komarudin said it is a fact that Indonesian society consists of a variety of religions. It is this variety that prompts the holding of academic dialogues. "People who do not accept religious variety have a narrow outlook," he declared.

He acknowledged that an interreligion dialogue should actually be viewed as a joint effort to distribute the "sweet fruit" of faith to other people. "In my opinion, the propagation of religion must be put in this context. In other words, I explain my religion so that other people will not misunderstand it," he said.

He admitted that there are requirements for the creation of good dialogue. One requirement is that a person must be truly religious and have an appreciation for humanitarian values. This is especially true now that our information democracy prevents our being secretive. People know what is happening in each religion. A need is seen for an interreligion dialogue in this situation. "In my



opinion, therefore, interreligion dialogue is the calling of each religious person so that harmony can be created. We need to promote this collectively, however," he stated.

Komarudin said the existence of a dialogue is reflected in the rapid flow of globalization. The fall of communism and the emergence of a "crisis of meaning" is actually a victory for religion. It is a climate conducive to practice of religion.

He said religions should anticipate the "convergence" that is taking place. In other words, a feature of this "postmodern" era is the search for identity through fleeing to religion, to ethnic emphasis, and to cultic religions. "In my opinion, there should be a mutual strengthening of the big religions by solving problems through searches for similarities among the religions. In this way, problems can be resolved collectively," he said.

Therefore, Komarudin said, Indonesia, which is a religious society with an awareness of history, moves in this way toward the future with heightened human dignity. "It is in this context that each religious person notes the differences between religions. That is healthy religion," he asserted.

He said interreligion dialogue should be conducted on campuses, because the university communities are made up of intellectuals and prospective intellectuals. "In my view, religious harmony depends on how we appreciate the differences. Initially, only intellectuals and religious leaders can have such appreciation," he said.

Meanwhile, Dr. Nico Dister said he agreed that the forum for dialogue should be academic, but participants must have a broad outlook on other religions. Dialogue can move smoothly in such a situation. "I think the forum could be of many forms. The most important thing is a healthy understanding of other religions," he said.

He said such understanding is apparently necessary in view of the situation in the religious community. For example, it is important for parents to teach their children how to live with other religions. If student fights occur, help should be sought from the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Council (MUI), the Indonesian Federation of Churches (PGI), or the Indonesian Conference of Bishops (KWI). "That religion has an important role in Indonesian life is a fact. Therefore, because there are many religions in Indonesia, there is a feeling that a dialogue is necessary," he said.

#### Understanding of Harmony

Dawam Rahardjo said that in the life of the community, where a number of religions are followed, dialogue and interaction among religious people is necessary.

"I lean toward a dynamic life among religions rather than toward compromise and mere consideration of feelings," he said. All sides should be more active and should respect and draw benefit from others.

According to Dawam, who was also a seminar speaker, an interreligion dialogue should enable a person to

understand the "obsessions" of other religions. Instead of concentrating on his own convictions, he should learn from others.

"I can learn how other religious communities live out their religions, which means that I can benefit from the dialogue," he said. He said he felt such a dialogue would be a step beyond mere harmony.

If this happens, he said, each person will be more active in his religion. Let each religion perform its task of propagation. There is no need to hinder it merely for the sake of harmony, for it is the individual who decides. Conflict is not necessary when there is mutual understanding.

#### Threat of Secularism

Dawam also asked for more cooperation among adherents of religion, for, if we look at the issues, we see that all the religions now have the same objective. They are all reacting to the same threat, namely the strong current of secularism that is hitting the world.

In this situation, each religion seeks to develop influence in society. There is risk in this, but that is not a problem as long as it does not produce enmity. Conflict may arise within a religion as well as between religions.

It is necessary to remember that in each religion there are religious values that are universal values. Because of the strong current of secularism, these universal values should encourage cooperation among religions as an answer to social problems.

There are many social problems, such as business ethics, crime, basic human rights, and the environment. Religions should respond with ways to resolve these problems. "I think all the religions have their concepts of solutions, despite different wordings," he added.

In response to specific social problems, the religions should collectively try to resolve the problems by freeing themselves from the threat of modern life, which tends to be secular and questions the need for religion.

On the other hand, Dawam feels that religious communities, and especially their leaders, have been slow in responding to these problems. He believes religious leaders are often unable to make religious values contemporary as a response to social issues.

If religious leaders had a better means of communication for explaining values, the social and collective problems in our religious society could be solved.

## ECONOMIC

### President Asks Opportunities for Companies

93SE0100A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 92 pp 1, 5

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—No one in Indonesia should allow competition to hurt, let alone destroy, small businesses while benefiting big businesses. "We certainly do not want to create an economic life that benefits big

businesses alone." President Suharto cautioned yesterday, Thursday, at Freedom Palace in Jakarta during a visit by participants in a conference of leaders of the Indonesian Association of Small and Medium Businesses (KUKMI).

The head of state said the Constitution stresses that Indonesia's economic system must be marked by a family spirit. The government must pursue the economic policy outlined by the Constitution.

He asserted that the development of interrelationships among small, medium, and big businesses must continue. Small and medium businesses must be given opportunity to develop and expand their operations for the sake of creating social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

The head of state said Indonesia is now at the end of the First Long-Term Development Phase and is soon to enter the Second Long-Term Development Phase. We have gained much experience in conducting national development. We have achieved many successes in every sector. We have created political stability. We have all experienced progress in economic life. We have also progressed in sociocultural life and in defense and security. "The number of people living below the poverty line is declining."

Besides describing our successes, the president also pointed out shortcomings in our implementation of development, areas in which the desired progress has not been made. Therefore, at this moment prior to the convening of the MPR [People's Consultative Council] General Assembly, which is to formulate a new GBHN [Broad Outline of State Policy], we must reflect on what we have done so far for the development of the nation and the state, the president declared.

The president said that as we learn from experience, we must remain faithful to the position that development must focus on our own strength and ability. Foreign aid, despite its importance to development, must remain supplemental. The president added that small and medium businesses make Indonesia's economic wheels turn faster. Furthermore, the president continued, big businesses cannot function well without the support of small and medium businesses.

#### **Economic Democracy**

The president then recalled the things outlined by our predecessors in Indonesia regarding their aspirations for creating political and economic democracy. Such democracy is the basic idea of Pancasila democracy, which Indonesians wish to uphold. He said political and economic development must move in parallel and be mutually supportive.

KUKMI can make a positive contribution to the realization of such aspirations for democracy, the head of state said. He said small and medium businesses conducted by Indonesians face various kinds of obstacles. Therefore, the president said, it is important that there should be cooperation among small businesses, among medium businesses, and between small and medium businesses.

The president then stressed his determination to improve the quality of life of the Indonesian people by improving the quality of the work and business of the people themselves. Improvement in the quality of life, the head of state said, encompasses improvement in the work and operations of small and medium Indonesian businesses.

According to the president, this is not a trivial or easy challenge. Specific, well-planned measures are needed. Operators of small and medium businesses themselves need awareness that profit by the group must be given priority over individual profit. There must be an expression of family spirit in the creation of business cooperation.

He also emphasized that small and medium businesses play a very important role in development in Indonesia. Besides creating jobs and expanding business, they also increase exports and represent a dynamic source of economic activity. Therefore, the president said, the government gives great attention to the small and medium business sector.

The president also linked small and medium business to jobs. He said the provision of jobs is a big issue and one that must be dealt with. National development can continue to progress only if the employment problem is resolved.

H.M. Noer Madjid, general chairman of the KUKMI DPP [Central Executive Council], said in his report that the purpose of the leadership conference, which is being held in Jakarta from 8 to 10 December, is to consolidate viewpoints and organizational aspects.

#### **Steel Industry**

Meanwhile, the head of state yesterday received Minister of Industry Hartarto and Junior Minister of Industry T. Ariwibowo. The junior minister reported, among other things, that the Indonesian steel industry is increasingly stable.

The Indonesian steel industry not only supports the domestic machinery and construction industries, but is also fourth in industrial exports. Indonesian steel exports include machinery and steel components. "The initialization of a national steel industry was a strategic step decided by the president in 1975," said T. Ariwibowo.

The junior minister said that after 17 years of growth the steel industry is a support to the manufacturing and construction industries. Even more important, he added, is that the fact that the steel industry, centered at PT [Limited Company] Krakatau Steel, has reduced imports by supplying capital goods.

He said that Krakatau Steel's output of finished steel products will reach 1.9 million tons in 1992-93. Sales declined to 1.27 trillion rupiah in 1992, however, compared with 1.58 trillion rupiah in 1991 and 1.6 trillion rupiah in 1990.

**Government To Develop Shipbuilding Industry**  
*93SE0108B Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN*  
*in Indonesian 5 Dec 92 p 4*

[Text] Palembang, 5 Dec—The government is determined to proceed with its development of the domestic shipbuilding industry as industrial exports continue to grow. Industrial exports totaled \$3.2 billion in 1983, then rose in 1991 and reached \$16.2 billion in 1992.

"Industrial exports contributed to 85 percent of nonoil exports and 57 percent of all the country's exports," Soeparno Prawirodiredjo, director general for machine, basic metals, and electronics industries, said recently at the launching of the Caraka Jaya III general cargo ship at PT [Limited Company] Intan Sekunyit, Palembang.

He said \$22.35 billion in exports are projected for 1993, including exports of ships. This shows that the industrial sector has achieved its goal. For that reason, the orientation of principal industries toward competitiveness and exports will continue.

Soeparno said the shipbuilding industry is one of the industries with strong competitiveness and needs to be stimulated by policies that create a dynamic business climate. Therefore, the minister for economics, finance, industry, and development control issued Circular No. SE-10/M EKUIN on 4 November 1992 to speed up the process of mastering design and engineering technology. The circular required all departments, nondepartmental agencies, BUMN's/BUMD's [state-owned enterprises/regional-government-owned enterprises], and PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company] to use domestic potential in the handling of projects.

Consistent with that, the director general said, future policies on the development of the domestic shipbuilding industry will emphasize exports in addition to meeting domestic demand. International developments show that the domestic shipbuilding industry has bright prospects.

Soeparno said international shipbuilding capabilities have declined, because Japan and Western Europe have reduced their production capacities. International orders for ships in 1991 amounted to 43 million GT [gross tons], whereas production capability totaled only 16 million GT.

Furthermore, 68 million GT of the world's 436 million GT are more than 20 years old and need immediate refurbishing or augmentation in order to meet shipping demands.

Another 215 million GT are between 10 and 20 years old, he said.

He also said that young people in the industrialized countries are not interested in entering the shipbuilding industry because of the high technology of the work. Our domestic shipbuilding companies should take note of this and develop professional capabilities, he added.

As for repair work, Director General Soeparno said that domestic shipyards have repaired 10,000 vessels operating in Indonesian waters. They have also won an

export market in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. A Swedish firm has ordered a trailer ship of 18,900 GT and a tanker of 16,000 deadweight tons.

**Labor Unions Seek New Wage Policy**

**SBSI Proposes New System**

*93SE0101A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 92 p 2*

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—A delegation from the Prosperity Labor Union of Indonesia (SBSI) on Thursday, 10 December, presented to the MPR [People's Consultative Council] several proposals on labor issues for consideration in the drafting of the 1993-98 GBHN [Broad Outline of State Policy]. The SBSI proposed that wage policy be founded on requirements for an adequate living, while giving attention to performance and humanitarian values.

A wage system should continue to adhere to considerations of performance and ability and the resources of companies involved.

Initially, a visit by 15 SBSI delegates was to be received by the F-KP [Development Function Faction], but because of bureaucratic problems they shifted their presentation of proposals to the F-PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party Faction]. Dr. Sukowaluyo Mintoraharjo and Marcel Beding received the delegation in a meeting held by the F-PDI for an exchange of views.

SBSI DPP [Central Executive Council] Chairman Muchtar Pakpahan recommended to the F-PDI that the term "workers" in the F-ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces Faction] draft of the GBHN be changed to "labor." Pakpahan said "labor" is understood to include all people who are paid for production work outside the sphere of government. "Worker," however, has a broader meaning, in the sense that it includes everyone who works, including government employees and members of the Armed Forces.

Pakpahan also recommended that the commonly used term "Pancasila industrial relations" (HIP) be replaced with "Pancasila labor relations" (HPP). To justify the proposal, Pakpahan pointed out that HIP has a narrow meaning, since it includes only industrial workers. There are laborers in other sectors, too, including domestics and retail business employees.

The SBSI believes it is necessary to revise labor laws and to take national development into consideration. According to Pakpahan, many labor problems are not resolved by current labor laws. Many regulations issued during the colonial era are no longer appropriate and should be rescinded.

Sukowaluyo responded by saying that most of the SBSI recommendations were also concerns of the F-PDI. The F-PDI promised, therefore, to submit the proposals as input to the drafting of the GBHN, which is now being studied by the First Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR Working Committee.

**SPSI Criticizes Current System***93SE0101A Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN  
in Indonesian 5 Dec 92 p 16*

[Text] Jakarta, 5 Dec—The DPP of the All-Indonesia Labor Federation (SPSI) believes that the wage system now in use is not an instrument for even distribution of development but tends toward exploitation of the work force.

The reason for this is that wages are always set according to the business approach of "supply and demand." The result is that already low wages are pushed even lower. This wage system should therefore be abolished.

SPSI DPP Chairman Marzuki Achmad and Secretary-General Drs. H. Bomer Pasaribu, S.H. [Master of Laws], said this Friday night, 3 December, in Jakarta as they explained to reporters the decisions made in the First Leadership Conference of the SPSI, held in Bandung from 23 to 26 November. SPSI General Chairman Imam Soedarwo also attended the press conference.

The DPP leaders recommended that the government intervene to revise the current wage system. Marzuki Achmad emphasized that the wage problem must be handled through policy and not through the market approaches used until now.

"The market approach is not consistent with the constitution, and this can be corrected if the government has the 'political will.' If the governments of even the liberal countries regulate wages, how can the government of a Pancasila-based state ignore wages?" he asked.

Bomer Pasaribu added that while until now serious attention has been paid to private business, it is time for private business to use an even distribution approach to wages. He noted that the garment industry is the sector recently receiving the most government attention, but wage conditions in that sector show that it is the most exploitative.

One decision of the First Leaders Conference of the SPSI was to refute the view that links wage increases to inflation. Such a link is not valid.

In a country where wage conditions are such as they are now and where workers in service industries are not yet dominant, higher wages will have virtually no effect on inflation.

**IPTN Capabilities, Plans for Privatization***93SE0108A Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN  
in Indonesian 5 Dec 92 p 4*

[Text] Bandung, 5 Dec—Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie, minister of research and technology and principal director of PT [Limited Company] Nusantara Aircraft Industry (IPTN), says IPTN still needs to be held by the government and should not be privatized until 2006 or 2010.

"Meanwhile, we cannot issue shares to private interests, because IPTN must remain healthy, as must Indonesia," he said yesterday, Friday, in reply to a question from the press as he accompanied Lady Margaret Thatcher on a visit to IPTN in Bandung.

He feels privatization is a good step for improving production, forming capital, producing efficiency, and creating jobs.

Habibie said that under privatization the government would be merely a stockholder and would set policy only through general meetings of stockholders. Management would be by the private sector.

The general meeting of stockholders is the company's highest forum and may replace the IPTN general director if it feels he has failed to accomplish the company's mission, Habibie said. He added, "If I fail, I shall ask to be dismissed."

IPTN was founded on 23 August 1976. The approval of the people through the MPR/DPR [People's Consultative Council/Parliament] and the president will be sought for possible privatization between 2006 and 2010.

IPTN now makes several types of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. One of its directorates, the Universal Maintenance Center, also repairs and services industrial machinery and aircraft.

Military equipment is produced by the IPTN Weapons Systems Division. IPTN also makes primary components for F-16 fighters and a number of components for the Boeing 747.

Habibie said the IPTN will keep its military production at only 7 percent and that the rest of its output is nonmilitary.

**CAA Certification**

In 1986, IPTN initiated cooperation as an equal partner with CASA [Construcciones Aeronauticas SA] of Spain for the design, manufacture, and marketing of commercial and military versions of the CN-235 fixed wing aircraft.

By the end of 1996, IPTN will be making the N-250 fixed wing aircraft, which is one hundred percent designed by Indonesians. By the time IPTN reaches age 30 in 2006, it will also be producing the N-2130 fixed wing aircraft.

The N-2130 will be an enlargement of the N-250. The N-2130 will carry 130 passengers and will have engines built by PT IPTN itself.

Habibie said IPTN is in the process of obtaining certification for the CN-235 from the British Civil Airworthiness Authority (CAA).

CAA certification is respected in Europe and is considered equal to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification in the United States.

IPTN has long worked with British aerospace companies like Rolls Royce, British Aerospace (BAE), and Lucas.

Three years ago, BAE assigned to the IPTN Weapons Systems Division the manufacture of 20 component units for launchers, casings, and power distribution boxes for the Rapier guided missile system.

According to Habibie, Rolls Royce will give IPTN the servicing and component construction for one of its engines much used in F-27 aircraft in Indonesia and elsewhere.

"There are now 4,500 engines of that type in use in the world," he said.

**Attapeu, Bokeo Assembly Candidates' Careers Profiled**

**Army Inspection Chief, Savai Saignasena**

93SE0072A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 17, Attapeu Province**

Brigadier General Savai Saignasena, Number 1: Date of birth: 12 April 1935; Place of birth: Ban Vatthat Village, Fangdeng Canton, Saisettha District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Brigadier General; Area of responsibility: Head of the Army Inspection Department; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High; Level of political philosophy: High in support; Date of joining revolution: 4 February 1950; Date of joining party: 1 January 1957.

**Personal biography:**

1943-1949: Primary school, then revolutionary activity.

1950: Leader of Revolutionary Youth.

1951-1952: Was a guerrilla and a spy for the chairman of Saisettha District.

1953: Squad leader in the district military, took part in liberating Attapeu.

1953-1954: Worked with Vietnamese volunteers in liberating Veunsai and Senpang Provinces.

1954: Went to the Sam Neua united area, squad leader in the office of the 314th company, 609th battalion, was a clerk-secretary and was responsible for helping with the political activities of the company, took part in defending two united provinces.

1957-1958: Joined the Houam Lao movement, studied in Vietnam then went on to study at the officers' school in Vietnam until.

1960-1961: Returned to Laos, worked to mobilize new recruits.

1961-1962: Appointed to the Supreme Headquarters, was a clerk-secretary, involved in defense, was an office cadre, promoted to company commander.

1975-1978: Power had been seized, continued at the Supreme Headquarters, became deputy head of the office of the Ministry of Defense.

1979: Studied high-level theory in Vietnam for 22 months, was promoted to battalion commander.

1981: Head of the ministry office, head of the PSS office.

1982: Promoted to colonel.

1986: Promoted to bigadier general, head of the office of the Ministry of Defense.

1991-1992: Studied at the military institute in Vietnam.

1992: Member of the central party inspection committee, became head of the party inspection committee for the Army.

Nominated by: Ministry of Defense.

**Deputy Provincial Secretary, Khamsian Sisoulat**  
93SE0072B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 17, Attapeu Province**

Mr. Khamsian Sisoulat, Number 2: Date of birth: 10 February 1943; Place of birth: Ban Sai Village, Saisettha District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Deputy provincial party secretary; Area of responsibility: chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction and leader of mass organizations; Education level: higher education; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 10 February 1960; Date of joining party: 5 May 1968.

**Personal biography:**

1960-1961: Clerk-secretary in the district administrative office.

1961-1967: Clerk-secretary in the office of the standing committee of the provincial party.

1968-1971: Provincial information cadre.

1971-1976: Studied culture and theory in the SRV.

1976-1983: Member of the provincial propaganda and training service.

1984-1988: Head of the provincial party office, went to study theory in the SRV.

1988-1989: Studied theory in the USSR.

1990-1992: Elected deputy provincial party secretary, chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction, led provincial mass organizations.

Nominated by: provincial party administrative committee.

**Deputy Provincial Propaganda Chief, Sithat Inthivong**

93SE0072C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 17, Attapeu Province**

Mr. Sithat Inthivong, Number 3: Date of birth: 1 January 1942; Place of birth: Ban Inthi Village, Sanamsai District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Oi; Position and area of responsibility: Deputy head of the provincial propaganda and cultural service; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High in training and propaganda; Level of political philosophy: High for the training system; Date of joining revolution: 1 January 1959; Date of joining party: 31 August 1969.

**Personal biography:**

1959-1962: Leader of the Inthi District guerrillas.

1963-1965: Cadre supporting activities in Sanamsai District.

1965-1966: Studied at the teachers' school.

1967-1968: Deputy head of the committee for the district education service.

1969-1970: Studied at the teachers' school of central authority.

1971-1973: Head of the administrative committee for the provincial teachers' school.

1974-1975: Studied theory in the SRV.

1975-1976: Teacher involved in training at Vieng Sai.

1977-1987: Head of organizing at the school for high-level theory of the party and state.

1988-1989: Studied theory in the USSR, member of the committee for the information and cultural service of Attapeu Province.

1989-1992: Head of the Attapeu Province service for propaganda and culture.

Nominated by: Attapeu Province service for propaganda and training.

**Deputy Provincial Inspection Committee Member,  
Bounsai Khammanivong**

93SE0072D Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 17, Attapeu Province

Mr. Bounsai Khammanivong, Number 4: Date of birth: 15 May 1953; Place of birth: Ban Dak-hiat Village, Sansai District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Alak; Position and area of responsibility: Vice chairman of the provincial inspection committee of the party and state; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: Mid-level; Date of joining revolution: 10 February 1967; Date of joining party: 22 December 1980.

Personal biography:

1966-1970: Student.

1970-1971: Teacher.

1972-1973: Deputy head of the provincial service for the LPRYU [Lao People's Revolutionary Party Youth Union].

1973-1974: Studied in Vieng Sai District.

1975-1983: Deputy secretary of the administrative committee of the provincial LPRYU.

1983-1991: Member of the administrative committee of the provincial LPRYU.

1991-1992: Vice chairman of the Attapeu Province inspection committee of the party and state.

Nominated by: Attapeu Province party inspection committee.

**Deputy Organizational Committee Chief,  
Bounthong Chitmani**

93SE0072E Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 5, Bokeo Province

Mr. Bounthong Chitmani, Number 1: Date of birth: 3 July 1949; Place of birth: Ban Vangmeo Village, Phoudom Canton, Bokeo Province; Ethnic group: Lamet

(Lao Theung); Position: Deputy chief of the organizational committee of central authority; Area of responsibility: Organization to build the party and cadres; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: High (in organization and Marxist-Leninist theory); Level of political philosophy: High (for the training system); Date of joining revolution: 7 January 1964; Date of joining party: 9 July 1967.

Personal biography:

1957-1961: Student of education.

1961-1963: Elementary teacher.

1964-1965: Guerrilla in a mobile unit.

1965-1968: Policeman in Oudomsai Province, appointed platoon leader.

1968-1974: Provincial cadre involved in organization - head of the organizational office of the province, deputy head of the organizational committee of the province.

April-1974: Member of the standing committee of the provincial LPRYU, secretary for the LPRYU around the province.

20 October 1974: Became professional cadre for building the party -central organization.

1975-1978: Studied Marxist-Leninist theory and organizational activities in Vietnam.

1978-1979: Studied teaching organizational skills in Vietnam.

1979-1980: Professor at the organizational school of central authority.

1981-1983: Deputy head of the administrative committee of central authority's school for organization and inspection.

1983-1987: Studied Marxist-Leninist theory (high-level) in the USSR.

1987-1989: Deputy head of the policy department in the office of the organizational committee of central authority.

20 September 1989 to the present: Deputy head of the organizational committee of the Central Committee.

Nominated by: the organizational committee of central authority.

**Provincial Committee Member, Vilai Soupalin**

93SE0072F Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 5, Bokeo Province

Maj. Vilai Soupalin, Number 2: Date of birth: 12 August 1932; Place of birth: Ban Nokkok Village, Benglouang Canton, Beng District, Oudomsai Province; Ethnic group: Kha Mou; Position: Deputy provincial party secretary; Area of responsibility: Military commander of Bokeo Province; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High in the military; Level of political

philosophy: High (for the support system); Date of joining revolution: 2 February 1953; Date of joining party: 15 June 1965.

**Personal biography:**

1965: Military commander of Beng District.

1969: Studied mid-level theory.

1971: Military chief of staff of Oudomsai Province.

1972: Commander of the 406th battalion.

1976: Deputy secretary of the Oudomsai Province party committee.

1979: Responsible for chief of staff duties on the battlefields of three provinces.

1982: Administrative chief of staff for the 3rd division in Louang Namtha Province.

1983: Chief of staff for Louang Namtha Province.

1986: Member of the Louang Namtha Province party committee, deputy head of the military headquarters of Louang Namtha Province.

1988 to the present: Deputy provincial party secretary, deputy chairman of the provincial administration, military commander of Bokeo Province.

1989: Member of the second Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: the party administrative committee of Bokeo Province.

**Organizational Committee Chief, Thongkhamli Chateng**

93SE0072G Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 5, Bokeo Province**

Mr. Thongkhamli Chateng, Number 3: Date of birth: 8 May 1942; Place of birth: Ban Phoulouang Village, Thafa Canton, Thafa District, Louang Namtha Province; Ethnic group: Hmong; Position and area of responsibility: Head of the provincial organizational committee; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: Mid-level (support system); Date of joining revolution: 5 March 1965; Date of joining party: 9 October 1971.

**Personal biography:**

1965-1975: Revolutionary soldier operating behind enemy lines in the Houai Sai area.

1975-1976: Member of the Houai Sai District administrative committee.

1977-1982: continued his studies.

1983-1984: Head of the Bokeo Province organizational committee.

1984-1986: Acting head of the Bokeo Province organizational committee.

1986-1989: Deputy head of the Bokeo Province organizational committee.

1989-1991: Acting head of the Bokeo Province organizational committee.

1992 to the present: Head of the Bokeo Province organizational committee.

Nominated by: the Bokeo Province organizational service.

**Provincial Trade Union Member, Bounthom Vannachomchan**

93SE0072H Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 5, Bokeo Province**

Mr. Bounthom Vannachomchan, Number 4: Date of birth: 1 July 1942; Place of birth: Ban Pong Village, Ban Pong Canton, Houai Sai District, Bokeo Province; Ethnic group: Leu; Position and area of responsibility: Chairman of the provincial trade union federation; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 1 July 1963; Date of joining party: 24 April 1966.

**Personal biography:**

1963-1966: A state cadre, studied police operations in the SRV.

1967-1973: Worked to mobilize and build the political grassroots.

1973-1975: Party secretary for the special district in the Nam Chon area of Houai Sai District.

1975-1983: Party secretary of Houai Sai District, mobilized and built the political grassroots, studied Marxist-Leninist theory for eight months at the Tha-ngon high-level school of the party in Vientiane.

1984-1986: Secretary of the party unit for economics of Bokeo Province.

1988-1990: Secretary of the party unit for organizing the masses of the province, studied trade union operations for two months in the USSR.

1980-1992: Chairman of the Bokeo Province trade union federation.

Nominated by: The Bokeo Province trade union federation.

**Champasak Assembly Candidates' Careers Profiled**

**Central Committee Member, Saman Vi-gnaket**

93SE0074A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province**

Mr. Saman Vi-gnaket, Number 1: Date of birth: 3 March 1927; Place of birth: Ban Mai Village, Savang Canton, Sanamsai District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee; Area of responsibility: Minister of education and



sport; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: June 1945; Date of joining party: December 1949.

**Personal biography:**

1935-1945: Field worker for hire.

1945-1948: Soldier operating on the Lao-Vietnamese border.

1948-1950: Head of political activities for a military platoon in the Saichakkaphat [Victory over the Imperialists] Company of Champasak Province.

1950-1954: Deputy head of the political office of the military in the South in Attopeu Province.

1954-1960: Field grade officer, responsible for the organizational service under the political office of the supreme headquarters of the Lao People's Liberation Army [LPLA].

1960-1969: Secretary to the party committee, responsible for political activities under the military headquarters of the Xieng Khouang area.

1970-1973: Secretary to the party committee, head of the military headquarters for the South of Laos. In February.

1972: At the Second Congress of the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] he was elected to be a member of the administrative committee of the Central Committee.

1973-1975: Head of the political office under the Supreme Headquarters of the LPLA.

1977-1981: Deputy minister of defense, head of the political department of the Lao People's Army [LPA], promoted to lieutenant general in the LPA.

1982-1986: In the Third Congress of the LPRP he was elected to the secretariat of the Central Committee, he was head of the organizational committee of the Central Committee.

1986-1988: In the Fourth Congress of the LPRP he was elected to be a member of the politburo of the Central Committee, he was a member of the secretariat of the Central Committee and head of the organizational committee of the Central Committee.

1988 to the present: Minister of education and sport, at the Fifth Congress of the LPRP in 1991 he was elected again to be a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

1992: He was vice chairman of the national election committee for the election of the Third Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: The administrative committee of the Central Committee of the LPRP.

**Deputy Cultural Committee Member, Noubeng Chanthasak**

93SE0074B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province

Mr. Noubeng Chanthasak, Number 5: Date of birth: 6 October 1948; Place of birth: Ban Phimanphon Village, Banhouai Canton, Khong District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Deputy head of the commission for culture and society of the Supreme People's Assembly; Education level: University; Professional level: High (mathematics instructor); Level of political philosophy: High (support); Date of joining revolution: 2 December 1975; Date of joining party: 4 July 1988.

**Personal biography:**

1962-1969: Student at the Dongdok teachers' training school in Vientiane (secondary, higher education).

1969-1971: Student at the Dongdok teachers' training institute in Vientiane (first and second year).

1971-1972: Practiced teaching in France.

1972-1974: Student at the Dongdok teachers' training institute in Vientiane (third and fourth year).

1974-1980: Instructor in mathematics at the college in Vientiane.

1980-1989: Deputy head of the administrative committee at the college in Vientiane, responsible for technology.

1989 to the present: Member of the second Supreme People's Assembly from the first election area in the Vientiane Municipality; deputy head of the commission for culture and society of the second Supreme People's Assembly; secretary to the trade union unit of the Supreme People's Assembly; member of the administrative committee of the International Congress of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic]; member of the subcommittee and assistant secretary to the national election committee for the election of the third Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: The Ministry of Education and Sport.

**Deputy Provincial Secretary, Boualai Sisomvang**  
93SE0074C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province**

Mr. Boualai Sisomvang, Number 2: Date of birth: 1939; Place of birth: Ban Saphangtai Village, Mounlapamok District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Deputy provincial party secretary, deputy province chief; Area of responsibility: Head of the Champasak Province service for agriculture and forestry; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 13 March 1961; Date of joining party: 12 December 1965.

**Personal biography:**

1946-1960: Studied general education, became a cadre supporting the revolution at the local level, then turned to combat, joined the revolution.



1961-1973: Left the military, became a teacher, head of education for Chantha-oudom District, head of education in Nakhon Sai District, built education services in liberated areas, member of the education [service] of Siphandon Province.

1974-1975: Member of the party committee and administrative committee in the liberated area of Siphandon Province, responsible for education.

1975-1983: After four province were joined together he continued on the party committee and administrative committee of Champasak Province; responsible for education, sport and membership; member of the first Supreme People's Assembly.

1984-1989: Regular party member, member of the province administration, responsible for leadership in activities involving culture and society, chairman of the Champasak Province branch of the Lao-Soviet friendship society.

1986 to the present: Deputy provincial party secretary and vice chairman of the provincial administration, responsible for the agriculture and forestry service, member of the second Supreme People's Assembly.

1990-1991: Assigned the duties of acting provincial party secretary and acting chairman of the provincial administration.

Nominated by: Party administrative committee of Champasak Province.

**National Construction Committee Member,  
Bounlap Gnoui-vanitsavong;**

93SE0074D Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province**

Mr. Bounlap Gnoui-vanitsavong, Number 6: Date of birth: 10 November 1923; Place of birth: Ban Thalouang Village, Thalouang Canton, Pakse District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Member of the Lao Front for National Construction of Champasak Province Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Mid-level in trade; Level of political philosophy: Primary for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 1974.

**Personal biography:**

1955-1972: Representative from Champasak Province, director of Lao Airways.

1973-1975: Joined the congress of progressive Lao students in Paris, France; took part in operations to seize power in Pakse District, Champasak Province; member of the first Supreme People's Assembly.

1978-1988: Member of the trade union of Champasak Province; head of the Ban Nalong Village cooperative, Sanasomboun District; guided the construction of the Lon River dike in Ban Thatpakson Village, Sanasomboun District; took part as a technician in the repair of

the Selabam hydroelectric dam; worked with the administration in mobilizing the villagers of Ban Saphai Village and Ban Yong Village to build a 4 km road to their villages; worked with the villagers of Ban Nalong Village to repair a 32 meter long bridge and dig seven wells.

1988 to the present: Member of the people's assembly of Champasak Province.

Nominated by: The Lao Front for National Construction of Champasak Province.

**Social Welfare Minister, Khamliang Phonsena**

93SE0074E Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province**

Dr. Khamliang Phonsena, Number 3: date of birth: August 1930; Place of birth: Ban Fangdeng Village, Fangdeng Canton, Mai District, Attopeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Minister of social welfare and veterans affairs; Education level: University; Professional level: High-level medical; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 1 July 1961; Date of joining party: 24 March 1977.

**Personal biography:**

1939-1944: Studied in Pakse District.

1944-1945: Continued studying in Vientiane.

1945-1947: Taught in Phoeiphai District (Pathumphon).

1947-1949: Completed the French secondary school in Vientiane.

1950-1954: Completed mid-level medical studies in Phnom Penh (Cambodia).

1954-1961: Studied medicine at a University in France.

1961-1962: Returned to the liberated area in Xieng Khouang (Pek-Phonsavan District).

1962-1966: Head of the hospital in the Phonsavan area and the Khangkhai area.

1966-1974: Deputy head of public health in Vieng Sai District for all central authority.

1974-1975: Deputy minister of public health in the coalition government.

1975-1983: Deputy minister of public health of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic], chairman of the Red Cross Society, member of the committee for economic relations with Eastern Europe, member of the committee for science and technology, vice chairman of the commission on children, vice chairman of the Lao-Soviet Friendship Society.

1984-1987: Acting Minister of Public Health and Chairman of the Red Cross Society.

1989-1992: Minister of Social Welfare and Veterans Affairs, chairman of the National Red Cross Society.

Nominated by: Ministry of Social Welfare and Veterans Affairs and the National Red Cross Society.

**Provincial Committee Member, Mani Heuangvongsa**

93SE0074F Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province

Mr. Mani Heuangvongsa, Number 7: Date of birth: 13 November 1922; Place of birth: Ban Laidong Village, Khokchan Canton, Takan District, Oubon Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Member of the provincial party committee; Area of responsibility: Chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction of Champasak Province; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: Mid-level in agriculture; Date of joining revolution: November 1954; Date of joining party: 10 January 1967.

Personal biography:

1954-1957: Took part in revolutionary activities to build political grassroots behind enemy lines.

1957-1960: Chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction in Pakse Canton.

1960-1965: District chairman of of Pakse District.

1965-1968: Mobilized and built the grassroots in the South of Laos.

1968-1970: Assigned to the party school of the South.

1970-1975: Responsible for building the grassroots behind enemy lines.

1975 to the present: Member of the provincial party committee, chairman of Lao Front for National Construction of Champasak Province, member of the central organization of the Lao Front for National Construction.

Nominated by: The Lao Front for National Construction of Champasak Province.

**Provincial Committee Member, Chankham Thammanoun**

93SE0074G Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province

Mr. Chankham Thammanoun, Number 4: Date of birth: 5 December 1943; Place of birth: Ban Phong Village, Sopsai Canton, Xieng Kho District, Houa Phan Province; Ethnic group: Thai Deng; Position: Member of the standing committee of the provincial party; Area of responsibility: Head of the committee for the education service of Champasak Province; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: High-level teacher; Date of joining revolution: 1 January 1961; Date of joining party: 26 April 1969.

Personal biography:

1951-1960: Student.

1961-1963: Studied in the SRV.

1964-1971: Studied at the teachers' school at the primary level and middle level, worked at the Nakhao school in Sam Neua.

1972-1977: Responsible for educational activities, assigned to the administrative office of Saravane Province.

1978-1980: Studied at the teachers' University (Dongdok, Vientiane).

1981-1983: Instructor at the school of higher education in Pakse, Champasak Province.

1984-1986: Head of the education service of Champasak Province.

1987-1989: Head of the organizational service of Champasak Province.

1990-1992: Member of the standing committee of the provincial party, member of the provincial administrative committee, head of the education service of Champasak Province; member of the second Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: The administrative committee of Champasak Province.

**Deputy Provincial Secretary, Bountong Phommathep**

93SE0074H Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Nov 92 p 3

[Text] Election Area 15, Champasak Province

Lieutenant Colonel Bountong Phommathep, Number 16: Date of birth: 12 March 1932; Place of birth: Ban Houadondeng Village, Dondeng Canton, Pathoumphon District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Deputy party secretary and deputy district chief of Khong District; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Primary level military medical; Level of political philosophy: Support system; Date of joining revolution: 6 April 1949; Date of joining party: 19 August 1968.

Personal biography:

1949: Joined the revolution as a soldier.

1945: Went to the two united provinces (Sam Neua - Phong Saly).

1958-1969: Returned to build the grassroots in Champasak Province.

1959-1960: Trained in combat, returned to being a soldier in the Lao Army.

1961-1965: Studied military activities in the SRV.

1965-1974: Returned and was assigned to the Lao People's Liberation Army under the battalion in the South.

1974-1975: Joined in seizing power in the South.

1975-1984: Assigned to the military headquarters in the South.

1984-1986: Commander of the Khong District military.

1986-1990: Commander of the Khong District military, deputy party secretary, and deputy district chief of Khong District.

Nominated by: The military headquarters of Khong District.

### **Luang Prabang Assembly Candidates' Careers Profiled**

#### **Deputy Propaganda Chief, Phandouangchit Vongsa**

93SE0073A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Mr. Phandouangchit Vongsa, Number 1: Date of birth: 12 December 1947; Place of birth: Ban Sopsan Village, Sopsan Canton, Xieng Kho District, Houa Phan Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Deputy head of the propaganda and training committee of the Central Committee; Area of responsibility: Editor in chief of the party periodical, ALOUN MAI; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: Mid-level teacher; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 4 November 1963; Date of joining party: 20 September 1968.

Personal biography:

1963-1967: Studied primary and secondary education at Nakhao in Vieng Sai District.

1968-1970: Taught at the Nakhao teachers' school.

1970-1971: Worked in the education office of central authority.

1971-1974: Continued his studies in the SRV.

1974-1976: Worked at the organizational school of central authority, then was assistant to Mr. Sisomphon Lovansai.

1976-1980: Worked at the high-level teachers' schools in Nakhao and Dongdok.

1980-1983: Studied political theory in the USSR.

1983-1990: Secretary-general (standing committee) of the central organization of the LPRYU [Lao People's Revolutionary].

1991 to the present: Deputy head of the propaganda and training committee of the Central Committee, performed other social activities, for example he was a member of the administrative committee of the central organization of the Lao Front for National Construction, a member of the Lao-Vietnamese Friendship Society, a member of the Lao-Soviet Friendship Society and a member of the Lao-Thai Friendship Society.

Nominated by: The committee for propaganda and training of the Central Committee.

#### **Provincial Committee Member, Chanthi Souvannachak**

93SE0073B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Major Chanthi Souvannachak, Number 6: Date of birth: 15 May 1946; Place of birth: Ban Lakhon Village, Vieng Sai Canton, Nam Bak District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Provincial party member; Area of responsibility: Deputy commander of provincial military; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: Mid-level; Date of joining revolution: 10 April 1964; Date of joining party: 11 March 1978.

Personal biography:

1964-1965: Local guerrilla.

1965-1968: Cadre for mobilization in Nam Bak.

1968-1970: Soldier for Nam Bak District.

1971-1972: Studied at the primary-level officers' school in Nam Bak.

1973-1976: Deputy head of political activities for the military company of Nam Bak District.

1976-1977: Head of the 15th independent company of Luang Prabang Province.

1977-1978: Head of political activities for the 4th company, 413th battalion.

1978-1982: Studied political activity in Vietnam.

1983-1984: Head of political activities for the 413th battalion.

1985-1987: Member of the responsible committee for the battlefield in the Xieng Hon area, head of the military office of Luang Prabang Province.

1988 to the present: Member of the provincial party, deputy military commander of Luang Prabang Province.

Nominated by: [missing].

#### **Chief of Protocol, Souphanthaheuangsi Sisaleumsak**

93SE0073C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Mr. Souphanthaheuangsi Sisaleumsak, Number 3: Date of birth: 22 February 1934; Place of birth: Ban Siangthong Village, Siangthong Canton, Luang Prabang District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Chief of protocol department; Area of responsibility: Protocol; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: Mid-level (politics, economics, and law); Date of joining revolution: 2 December 1975.

Personal biography:

1942-1949: Studied in the primary and secondary schools of Luang Prabang Province.

1950-1953: Studied at Pavi College in Vientiane.

1953-1954: Studied at Dekak College in Phnom Penh.  
 1955-1957: Studied at the Institute for Politics, Economics, and Law.  
 1957-1958: Cadre in the Ministry of Trade.  
 1958-1959: Cadre in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 1959-1962: Secretary stationed at the Lao Embassy in Washington.  
 1962-1963: Cadre in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 1964: Took training in foreign affairs in France  
 1965-1966: Deputy director of the protocol department at the palace in Vientiane.  
 1967-1970: Second secretary at the Lao Embassy in Burma.  
 1970-1974: Deputy director of the protocol department at the palace in Vientiane.  
 1974-1978: First secretary and Lao charge' in Australia.  
 1979-1983: Deputy chief and then chief of the protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 1983-1990: The Lao Ambassador to Japan.  
 1990-1992: Presently chief of the protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 Nominated by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### **District Chief, Chanthavong Douangmala**

*93SE0073D Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2*

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Mr. Chanthavong Douangmala, Number 7: Date of birth: 17 June 1935; Place of birth: Ban Pho Village, Hatphouan Canton, Pak Seng District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: District chief of Chomphet District, Luang Prabang Province; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Mid-level in police leadership; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 13 February 1953; Date of joining party: 19 November 1961.

Personal biography:

1953-1954: Local guerrilla.  
 1954-1957: Soldier in two united provinces.  
 1957-1960: Assistant cadre at the election branch in Pak Seng Canton, also a guerrilla.  
 1961-1965: Policeman in Pak Seng District.  
 1965-1966: Member of the party committee of Pak Seng District, responsible for the district police.  
 1966-1967: Studied police leadership in the SRV.  
 1968-1970: Member of the party committee of Pak Seng District, responsible for the police.

1971-1974: District party secretary, chairman of Pak Seng District.

1975-1977: Chairman of the Luang Prabang District administration.

1978-1980: Studied theory at the school for theory of central authority.

1988 to present: District chief of Chompet District, Luang Prabang Province.

Nominated by: Administrative committee of Chompet District, Luang Prabang Province.

#### **Provincial Committee Member, Khamphai Sou-outhai**

*93SE0073E Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2*

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Mr. Khamphai Sou-outhai, Number 9: Date of birth: 10 July 1943; Place of birth: Ban Bouamsamai Village, Pak Seng Canton, Pak Seng District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Kha Mou; Position: Provincial party member; Area of responsibility: District party secretary, district chief of Viangkham District, Luang Prabang Province; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Primary teacher; Level of political philosophy: Mid-level; Date of joining revolution: 20 July 1959; Date of joining party: 20 March 1973.

Personal biography:

1959-1962: Communications cadre in a reserve unit in the forest.

1963-1964: Assistant cadre in Pak Seng Canton.

1964-1967: Guerrilla.

1967-1968: Teacher in the Pak Seng Canton school.

1969-1973: Head of Pak Seng Canton education.

1973-1974: Member of the education committee of Pak Seng District.

1975-1978: Member of the district people's assembly, head of the district education service, district organizational cadre.

1978-1980: Studied theory under central authority.

1980-1984: Party secretary of Pak Seng District.

1985-1988: Member of the provincial party, head of the service for industry, handicrafts and forestry of Luang Prabang Province.

1989-1992: Member of the provincial party, district party secretary and district chief of Viangkham District.

Nominated by: Administrative committee of Viangkham District, Luang Prabang Province.

#### **National Construction Member, Faida Nengfawangchouasong**

*93SE0073F Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Nov 92 p 2*

[Text] Election Area 6, Luang Prabang Province

Mr. Faida Nengfawangchouasong, Number 11: Date of birth: February 1940; Place of birth: Ban Kou Village, Pakfai Canton, Pak Seng District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Hmong; Position and area of responsibility: Chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction of Luang Prabang District; Education level: Secondary Professional level: High in banking; Date of joining revolution: 10 June 1962; Date of joining party: 27 April 1974.

**Personal biography:**

1962-1963: Assistant cadre in Xieng Ngeun District.

1963-1968: Cadre for mobilization and cadre for trade in Luang Prabang Province for a period, then studied in the SRV.

1968-1971: Studied banking in the SRV.

1971-1975: Deputy head of banking in Luang Prabang Province.

1975-1978: Cadre in the bank branch in Luang Prabang Province.

1978-1979: Head of the administrative committee of the mid-level banking school in Vientiane.

1979-1982: Studied high-level banking in the SRV.

1982-1983: Head of the administrative committee of the mid-level banking school in Vientiane.

1983-1984: Studied theory at the school for theory of central authority.

1985-1988: Member of the committee for ethnic groups of Luang Prabang Province.

1988 to the present: Chairman of the Lao Front for National Construction of Luang Prabang District.

Nominated by: The Lao Front for National Construction of Luang Prabang District.

**Saravane, Houa Phan Assembly Candidates' Careers Profiled**

**Vice Minister of Culture, Paset Sisanon**

93SE0071A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 20 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 14, Saravane Province**

Mr. Paset Sisanon, Number 1: Date of birth: 15 April 1932; Place of birth: Ban Sekaman Village, Sekong Canton, Samakhisai District, Attopeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Vice minister; Area of responsibility: Culture and art; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High (classical music); Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 20 May 1954; Date of joining party: 5 June 1956.

**Personal biography:**

1953: Became schoolmaster.

1954: Administrator for the 12th Battalion, went to united area (Houa Phan Province).

1955-1956: Leader of the artists' unit of the Liberation Army.

1957: Leader of the artists' unit of central authority.

1958: The artists' unit broken up - it had been destroyed by the enemy, he went to help the branch in Attopeu Province, that year he was sent secretly to the base in Sam Neua Province for the second time.

1959: Went to study and train in the arts in the SRV.

1960: Responsible for the Lao radio news and cultural broadcasts in Hanoi.

1961-1968: Returned to Houa Phan Province to create an artists' unit for central authority to perform political duties.

1969-1970: Head of the artists' school at Phou Khe.

1971-1974: Member of the cultural service affiliated with the office of propaganda, information, training and culture at Phou Khe.

1975-1988: Head of the arts department of the Ministry of Culture.

1989 to the present: Vice minister of culture, responsible for cultural activities and the arts.

Nominated by: Ministry of Information and Culture.

**Provincial Committee, Viangthong Inlaseng**

93SE0071B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 20 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 14, Saravane Province**

Mr. Viangthong Inlaseng, Number 5: Date of birth: 1 September 1951; Place of birth: Ban Chanvong Village, Sapon Canton, Saravane District, Saravane Province; Ethnic group: Katang; Position: Provincial party member; Area of responsibility: Secretary of the provincial LPRYU [Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union] administrative committee; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Primary teacher; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 4 January 1969; Date of joining party: 10 December 1975.

**Personal biography:**

1969-1971: Was a guerrilla operating from his village.

1972-1975: Studied at the teachers' school of Saravane Province.

1976-1980: Director of the province school.

1980-1981: Head of the Saravane Province public education service.

1981-1983: Deputy head of the provincial inspection service of the party and state.

1984-1985: Studied political theory in the SRV.

1986: Provincial party member, secretary for the provincial LPRYU.

1987-1988: Party secretary for the special area in Pak Taphan.

1988-1989: Deputy head of the provincial party office.  
 1989-1990: Deputy head of the provincial trade service.  
 1991 to the present: Acting secretary of the provincial LPRYU administrative committee, member of the second Supreme People's Assembly.  
 Nominated by: [missing]

### **Provincial Committee, Phosai Sihachak**

*93SE0071C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 20 Nov 92 p 2*

#### **[Text] Election Area 14, Saravane Province**

Mr. Phosai Sihachak, Number 2: Date of birth: 5 April 1938; Place of birth: Ban Songkhon Village, Nongsai Canton, Bachieng District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Regular member of the provincial party; Area of responsibility: Head of the Saravane Province party inspection committee; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High-level military; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining the revolution: 10 October 1959; Date of joining the party: 8 March 1963.

#### **Personal biography:**

1959-1962: Revolutionary soldier in Pakse District.  
 1963-1968: Military instructor at the provincial military school.  
 1969-1971: Studied at the Vieng Sai District officers' school, reporter for the military radio broadcast.  
 1972-1974: Member of the Lao-ngam District party committee, commander of the district military.  
 1975-1977: Deputy commander of the province military.  
 1978-1983: Member of the provincial party, deputy head of the provincial military headquarters.  
 1984-1985: Deputy provincial party secretary, head of the provincial military headquarters.  
 1986-1987: Regular member of the provincial party.  
 1988 to the present: Regular member of the provincial party, head of the Saravane Province inspection committee for the party and state.

Nominated by: Saravane Province party administrative committee.

### **Provincial Committee, Khamseen Meuangmani**

*93SE0071D Vientiane PASASON in Lao 20 Nov 92 p 2*

#### **[Text] Election Area 14, Saravane Province**

Mr. Khamseen Meuangmani, Number 4: Date of birth: 18 July 1942; Place of birth: Ban Taopoun Village, Saravane Canton, Saravane District, Saravane Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Member of provincial administration; Area of responsibility: Head of the provincial service for communications, transportation, post,

and construction; Education level: Completed University; Professional level: High in civil engineering; Date of joining revolution: 1 May 1975; Date of joining party: 31 July 1988.

#### **Personal biography:**

1950-1953: Primary school student in Saravane schools.  
 1954-1962: Secondary education in Pakse and higher education in Vientiane.  
 1963-1965: Studied at the technical University (civil engineering in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam).  
 1966-1968: Trained in highway engineering in France.  
 1969-1974: Civil servant, first grade, in the old regime.  
 1975: Head of central authority's general department for public works at Phou Khoun.

1976-1982: Head of the Vientiane Province public works service, deputy head of communications service of the Vientiane Municipality, head of the corporation for communications, transportation, and construction.

1982-1983: Head of the department for materials and technology of the Ministry of Communications.

1983-1985: Head of the Luang Prabang Province communications service.

1986 to the present: Member of the provincial administrative committee, head of the Saravane Province service for communications, transportation, post and construction.

Nominated by: the Lao Front for National Construction of the province.

### **Central Committee, Maisouk Saisompheng**

*93SE0071E Vientiane PASASON in Lao 21 Nov 92 p 2*

#### **[Text] Election Area 8, Houa Phan Province**

Mr. Maisouk Saisompheng, Number 1: Date of birth: 8 March 1926; Place of birth: Ban Son Neua Village, Son Neua Canton, Vieng Thong (Son) District, Houa Phan Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Central Committee member; Area of responsibility: Chairman of the central organization of the Lao Front for National Construction; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 10 June 1950; Date of joining party: 20 July 1957.

#### **Personal biography:**

1950-1953: Deputy chairman, then chairman of Son District administration.

1953-1960: Regular member of the Houa Phan Province administrative committee, chairman of Liap District, Son District and Houa Meuang District.

1960-1961: Regular member of the provincial party, vice chairman of the Houa Phan Province administration.

1961-1968: Secretary of the party committee, head of the 50-98 office in the SRV.

1968-1970: Provincial party secretary, vice chairman of the Houa Phan Province administration.

1971-1975: Central Committee member, deputy head of the economic and financial committee of central authority.

1975-1978: Central Committee member, minister of industry, trade, forestry and handicrafts.

1978-1988: Head of the committee responsible for helping Houa Phan Province.

1988-1991: Central Committee member, head of the Central Committee office, and the office of the Council of Ministers.

1991 to present: Central Committee member, chairman of the central organization of the Lao Front for National Construction.

Nominated by: The central organization of the Lao Front for National Construction.

#### **Provincial Committee, Boun-gnong Sailichan**

93SE0071F *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 21 Nov 92 p 2*

##### **[Text] Election Area 8, Houa Phan Province**

Mr. Boun-gnong Sailichan, Number 2: Date of birth: 14 November 1946; Place of birth: Ban Sopsan Village, Sopsan Canton, Xieng Kho District, Houa Phan Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Regular provincial party member; Area of responsibility: Head of the party office and administrative office of the province; Education level: Secondary; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 25 September 1963; Date of joining party: 10 January 1974.

##### **Personal Biography:**

1963-1968: Elementary teacher in Xieng Kho District.

1969-1971: Cadre in the Xieng Kho District education office.

1972-1974: Head of the Sopsan elementary school in Xieng Kho District.

1975-1976: A cadre mobilizing for the seizure of power in Tha Deua and the Vientiane Municipality.

1977-1979: A cadre organizing Xieng Kho District.

1980-1983: A Xieng Kho District party member.

1984-1985: Regular member of the district party, vice chairman of Xieng Kho District, Houa Phan Province.

1986-1988: District party secretary, chairman of Xieng Kho District administration, member of the district people's assembly.

1989-1992: Provincial party member, deputy province chief, head of the party office and administrative office of Houa Phan Province.

Nominated by: the Houa Phan Province party administrative committee.

#### **Provincial Committee, Bouason Thammali**

93SE0071G *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 21 Nov 92 p 2*

##### **[Text] Election Area 8, Houa Phan Province**

Mr. Bouason Thammali, Number 6: Date of birth: 10 December 1951; Place of birth: Ban Phoudan Village, Thamla Canton, Vieng Thong District, Houa Phan Province; Ethnic group: Kha Mou; Position: Provincial party member; Area of responsibility: District secretary and district chief of Vieng Thong District, Houa Phan Province; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: Primary teacher; Level of political philosophy: high; Date of joining revolution: 5 May 1969; Date of joining party: 7 April 1989.

##### **Personal biography:**

1969: Village leader and teacher for first and second grades in the village.

1970-1972: Teacher in Sakok Canton Vieng Thong Canton.

1972-1974: Studied primary education in Poua District, Houa Phan Province.

1974-1976: Head of the primary schools in Thamla Canton and Daoheuang Canton.

1976-1978: Cadre in the Vieng Thong District education office.

1978-1988: Member of the district education committee, head of district education, member of the committee responsible for Vieng Thong District, Houa Phan Province.

1988-1990: Member of the provincial party, deputy secretary, deputy district chief of Vieng Thong District; member of the district assembly, member of the Houa Phan Province People's Assembly.

1990-1992: Member of the provincial party, district party administrative secretary and district chief of Vieng Thong District, member of the district assembly and the Houa Phan Province assembly.

Nominated by: the Vieng Thong District Administrative Committee.

#### **Provincial Committee, Thongyeutho**

93SE0071H *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 21 Nov 92 p 2*

##### **[Text] Election Area 8, Houa Phan Province**

Mr. Thongyeutho, Number 3: Date of birth: 15 April 1947; Place of birth: Ban Houai Gnao Village, Dongko Canton, Nong Het District, Xieng Khouang Province; Ethnic group: Hmong; Position: Provincial party member; Area of responsibility: party secretary and district chief of Houa Meuang District, Houa Phan Province; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Mid-level in organization; Level of political philosophy:



Mid-level; Date of joining revolution: 16 August 1966; Date of joining party: 30 July 1971.

**Personal biography:**

1966: Aide to Mr. Lao Fong in Vieng Sai District.

1966-1967: Studied at Siang Louang School in Vieng Sai District.

1967-1968: A cadre serving at the education school in Vieng Sai District.

1968-1969: Studied at the elementary teachers' school of central authority at Tham Khwai in Vieng Sai District.

1969-1971: Taught at the multiethnic school and the Houa Phan Province school at Houai Oi in Poua District.

1971-1974: Studied mid-level theory in Vietnam.

1974-1977: A cadre assigned to organizing in Houa Phan Province.

1977-1978: Studied organizing and inspection in the SRV.

1978-1981: Deputy member of the leadership committee of a drive for changing to agricultural cooperatives in Houa Phan Province.

1981-1982: Deputy district party secretary, chairman of the Houa Meuang District administration in Houa Phan Province.

1982-1992: Member of the provincial party, secretary and district chief of Houa Meuang District, Houa Phan Province.

Nominated by: The Houa Meuang District administrative committee.

**Vientiane City Assembly Candidates' Careers Profiled**

**Central Committee Member, Onchan Thammavong**

93SE0075A Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
24 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Mrs. Onchan Thammavong, Number 1: Date of birth: 13 May 1953; Place of birth: Ban Phai-ngam Village, Yotngeum Canton, Pek District, Xieng Khouang Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Central Committee member; Area of responsibility: Chairwoman of the central organization of the Lao Women's Federation; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: Mid-level teacher; Date of joining revolution: 12 October 1970; Date of joining party: 28 May 1972.

**Personal biography:**

1968-1970: Studied general education and concentrated in education in Xieng Khouang Province.

1970-1974: Taught at the primary teachers' school of Xieng Khouang Province; head of the Xieng Khouang

Province education department of the women's federation; deputy head of the Xieng Khouang Province education department of the LPRYU.

1974-1976: Member of the committee for the provincial education service, responsible for the branch for general education and organization.

1976-1978: Studied mid-level theory in the SRV.

1978-1980: Taught politics, member of the party committee at the No. 3 mid-level teachers' school of central authority in Xieng Khouang Province.

1981-1983: Taught at the school for education administration cadres, head of the women's federation of the Ministry of Education.

1983-1986: Member of the provincial party committee, chairwoman of the women's federation of Xieng Khouang Province.

1986-1992: Central Committee member; chairwoman of the central organization of the Lao Women's Federation; member of the second Supreme People's Assembly; member of the national election committee for the election of third Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: The central organization of the Lao Women's Federation.

**Peace Council Chairman, Singkapo Sikhotchounnamali**

93SE0075B Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
24 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Mr. Singkapo Sikhotchounnamali, Number 2: Date of birth: 10 February 1913; Place of birth: Ban Thakhek Village, Thakhek Canton, Thakhek District, Khammouan Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Chairman of the Lao Committee for World Peace; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: High level teacher; Level of political philosophy: High; Date of joining revolution: 1945; Date of joining party: September 1949.

**Personal biography:**

1945: Led the LPRYU [Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union] of Thakhek in siezing power from the Japanese fascists.

1946: Led forces from Thakhek in attacking the Bounom forces and the French in Savannakhet.

1947-1950: Led Itsala [free] forces on operations in Thailand and returned.

1950-1951: In the national congress of the Lao Itsala Front he was elected vice chairman of the Lao Itsala Front.

1952: Led forces in liberating Sophao and Xieng Kho in Sam Neua Province.

1953: Led forces in liberating Sam Neua.



1954: Took part in the World Peace Conference in Stockholm, struggled to make the French sign the Indochina peace agreement.

1955-1958: Member of the Lao delegation to the talks to implement the agreement on the cease-fire line with the French at Khangkhai and Vientiane.

1959-1960: Arrested and imprisoned in the Phonkheng Prison along with 16 others.

1960-1963: Responsible for the headquarters and defense on the Xieng Khouang battlefield.

1964-1972: Member of the command committee for defense on the Xieng Khouang battlefield.

1969-1972: Took part in various conferences such as the World Peace Conference in Moscow and conferences in other places.

1974-1975: Was appointed Minister of Public Works and Transportation in the national coalition government.

1978-1981: Chairman of the International Mekong River Commission.

1982 to the present: Chairman of the Lao Committee for World Peace and chairman of the Lao Olympic Committee.

Nominated by: The Lao Sport Federation.

**Vientiane Commander Siboun Khounthongbang**

93SE0075C Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
24 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Colonel Siboun Khounthongbang, Number 3: Date of birth: 1 March 1936; Place of birth: Ban Pheuilat Village, Pheuilat Canton, Pheuilat District, Vientiane City; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Member of the standing committee of the party of Vientiane City; Area of responsibility: Military commander of Vientiane City; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High level officer; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 15 March 1953; Date of joining party: 9 July 1956.

**Personal biography:**

1954: Volunteered to be a soldier, went to the united area of two provinces.

1957: Returned to be a mobilizer for base areas, led village-level guerrilla forces.

1960: Joined in getting the leaders out of prison and taking them to Phoukhoun.

1961: Joined in liberating Vang Viang District of Vientiane Province.

1963: Operated in Xieng Khouang Province.

1964: Joined in resisting the Sanson operation in Salaphoukhoun.

1969: Chief of staff for the West of Vientiane Province.

1975: Was a candidate to represent Vientiane City in the first election, military commander of the city.

1979: Continued his studies in the USSR.

1981-1986: Member of the party committee of Vientiane City.

1987-1992: Regular member of the party committee of Vientiane City; military commander of Vientiane City; member of the second Supreme People's Assembly.

Nominated by: The administrative committee of Vientiane City.

**Assembly Economic Planning Chief, Somphavan Inthavong**

93SE0075D Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
24 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Dr. Somphavan Inthavong, Number 4: Date of birth: 27 February 1936; Place of birth: Ban Nasai Village, Phonsai Canton, Saisettha District, Vientiane City; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Member of the standing committee and head of the economics, planning, and finance commission of the Supreme People's Assembly; Education level: Higher than University; Professional level: Completed doctorate in hydrodynamics and construction engineering; Level of political philosophy: High for special education; Date of joining revolution: 2 December 1975.

**Personal biography:**

1951-1956: Completed higher education and high level mathematics in France.

1956: Lao student representative to the Conference on Resisting Colonialism and Imperialism of Asian and African Students in Bandung, Indonesia.

1956-1961: Student at the University in Lausanne, Switzerland.

1961-1969: State worker under the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation of the coalition government of the three factions.

1969-1975: Completed his doctorate in hydrodynamics in France, worked in the office of the International Mekong River Commission in Bangkok, wrote an article supporting the Vientiane agreement of 1973, joined the uprising of the people of Vientiane in 1975.

1975-1989: Elected to be a member of the first Supreme People's Assembly of the new system, member of the standing committee and head of the commission on decrees and election laws of this assembly; in 1984 studied high level political theory in Vietnam; from 1981 to 1988 was vice chairman of the state planning committee; from 1988 to 1989 was deputy minister of trade and foreign economic relations; was chairman of the National Mekong River Committee from 1981-1989.

1989-1992: Member of the second Supreme People's Assembly, member of the standing committee and head of the commission for economics, planning, and finance, member of the committee to draft a constitution for the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic].

Nominated by: The Ministry of Economics, Planning and Finance.

**Vientiane City Administrative member, Siho Bannavong**

93SE0075E *Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao*  
24 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City

Dr. Siho Bannavong, Number 5: Date of birth: 15 September 1937; Place of birth: Ban Phonsida Village, Nalao Canton, Phon Hong District, Vientiane Province; Ethnic group: Phouan; Position: Member of the party committee of Vientiane City; Area of responsibility: Deputy administrator of Vientiane City; Education level: higher education Professional level: High level medical; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 1 January 1959; Date of joining party: 29 November 1975;

Personal biography:

1955-1957: Primary level doctor at the Mahosot Hospital in Vientiane.

1957-1960: Studied mid-level medicine in Vientiane; during the coalition period was assigned by the Lao Patriotic Front to mobilize the students and government officials in Vientiane City; 1959 was a member of the Lao Patriotic Front; 1960 led 200 LPRYU [Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union] members to Xieng Khouang Province because the enemy had applied heavy pressure.

1961-1968: Studied high-level medicine in Poland; trained in France and worked with the mobilization unit to make contact with Lao students in France.

1968-1975: Head of public health in the 12 October textile plant of central authority in the liberated area in Houa Phan Province.

1975-1980: Member of the administration committee of Vientiane City; head of the public health service of Vientiane City.

1981-1992: Member of the party committee of Vientiane City; deputy administrator of Vientiane City, was the person on duty.

Nominated by: The administrative committee of Vientiane City.

**Vientiane City Administrator, Khampong Soulinphoumi**

93SE0075F *Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao*  
24 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City

Mr. Khampong Soulinphoumi, Number 6: Date of birth: 2 May 1938; Place of birth: Ban Lathanam Village, Songkhon District, Savannakhet Province; Ethnic group: Phou Thai; Position: Party committee and administrative committee of Vientiane City; Area of responsibility: Head of the education and sport service of Vientiane City; Education level: Completed secondary; Professional level: high in foreign relations; Date of joining revolution: 10 December 1960; Date of joining party: 8 June 1975.

Personal biography:

1960: After the government of 9 August 1960 left Vientiane, he went to join the revolutionary forces and was sent to Hanoi (Vietnam).

1961-1967: Studied for the first level of his professional training in Moscow, USSR.

1967-1975: Worked in the research office of central authority.

1975-1983: Worked in the office of the Central Committee and in the office of the Council of Ministers.

1983-1989: Member of the party committee, member of the city administrative committee, responsible for the party office and the administrative office; then was head of the agricultural service and head of the service for propaganda and culture of Vientiane City.

1989-1992: Member of the party committee and administrative committee and head of the education and sport service of Vientiane City.

Nominated by: The education and sport service of Vientiane City.

**Deputy Interior Chief, Phosai (Oudon) Saipan-gna**  
93SE0075G *Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao*  
25 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City

Colonel (Oudon) Phosai Saipan-gna, Number 9: Date of birth: 3 March 1933; Place of birth: Ban Namai Village, Savannakhili Canton, Sanasomboun District, Champasak Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Deputy head of the office of the Interior Ministry; Area of responsibility: Administration; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: High level police; Level of political philosophy: High for the support system; Date of joining revolution: 13 May 1959; Date of joining party: 14 April 1964.

Personal biography:

1957-1960: Military inspector in the old regime; this was the period of the coalition.

1960-1961: Together with 10 friends helped leaders of the Lao Patriotic Front escape from the Phonkheng Prison and go safely to a revolutionary base.

1961-1962: Studied and entered the Army Officers' School in the SRV, then stationed in (Khengkhai) Xieng Khouang Province.

1962-1963: Took part in liberating Louang Namtha Province.

1963-1964: Took part in liberating Phonsavan, neutralist forces were divided into two groups: the rightist-neutralists and the true neutralists.

1964-1967: Set up a police force in Xieng Khouang Province, he became police commander and deputy PSS commander of Xieng Khouang Province.

1967-1973: Deputy head of the office for mobilization of the masses and public security in Vieng Sai.

1974-1975: Took part in siezing power throughout the country.

1975-1976: Head of the municipal police in Vientiane City.

1976-1977: Head of the traffic police department.

1977-1979: Studied theory at central authority's school in Tha-ngon.

1979-1980: Deputy head of the meteorology department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

1980-1982: Deputy head of the office of the Interior Ministry.

1982-1990: Deputy head of the National Police Department under the Interior Ministry.

1990-1992: Deputy head of the office of the Interior Ministry.

Nominated by: The Interior Ministry.

**Electricity Company Director, Houmphon Bouli-gnaphon**

93SE0075H Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
25 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Mr. Houmphon Bouli-gnaphon, Number 10: Date of birth: 1 January 1947; Place of birth: Ban Houasiang Village, Vatthat Canton, Luang Prabang District, Luang Prabang Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: Director of the Lao Electricity Company; Education level: University; Professional level: High in electrical engineering; Date of joining revolution: 2 December 1975; Date of joining party: 5 October 1979.

**Personal biography:**

1967-1971: Studied electrical engineering at the technological institute in Canada and trained at the Quebec Electricity Company.

1972-1975: Cadre at the Nam Ngoem hydroelectric dam, deputy head of the technical division for electricity.

1975-1978: Acting director of the [Nam] Ngoem hydroelectric dam.

1978-1986: Director of the [Nam] Ngoem hydroelectric dam, member of the party committee for the Nam Ngoem hydroelectric dam.

1989-1992: Director of the Lao Electricity Company, secretary of the party committee of the electricity company.

Nominated by: The Lao Electricity Company.

**Deputy District Chief, Bouchai Boutavong**

93SE0075I Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
25 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Mr. Bouchai Boutavong, Number 16: Date of birth: 1 May 1957; Place of birth: Ban Fangdeng Village, Fangdeng Canton, Saisettha District, Attapeu Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position and area of responsibility: deputy district party secretary and deputy district chief of Saithani District; Education level: Higher education; Professional level: High level military; Level of political philosophy: High for the training system; Date of joining revolution: 1 January 1971; Date of joining party: 15 August 1979.

**Personal biography:**

1971-1973: Primary level medical at the hospital in Saisettha District, Attapeu Province.

1973-1983: Reporter for the Army radio and newspaper under the Ministry of Defense.

1983-1988: Studied at the high level officers' school in the USSR in political cooperation.

1988-1990: Engaged in mobilization in Sayaboury Province, became a member of the Sayaboury District party committee.

1990-1992: Engaged in mobilizing and building the grassroots in Vientiane City until the present; deputy party secretary of Saithani District; deputy district chief of Saithani District.

Nominated by: Administrative committee of Saithani District.

**Deputy District Chief, Som Visai-gno**

93SE0075J Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao  
25 Nov 92 p 2

**[Text] Election Area 1, Vientiane City**

Mr. Som Visai-gno, Number 18: Date of birth: 8 May 1943; Place of birth: Ban Thana Village, Bo-o Canton, Hatsaifong District, Vientiane Province; Ethnic group: Lao; Position: Deputy district party secretary and deputy district chief of Sisattanak District; Area of responsibility: Economic activities; Education level: Secondary; Professional level: Mid-level teacher; Level of political philosophy: Support system; Date of joining revolution: 2 December 1975; Date of joining party: 13 February 1980.

**Personal biography:**

1961-1968: Taught at the Chomphet elementary school in Sisattanak District.

1968-1971: Continued his studies at the Dongdok Teachers' University, trained in Thailand.

1971-1973: Superintendent of the southern education district; head of the staff for the Ban Phosi Village school (Ban Hom Village).

1973-1975: Director of the Thatkhao elementary school.

1975-1977: Director of the Thatkhao school and member of the canton education committee.

1977-1978: Member of the district education committee.

1980-1985: Member of the district administrative committee, head of the district administrative office.

1985-1987: Vice chairman of the district administration, responsible for agriculture.

1988-1992: Chairman of the Sisattanak District people's assembly; chairman of the Sisattanak District administration; deputy party secretary of Sisattanak District; deputy district chief of Sisattanak District.

Nominated by: The administrative committee of Sisattanak District.

**Nouhak Career, Alliances Viewed**

93SE0098A Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA  
in Thai 4 Dec 92 p 78

[Text] A successful life does not depend on having a university degree or having money, which is what most people are interested in. Who knows, a child who sells leis along the side of the road or a truck driver could become the leader of the country just like Mr. Nouhak Phoumsavan, a former truck driver who did not go beyond primary school.

Mr. Nouhak was born into an ordinary family and was looked down on by members of the elite in Laos. But today, he is the new leader of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. He has been appointed president of the country in place of Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane, who died last week.

Nouhak is generally thought to be a "hawkish" communist and a long-time friend of Vietnam. Besides this, he was a close comrade of Mr. Kaysone and General Khamtai Siphandon, the prime minister. All three of

these men constantly struggled against imperialism and were nicknamed the "three tigers of Laos."

However, very few people know much about Mr. Nouhak's background. Even his official biography doesn't know the exact date of his birth. All it says is that Nouhak was born into an ordinary family in southern Savannakhet Province. He completed primary school and then went to work, becoming a mine foreman. After that, he became a truck driver, driving through Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Eventually, he established his own transport company. During the time that he was in the transport business, he played a role in smuggling weapons to the Viet Minh Communists, who were waging a struggle against the French in Vietnam.

He joined the Red Lao Communists in 1955 [as published] and is thought to have been a member of the first Lao group to join the Indochinese Communist Party. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Van Kiet, Vietnamese leaders in the struggle against France and the United States, appointed him representative to the People's Council of the Lao Struggle Front in 1950 during the struggle against the French imperialists. Besides that, he was an important activist in the struggle against the U.S.-backed Government, a struggle that finally succeeded in 1975.

This new leader of Laos, who is thought to be almost 80 years old, is one of the founders of the Lao Communist movement in 1950. When the Communist Party seized power, Nouhak was appointed to several important positions in the government party and military. He has held important positions during the past four decades. Most recently, he served as the minister of finance. And he is a member of the Politburo of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the government party. Besides this, he has played an important role in handling several important problems, including the internal conflicts within Laos today.

Thus, the fact that he has been appointed president and his close comrade in arms, General Khamtai, has been appointed prime minister and chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), is a clear indication that power remains in the hands of these two Lao leaders.

No one knows if there will be any sudden changes in Laos. However, a Thai official said that in the face of the changes in the world situation today, Laos will probably open up and become more free regardless of who the leaders are.

## POLITICAL

### **Mahathir Reiterates Islam Not Against Development**

93SE0121A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 5 Jan 93 p 2

[Text] Kangar, 4 January—On 4 January Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad spoke to a group which has been expressing opposition to development. This group states that the Islamic community, which is poor, is stronger than their leader.

The prime minister said that the anti-development group is urging the Islamic community to return to the status of Muslims 1,400 years ago.

He said: "Any effort to champion the view that Muslims in the word are unimportant is in conflict with our religion. It is not surprising that Islamic communities and countries throughout the world are not making progress in the economic field or are not skilled in the fields of manufacturing and marketing.

"Wealthy Islamic countries often use their wealth for warlike purposes, when Muslims themselves are not capable of managing the natural resources of their country," he said.

He made these statements when he presided over the opening session of the 35th National Tilawah al-Quran [Reading the Koran] Commemoration at Datuk Sheikh Ahmad Stadium on 4 January.

Doctor Mahathir said that, on the contrary, the Islamic community needs to try in a steadfast way to raise its standard of living, in accordance with the words of Allah, who said in Paragraph 10 of the "al-Jumaah" Surah [Lesson 62 from the Koran]: "Later, after Friday prayers are over, then you may disperse throughout the land to carry on your respective activities and seek the overflowing bounty of Allah."

Doctor Mahathir stated: "This means that even on Friday we are not required merely to rest. We must work to earn our daily bread."

According to Doctor Mahathir, the skill of the Islamic community in managing their possessions and wealth and their ability to understand the various aspects of science are important so that the image of the Islamic community and religion, which has declined, will be restored to its original state.

He joined in urging the Islamic community to apply the lessons of the Koran and the praiseworthy qualities of Rasul, who succeeded in the business field.

Mahathir said: "In this connection it is stated in the traditional sayings of Mohammed that nine-tenths of our daily bread comes from business activity.

"If the Sunnah [lesson] of Rasul is our guide, we must become involved in the business sector in an attentive, honest, and determined way.

"For that reason the highest qualities needed for the Islamic community to succeed in the business and commercial field are determination and honesty. The Islamic community in Malaysia will be able to take part in the process of development and will become a forward looking community, compared to other countries."

He said: "As a result, the image of the Islamic religion and community, which has declined since the period of Islamic splendor hundreds of years ago, will return."

He declared that knowledge of business and commercial practices and of science and technology by the Islamic community in Malaysia is still at a low level, although we are aware that this kind of learning is needed for the development of our country and the success of Wawasan 2020 [Project Clear Concept].

He said that the history of Islamic splendor in past centuries proves that the knowledge of science and technology placed the Islamic world and community in a high position in the eyes of the world.

He also asked the Islamic community to try to become producers and distributors of various kinds of essential needs which they now buy.

Doctor Mahathir said that Muslims are losing ground and are held in low esteem, not because of the Koran and the Hadis [sayings of Mohammed], but because of the way in which certain groups, which have an interest in continuing this attitude, look at Muslims.

He said that the Koran is unchanging, but many attitudes held in the past are wrong and need to be corrected.

He stated: "When the Koran is interpreted properly, it will be no obstacle to the development of the community, just as it was no obstacle to the development of the Islamic community in the past. And certainly it will not make Muslims weak and despised, as now is the case."

He said: "The subject of our reading this time is appropriate, since we are actively promoting Wawasan 2020. This theme means that a community which wants success and development must have a clear concept."

In that connection the prime minister hoped that all groups would make use of the Koran and the Hadis as a guide to living. This will lead humanity toward balanced development in this world and toward the world to come.

Doctor Mahathir concluded that the Islamic community in Malaysia should be thankful because, with the help of Allah, they can serve him and hold religious meetings without difficulty.

### **Intelligentsia Calls for End of Feudal Attitudes**

93SE0121B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 5 Jan 93 pp 1, 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 4 January—The government will be urged to abolish all forms of adat [customary] law and

feudal practices which only encourage servile attitudes and outlooks among the people.

This recommendation will be made at a meeting of Malay writers, journalists, and artists at the Writers' Corner of the Council on Language and Literature, to be held on 10 January.

The meeting will also urge the government and Parliament to study the original position and function of the institution of state rulers [rajas] so that they conform to the teachings of Islam as the official religion of the state and the principles of parliamentary democracy.

#### View

According to this view, the meeting will also adopt a resolution that a constitutional amendment which is now being prepared should be fully and completely implemented and cover all aspects of legislation concerned.

The meeting has been proposed by an independent, executive committee made up of writers, journalists, and artists who regard themselves as specially qualified on issues involving the interests of the nation and the country.

#### Independent

The independent, executive committee is composed of 12 persons who are thinkers, intellectuals, and artists and who feel that it is necessary for "courageous and clear-thinking people to express their concerns on issues which involve the palace group surrounding state rulers at this time.

They feel that the rulers, in accordance with their position, rank, and status, should act in an appropriate way so that they can serve as an example for the mass of the people.

What happens is just the reverse. The rulers and the palace groups surrounding them are symbols of excessive behavior and oppression who do not fit in with the concepts of nobility and respect which should be associated with these institutions.

The independent, executive committee has already met several times to determine the procedures for assembling the work and the thinking of Malay writers, reporters, and artists on this question.

They are convinced that writers, reporters, and artists as a group who have a feeling of responsibility toward the community must not remain in their ivory towers or in air conditioned rooms and allow the government and the leaders of the people to fight their battles.

A committee source told UTUSAN MALAYSIA: "This is a people's issue which we must handle together. There is no place in the struggle of the people at this time for thinkers, intellectuals, and artists who are afraid to speak up and who remain silent."

#### Status

The source said: "They are not relevant in the context of the struggle to raise the status of our nation today."

The source informed UTUSAN MALAYSIA that these people had decided to bring writers, reporters, and artists together because there is a view among the people that capable people who speak Malay have fallen behind events and appear deliberately to be standing on the sidelines or are playing no role.

According to the source, the committee realizes that there is a Malay organization at the national level which is not expressing its views on this question.

The source said: "It is hoped that this committee will be able to bring together as many people as possible who speak Malay and who, up to now, have not spoken up, because of the attitude of their leaders or the basic principles of the organization which they represent."

The source informed UTUSAN MALAYSIA that the committee believes that the survival of the Malay nation truly depends on a group of Malays of quality who are personally highly intelligent, who are acquainted with science, technology, and economic matters, who respect their religious leaders, and who believe in Allah.

In their view national political power is truly the power of the people. If there is authority, this must be the authority of the people.

UTUSAN MALAYSIA understands that the 12 persons making up the independent committee consist of M. Noor Azam; Usman Awang, a recognized state writer; Rahim Bakar; Dr Zainal Keling; Jins Shamsuddin; Dr Wan Hashim Wan Teh; Dr Siddiq Fadzil; Azran Rahman; Chamil Wariya; Baharuddin Zainal; and Sutung Umar R.S.

According to the source, letters of invitation to the council meeting have already been sent out.

#### Sabah Chief Minister Criticized

93SE0113A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 21 Dec 92 p 26

[Text] Ipoh, 20 Dec—Minister of Land and Cooperative Development Tan Sri Sakaran Dandai today called the approval by Sabah Chief Minister Datuk Sri Joseph Pairin Kitingan for a "round table" discussion and forum between the Sabah State Government and the Central Government on Sabah's 20 Points a political trick to win the sympathy of the people of the state.

Tan Sri Sakaran Dandai, who is also a member of the Liaison Committee of Sabah UMNO [United Malays National Organization] and president of the UMNO Semporna Division, said Pairin is trying to get the sympathy of the people of Sabah after failing to generate communal and religious problems and is trying to make the Sabah people hate federal leaders and officials by raising the issue of the 20 Points.

"Pairin is trying to get the sympathy of the people by agreeing to a 'round table' discussion and forum with the Central Government to talk about the 20 Points, despite the fact that the 20 Points are no longer an

issue," he told reporters today after inaugurating the 30th General Assembly of Perak Malay Housing Cooperative, Ltd.

As an example, he explained that the issue raised by the Sabah Government regarding Islam as the official national religion had been raised by previous Sabah State Governments.

He said the 20 Points brought up by the PBS [Sabah United Party] government under Pairin's leadership are no longer an issue and that the action is politically motivated to get public sympathy.

In connection with Pairin's objection to the government's decision to ban log exports from Sabah, Sakaran declared that the government's action is proper for the protection of the state's forests from excessive logging.

He said the people of Sabah face pressure from the international community to protect the state's forests from excessive logging.

"The Sabah people also need to protect their logging areas for the generations yet to come," he added.

He was confident that the National Front would have a good chance of winning the Sabah State Government if a surprise election were held in the state.

#### Confidence

He said the people of Sabah have lost confidence in the ability of the state's government to lead the state.

Sakaran declared that with the help of other National Front component parties, like the MCA [Malaysian Chinese Association] and AKAR [People's Justice Movement], the National Front could win an election in Sabah.

He said that since UMNO was established in Sabah its membership has risen to 240,000, which is greater than the membership of 100,000 possessed by USNO [United Sabah National Organization] before UMNO was formed.

## MILITARY

### Minister on Military Housing, Participation in UN Force

93SE0114A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 21 Dec 92 p 3

[Text] Seremban, 20 Dec—The government is considering increasing housing allowances for military personnel to make the allowances commensurate with higher rental costs.

Minister of Defense Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak says that his ministry realizes housing rents are high, especially in the cities, while housing allowances have remained constant.

As an example, he noted that even squatter housing rental in Kuala Lumpur has risen to about 200 ringgit,

whereas the housing allowance for an Army corporal and below is still 85 ringgit per month.

He said this to reporters today after inaugurating ATM [Malaysian Armed Forces] housing at Camp Senawang.

Earlier in the press conference, Najib expressed his regret that there are still military families who are forced to live in squatter housing, which could be considered humiliating.

He guaranteed, therefore, that the ministry will be more sensitive in resolving the problem of housing for military families.

"It is the responsibility of the country to do this, and the government has introduced a strategy for overcoming the housing shortage," he said, adding that the strategy involves privatization projects.

For this purpose, the ATM is soon to sign a contract with National Investments, Ltd., (PNB) for the privatization of housing projects.

He said the Economic Planning Unit and the Attorney General's Office are now preparing the contract.

He said that under the contract PNB will develop about 150 hectares of land owned by the Ministry of Defense at Sungai Buloh, Selangor.

"In return, PNB will provide finished houses throughout the country with a total value equal to that of the land," he said.

He said that under the contract, PNB will build almost 2,000 family housing units in crowded areas such as Sungai Besi, Subang, and Port Dickson.

The contract provides that PNB, through its TTDI [expansion unknown] subsidiary, will provide a special fund enabling another subsidiary, PERCONS [expansion unknown], to build houses for the ATM without waiting for the Sungai Buloh project to become profitable.

In addition, 500 million ringgit are to be provided for a training fund for members of the Armed Forces who retire.

In other developments, Najib reported that Malaysia is still waiting for approval from the United Nations for sending troops to join security forces in Somalia and Bosnia.

He said Malaysia is on the waiting list and may send troops at any time.

As for the Malaysian Army battalion that is to complete its tour of duty in Cambodia this April, he said its service is dependent on the mandate given by the United Nations to security forces in that country (UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia]).

"If UNTAC is given a mandate for several months after April, it would be better to extend the present battalion than to send a new battalion.



"Nevertheless, we may send an additional battalion to replace the forces of other countries that have completed their service," he said.

## ECONOMIC

### Slight Decline in 1993 Growth Forecast

92SE0122A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 1 Jan 93 p 11

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 31 December—The year 1993 continues to promise stimulating growth for the Malaysian economy.

Although the rate of growth will be slower, that is, it is expected to be about 8.0 percent, compared to 8.5 percent in 1992 and 8.7 percent in 1991, this rate is among the highest in the world.

It is expected that the industrialized countries will experience a growth rate of just 2.0 percent during 1993.

Promises of an improvement in the economy during the election campaign in the United States apparently will have to conform to the reality that domestic economic growth in that country will only amount to about 2.5 percent in 1993.

At a time when it is predicted that Western Europe will experience economic growth of only 1.1 percent, with an inflation rate of 4.0 percent, the unemployment rate will be about 9.5 percent.

Japan, which has emerged as a major economic power during the past decade, has experienced a decline in its growth, which is estimated at about 2.3 percent during 1993, lower than the previous estimate of 3.5 percent.

In the ASEAN area Singapore, which has always enjoyed a high rate of growth, is expected to experience slower growth in 1993, or 5.0 percent.

Slower economic growth in almost the whole world has raised the performance of the Malaysian economy to a level which is truly a source of pride.

While other countries are experiencing the problem of unemployment, Malaysia is enjoying virtually full employment, with an unemployment rate of 4.0 percent.

### Longed for Dream

Although the Malaysian rate of inflation is about 5.0 percent, which is the dream of many countries, particularly in Latin America, this is a matter receiving the serious attention of the government, which hopes to guard against it by reducing inflation to about 4.0 percent during 1993.

Based on these encouraging indications, the Malaysian people may look forward to 1993 as a year which is expected to be marked by a continuing high level of economic activity.

It is expected that the manufacturing sector will experience high growth, or 13.8 percent, compared to 13.0

percent in 1992. Domestic and foreign demand for the products of Malaysian factories is reaching a high point.

In any case the construction industry, which for the last several years has been an important sector in stimulating national economic growth, will experience relatively slow growth estimated at 11 percent, compared to 13.5 percent in 1992.

At the same time the services sector will also grow more slowly, at a rate of 8.6 percent, compared to 9.7 percent during 1992.

On the other hand previous concern about the receipt of foreign investment capital as a result of sharp competition from many other countries as places for investment, Malaysia continues to receive foreign capital. During the first 10 months of 1992, 17.1 billion Malaysian dollars in investment capital were received compared to 13.6 billion Malaysian dollars during the same period of 1991, an increase of 26 percent.

During the first 10 months of 1992, the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) approved 518 projects valued at 25.7 billion Malaysian dollars, an increase of 2.8 percent, compared to the same period of 1991, when 649 projects worth 25.0 billion Malaysian dollars were approved.

This private investment will continue to stimulate economic activity and permit Malaysia to achieve a rate of growth which should be a source of pride to the people.

If one looks at the record of Malaysian economic growth since independence [in 1957], there has been relatively high growth, that is, between 6.0 and 7.0 percent per year, with the exception of the period of economic recovery, beginning in 1985 until it was completed at the beginning of 1987.

### Attention

However, because Western industrialized countries were experiencing high economic growth, the ability of Malaysia to control its own economy did not receive attention and recognition from the Malaysian people.

However, when world economic growth, particularly among the industrialized countries, was slow, Malaysian economic performance, which has been a source of pride to the country, has succeeded in opening the eyes of many people.

This should sow self-confidence among the people of Malaysia in our ability to manage our economy well, surpassing the developed countries themselves.

### Comments on Reforms in MTUC Labor Union

93SE0122B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA  
in Malay 1 Jan 93 p 8

[Article by G. Manimaran: "Rajasekaran: MTUC [Malaysian Trade Union Congress] Reformer?"]

[Text] Long-postponed changes in the Office of the General Secretary of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) finally became a reality following the



surprise defeat of V. David, the veteran leader of the trade union federation, at the hands of G. Rajasekaran, his long time subordinate, at the beginning of last week.

Will Rajasekaran's victory, ending David's 13 years of control, also change the direction of the program of this trade union confederation?

Displaying a spirit of firmness, Rajasekaran has tried to give new life and substance to the tarnished image of the congress, which is regarded as antigovernment.

According to Rajasekaran, who is 51 years old, during the last several years, and particularly during the past two years, the MTUC has been labeled as a workers' movement which has politicized trade union issues.

He said that he was also aware that the MTUC has been open to considerable criticism because it was said to have made statements regarded as political in tone which served the interests of its leaders.

Rajasekaran said, in a special interview with UTUSAN MALAYSIA recently: "I will try to improve this image over the next two years by continuing simple contacts with people."

In any case, Rajasekaran declared that he does not intend to turn these simple contacts aimed at cooperating with the government into expressions of opinion or make critical comments on matters which affect the interests of the workers of this country.

In simple language which reflects his personality he said: "That does not mean that, as general secretary, I will not express the views of the MTUC. I will express criticism if the government takes action which is not appropriate and, on the other hand, I will welcome action by the government which is considered to serve the interests of the workers."

With further reference to the government and particularly the Ministry of Human Resources he spoke about how he regards the proper expression of views and criticism.

Rajasekaran, who is regarded by trade union observers as a leader with a simple but firm attitude, began to become involved in the trade union movement in 1960 as a leader of the National Union of Shopworkers in Kuala Lumpur.

In 1963 he became more actively involved in the trade union movement, following the emergence of serious labor problems at that time.

In 1963 he and a number of other people formed the Mineral Industry Employees' Union (MIEU), in which he held and still holds the position of executive secretary. This is the only office which he has held in the local trade union movement.

His second attempt to take over the position of general secretary of the MTUC was successful when he defeated V. David, who had been his mentor for about a decade—since 1980, when Rajasekaran became deputy general secretary of the MTUC.

In the recent MTUC elections David received 105 votes. There were two other candidates: A. H. Ponniah, general secretary of the CUEPACS [Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and Civil Service], who was trying to expand his influence in the private sector, received 129 votes. Minhat Sulaiman, from the Peninsula Woodworkers' Union, received 44 votes.

### The Right Time

A leader of the MTUC, which includes nearly 150 trade unions, said: "The election of Rajasekaran to this influential position in the MTUC came at the right time."

According to this leader, the administration of the MTUC was shaky and caused confusion at the 31st Session of MTUC Delegates, which was held on 18-19 December 1992.

For example, a copy of a draft proposal containing amendments to the organization's constitution was not sent to the trade unions affiliated with the MTUC two weeks in advance of the meeting, as provided in the constitution.

He went on to say that Rajasekaran's victory is a step toward "reform" in the MTUC, at a time when the relationship of the organization with the government is said to be increasingly distant, following the involvement of several of its leaders in politics and the formation of the Malaysian Labor Organization (MLO), an alternative trade union movement, in 1989.

Another union leader said: "Rajasekaran's dedication and his attitude of standing clear of politics may bring new life to the MTUC."

Rajasekaran has admitted the MTUC's weakness in administrative matters. As a result, he has not implemented the programs outlined in the Genting Highlands Declaration of 1990. He declared: "Making a start on putting together our administrative machinery is now a heavy responsibility for me. The next three months will be a great test."

Regarding the involvement of leaders in political parties, Rajasekaran said: "The trade union movement should avoid politics. At present I am not a member of any political party. I also do not intend to join any political party, although I have friends among political leaders," he stated.

He also rejected speculation on the possibility that he will follow in the footsteps of MTUC leaders who have been actively engaged in politics. At the same time he also denied that he will be a candidate in the next general elections.

As a result of developments in the MTUC, almost all of the top leaders of the MTUC have been political figures and candidates in general elections. Among them are Ahmad Nor, the former deputy president of the MTUC, who is now a member of Parliament for the DAP [Democratic Action Party], representing the Bayan Baru district; and Zainal Rampak, who has held his position

in the MTUC for five consecutive terms and was a candidate in the most recent general elections in the Ampang Jaya district.

At present Zainal Rampak is a member of the Supreme Executive Council of Semangat 46 [Spirit of 1946], while V. David is also a member of Parliament for the DAP from the Puchong district.

Rajasekaran promised not to run in the forthcoming general elections and to resign his post if he fails to turn in an improved performance as general secretary of the MTUC.

Regarding relations with international trade union movements such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Mineral Workers Union, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Rajasekaran declared that the international relationships of the MTUC will be taken up after demands for the formation of a union of electronics workers are resolved.

Rajasekaran said: "The MTUC will only take this matter to an international forum if necessary and there is no alternative.

"In any case, as the new general secretary, I hope the issue of a union of electronics workers can still be resolved at the local level, although it has already reached the international forum. We will express our demands with facts and figures in hand and will improve communications with the government," he said.

Will Rajasekaran be able to keep his promises and change the image of the MTUC? We will see what happens to both of these objectives over the next two years.

In any case, it appears that, without wasting any time, he has begun his duties by meeting for three hours with MTUC members on the day following his winning election to his present position.

**Justice Minister Against Amnesty for Ver**  
*93SE0078B Manila DIYARYO FILIPINO in Tagalog*  
*1 Dec 92 pp 1, 2*

[Article by E. Reyes and R. Salvacion: "Risky, According to Drilon"]

[Text] Former Armed Forces Chief Fabian Ver remains a threat to national security; hence, the government refuses to grant him amnesty.

Yesterday, at the People's Day celebration held in Malacanang, Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon stated that Ver cannot be granted amnesty because there was no political motive in his involvement with crimes.

The Secretary further stated that unlike the rebel groups that broke the laws because of supporting a political objective, Ver faces criminal and administrative charges.

In addition, Drilon clarified by saying, "Ver's case is purely murder and he had no political objective to overthrow the government."

Drilon also stressed that the beneficiaries of the amnesty are all those involved with the armed movement such as the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF), Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Young Officers' Union (RAM-KSP-YOU) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

In this connection, Drilon threatens to prevent any Army that plans to grant amnesty to the former military chief.

According to Drilon, Ver must be tried in court and detained because of his involvement with crimes.

Secretary Renato de Villa of the Department of National Defense (DND) supported Drilon's decision and stressed further that Ver must be punished if proven guilty.

De Villa also mentioned that Ver faces charges against the Anti-Graft Law, murder charges, and violations against common people's rights and so forth.

In the meantime, Executive Secretary Jose Almonte, director general of the National Security Council (NSC), indicated that Ver remains a threat to the cause of democracy.

**Decision of the DND**

Regarding the return of Ver to the country, Drilon passed the issue onto the DND because the agency, it is believed, is in a position to answer political questions relating to the former AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] chief.

Recently, President Ramos and De Villa favored the return of Ver to the country so that he can face the criminal charges in court.

Ver is the foremost suspect in the widespread infringement of the common people's rights during the Marcos

regime and also in the murder of former senator Benigno Aquino Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Ver is also believed to be the key to the military demoralization when Marcos refused to make Ramos as the AFP Chief.

In the meantime, it is not only Ver who must be allowed to return to the Philippines but rather also all the officials and cronies of the Marcos regime who are still hiding in various countries.

According to Senator Blas Ople, it is one of the measures that will show the just and fair intention of President Ramos to unite in agreement all the sectors of society.

Ople, chief of the committee on foreign relations, further stated that the administration must strive for the return of all the cronies so that they will face charges involving anomalies right here in the country.

In addition, Ople said, "We must let the court investigate them. They must be punished if proven guilty."

**Congress To Debate on Foreign Debt**  
*93SE0079B Manila DIYARYO FILIPINO in Tagalog*  
*7 Dec 92 pp 1, 7*

[Article by F. Jimenez]

[Text] Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., postponed, for a week, the debate in the House of Representatives concerning the debt ceiling because of a mass appeal to make the internal debt (the 308 billion peso losses of the Central Bank (CB) a mass national debt.

**Bank Debt Forgiveness**

After conferring yesterday with the commercial banks' committees which convened in a parliamentary meeting with the British government in London, de Venecia stated that "the payment of our national debt of \$3.2 billion dollars is no longer so heavy for our country."

According to this legislator, the foreign banks agreed to lower the interest rate on our debt, and to prolong the time for its repayment. The banks also promised to forgive a certain per cent of the Philippine debt.

The 30% forgiveness of our debt by the Paris club can be used to promote the studies abroad of 500 Filipinos in France or the United Kingdom, and also to replant the eroded forests.

In this way, Venecia stated the current need to study ways of solving the 308 billion peso debt of the CB. It will be possible for the public to shoulder this responsibility if and when the Central Bank is dissolved and replaced with a central monetary authority.

**To Be Defeated**

Meanwhile, de Venecia designated 15-17 December for the debt debate, instead of 8-10 December, so that the government would have time to defeat the said bill.

Furthermore, the Speaker stated last Saturday that some legislators had also asked for a much longer period of

time in order to enable them to think through more thoroughly the bill presented by Representative Edcel Lagman (LDP ("Struggle of Democratic Filipinos"), Albay).

The debt ceiling bill will limit the payment on our foreign debt to 10 per cent of the annual merchandise export receipts. This proposal is supported by 120 of the almost 200 members of the House of Representatives, but it is strongly opposed by the Senate.

According to government officials, limiting payment of foreign debt can become an obstacle to new loan offers from foreign banks.

However, the debt ceiling is also popular among those who believe that a huge chunk of the little wealth of the nation is set aside by the government to pay off its financial obligations.

### Call for NAPOCOR Officials To Resign

93SE0079A Manila *DIYARYO FILIPINO* in Tagalog  
5 Dec 92 pp 1, 7

[Article by E. Reyes]

[Text] Yesterday, employees of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) asked, in unison, for the resignation of the officials responsible for the shoddy operations of the company, and for the worsening of the energy crisis.

This message was stated yesterday in a letter yesterday to President Ramos by the NAPOCOR employees.

As a warning with regard to the impending reshuffling of the company, the President launched a "war" against the encrusted officials and employees of the NAPOCOR.

In their letter, the employees called upon the President to wage a war against the "extra baggage" of the company, and against those who worsen the brownouts, like Pablo Malixi, president of NAPOCOR, and also his twenty-three vice-presidents.

The letter also confirmed the implication of involvement of twenty-three officials in anomalies which cause NAPOCOR losses, at the heart of which are the irregular transactions of the Fuel Additive Treatment for the Malaya Thermal Power Plant, and of the Ambuklao Dredging Contract, which was first revealed to the House of Representatives.

### Investigation of Complaints

In this connection, Ramos approved a number of bills to ameliorate the irregularities perpetrated by officials, employees, and private contractors of NAPOCOR.

One of these bills deals with coordinating the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the ombudsman in order to facilitate the investigation of cases implicating those from the NPC, and also to facilitate the monitoring system of administrative and criminal cases involved in the anomalies.

The Central Bank will help in uncovering the financial irregularities in NAPOCOR, so as to prevent a recurrence of these financial losses.

The Central Bank will also certify the administrative order whereby electricity thieves will be heavily fined.

### Lay-offs

Meanwhile, Malixi reported that there will be some changes in NAPOCOR in order to erase its negative image.

According to Malixi, he will have only 16 assistants, instead of the former 33.

### Editorial Criticizing President Ramos' 'New Direction'

93SE0078A Manila *DIYARYO FILIPINO* in Tagalog  
30 Nov 92 p 4

[Editorial by Renato Constantino]

[Text] General Ramos blamed the past administration for running the government in such a way that the economy became crippled. He stated this at the first conference of the National Security Council attended by two former presidents, Diosdado Macapagal and Corazon Aquino. Ramos stressed that there exists a grave error in the political field, and that what is needed is unity between the Executive and the Legislative (Branches of the Government).

Ramos attributed the grave situation of the nation to factionalism. He added that the Philippines has been left behind (in the competition) by other nations of Asia, which used to be trailing us. The general emphasized, "It is now high time to give our way of life a new direction." However, the path he treads upon was not conceived by Macapagal, nor perpetuated by Marcos or even Aquino.

The grave situation of the country cannot simply be blamed on politics. It is necessary to fully understand the causes behind the crippled economy. It is amazing that General Ramos' statements are in tune with the reports of the World Bank, which blame politics as the cause of the retarded development, and which advocate strong leadership. It never occurred to Ramos to restudy the politics that the IMF and the World Bank imposed on us.

Ever since Macapagal's administration, our economic policy has been out of our hands. We have been under the watchful eye of the IMF and the World Bank. Our economy has been based on the powerful multilateral institutions and on our creditors. When analyzed very carefully, these policies still prevail until now. Hence, there is no need to search for other causes; there is no need to put the blame for our misery on politics alone. The nature of our politics is a result of the policies imposed on us by foreigners.

Since we are accustomed to simply following orders from foreign nations and institutions, and since our leaders still retain the colonial mentality, politics has not broadened our thinking. The politicians are afraid to be brutally frank to foreigners who intrude on our means of

livelihood. They are also afraid to be creative in searching for solutions to our problems if they are contrary to the prevailing thinking of the West. Since new solutions bring harsh realities before progress is attained; our politicians, therefore, have lost the courage and the strength to propose policies that fit the prevailing situations. Thus, what simply remains to be worth fighting for is personal ambitions and the favor of the powerful that can serve their own self-interest. This is the cause of factionalism.

Due to the erosion of national goals the people are forced to act only in their own self-interest. They have already lost the spirit of national community, since the examples they see are the actions of the politicians themselves. Thus, they too, act without any consideration for the good of the community. The result is loss of national unity. Lost are the pain, suffering, and sacrifice for the country's sake. This is the result of the influence of Western thinking and Western policy that harm their way of life; they are also absorbed in foreign culture. If General Ramos means to say that there is a need for a

new direction in the nation's actions, why then, does he perpetuate the failed policies that have made Filipinos miserable? If the past administrations have erred, why then did he appoint men known to be allies of the foreigners dominating our means of livelihood?

If politics is the disease of the nation, why then was he a participant in the work of the political parties in Congress and the Senate? Could it be a sign that he would implement the recommendations of the World Bank and of Lee Kuan Yew, who states the need for establishing a new political structure that has one political party dominating the executive and the legislative?

If this is the case, then, the new direction, therefore, does not deal with changing the erroneous policy, but rather with the implementation of this policy by a strong executive of a dominant party that he controls. In fact, Lee Kuan Yew stated that what is really needed is discipline, not democracy. Is this then the new direction of General Ramos?

## POLITICAL

**Business, Official Reaction to Khmer Rouge Trade Ban****Trat Governor, Khmer Rouge Official Comment***93SE0103A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 29 Nov 92  
pp 1, 2*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] At 0900 hours on 28 November at Lin Thamit Garden Hotel in Bo Rai District, Trat Province, members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee led by Dr. Krasae Chanawong, the subcommittee chairman, went to inspect the Thai-Cambodian border and listen to reports by government units and businessmen in the province who may be affected by the United Nations' decision to impose sanctions against the Khmer Rouge and require Thailand to close Thai-Cambodian border transit points.

Mr. Amon Anantachai, the governor of Trat Province, said that closing the border transit points, particularly those in Bo Phloi Subdistrict and at Ban Mun Dan, which are areas where gemstone mining and logging activities are carried on, will have a great effect. This will affect the livelihoods of the people in Trat Province, and theft and robbery will increase because Thais and Cambodians won't have jobs. Besides this, border smuggling will increase greatly.

A reporter reported that during their speeches, officials distributed documents summarizing the effects that this will have on the people in Trat Province. These stated that: 1. This will put 40-50,000 people out of work. 2. This will have a serious impact on 33 companies that operate 130 gemstone mines, because each of these companies has invested at least 1 billion baht. 3. This will affect the four large logging companies, that is, the Phiphat Logging Company, the Nit Yothakan Company, the Chao Phraya Chai Company, and the Wooddell Company. Each of these companies has already invested at least 200 million baht, and they have hired at least 40-50,000 people to cut timber.

After listening to the reports, the members of the subcommittee went to see the gemstone trading market in Bo Phloi Subdistrict, Bo Rai District, Trat Province, which is a large gemstone market. People told them that closing the border will cause serious problems and lead to an increase in robbery, because people won't have a job.

After that, the members of the subcommittee went to see the timber inspection checkpoint of the Phiphat Logging Company, which is located near the border. Mr. Chatchai Tanthanongsakkun, the manager of this company, said that the company began logging operations in 1992 and has a concession for approximately 40-50,000 tons. The company wants the government to postpone closing the border until 1993 so that it can recoup its investment of approximately 130 million baht.

Following that, the subcommittee went to inspect the border at Ban Mun Dan. There, Mr. Lekkong, the

deputy head of the Khmer Rouge foreign affairs section, came to talk to the subcommittee. He told them that if the border is closed, the Khmer Rouge won't have anything to say. If the Khmer Rouge is encircled economically, its only option will be to fight even though the Cambodian people do not want war.

Mr. Lekkong said that all sides should adhere to the agreement signed in Paris, France. That is, inspections should be conducted to determine whether there are still Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia. All four members of the Cambodian Supreme National Council should have an equal role to play instead of allowing the Phnom Penh faction to dominate things. Besides this, the election should be postponed.

"We hope that the Thai government will give the four Cambodian factions a chance to negotiate again instead of allowing the situation to remain as it is," said Mr. Lekkong. [passage omitted]

**Trat MP Thanit Comments***93SE0103B Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 17 Dec 92  
pp 1, 10*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] At parliament that afternoon, in his capacity as a member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Mr. Thanit Traiwut, a Chat Phattana Party MP [member of parliament] from Trat Province, talked about the United Nations setting up checkpoints at Thai-Cambodian border transit points. He said that no one will permit foreign forces to set up checkpoints in Thailand. As for the United Nations imposing trade sanctions on the Khmer Rouge, the subcommittee feels that the only way to solve the problem is for the United Nations to discuss matters with the countries that will be affected by the sanctions in accord with Article 50 of the UN Charter. In the present case, the subcommittee recommends that the Thai businessmen who have been carrying on business activities in Cambodia be allowed to continue carrying on activities until the contracts expire. This is because the Thai businessmen signed those contracts with all four Cambodian factions.

The subcommittee will submit a letter to the minister of foreign affairs in order to have him submit this proposal to the secretary general of the United Nations, who is scheduled to arrive for talks with Thai officials on 20 December. As for whether this will succeed, that depends on whether the foreign affairs minister can convince the UN secretary general and on whether this matter is submitted at a meeting of the UN Security Council.

"The fact that the United Nations has imposed sanctions this time is extraordinary, because it has never imposed sanctions on a small group before. Instead, it has always imposed sanctions against an entire country. It makes you wonder why the United Nations attaches so much importance to this."

Mr. Thanit said that in his view, the sanctions will not last very long. This is just a threat. Once the Khmer Rouge act in accord with the resolution, the sanctions will be lifted. The United Nations itself probably realizes

that imposing sanctions on the Khmer Rouge was a mistake. Prince Sihanouk is unhappy about this. At the same time, the Khmer Rouge are mobilizing Cambodians against the Vietnamese. This is like an underground war.

What he is most concerned about is not trade but peace. The efforts that have been underway for so long have failed. In the future, before the United Nations imposes sanctions against someone, this should be considered more carefully.

Mr. Traiwut said that opening border transit points 24 hours a day is not the right way to solve the problem. Timber and gemstone trading cannot be speeded up, because capabilities are limited. Things must be done step by step. [passage omitted]

#### Ministers Sawit, Nippon on Logging

93SE0103C Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 15 Dec 92  
pp 1, 8

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Mr. Sawit Phothiwiwok, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, talked about the matter of Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, the minister of foreign affairs, reviewing logging activities with neighboring countries in order to prevent the destruction of natural resources and the environment. He said that Squadron Leader Prasong was probably talking about the problems that Thailand is facing along the Cambodian border and that he doesn't want to say anything more about this until he has had a chance to discuss matters with Squadron Leader Prasong. But personally, he feels that the world's resources have always been used on a revolving basis. That is, in producing goods, you have to use raw materials from other countries to some extent. The question is whether importing such materials is proper and fitting and whether that will destroy the resources of other countries.

Mr. Sawit said that if we can't use the resources of neighboring countries, the question that must be asked is, Will trade be permitted at all? The view that investing in and using the resources of other countries is tantamount to destroying the resources of those countries is wrong. That depends on the framework and on the regulations for protecting and monitoring things to see if the import of resources is carried on properly in accord with technical principles or if that is simply destroying the resources. That also depends on the ethics of those engaged in these businesses.

Mr. Amma Siamwala, the director of the Thai Development Research Institute (TDRI), talked about our grabbing the resources of other countries. He said that if we view this from the standpoint of Thailand's interests alone and ignore the moral aspects of this, the question is, How much longer will people continue to take resources and what will the negative effects of this be? In the future, if the governments or peoples of those neighboring countries harbor resentment against Thailand, that means that we will have to spend more money to

defend the country. If we are going to exploit the resources of neighboring countries, regardless of whether it is gemstones or timber, the best way is to pay a fair price that is acceptable to the people of those countries.

However, in some countries such as Burma, it is difficult to know if that is acceptable to the Burmese people or not. But what is certain is that the Burmese government opposes the groups with which Thais have signed logging contracts. Thus, the government must look at several things, including both profits and international relations. But today, the government is looking at profits in a very short-term and near-sighted way. It is focusing on grabbing as much as possible without any thought about the future.

Mr. Nippon Phromphan, the minister of agriculture and cooperatives, disagrees with Squadron Leader Prasong about logging activities in neighboring countries. He thinks that it is the Forest Industry Organization [FIO] that should receive concessions in neighboring countries, because the FIO is involved in timber activities. It is responsible for such activities.

Mr. Nippon said that Thailand has banned timber activities in the country. Even such activities as building dams for use in generating electricity or channeling the water for use in agriculture must be considered very carefully, because such activities could affect the environment, such as the forests or forest animals. He said that he has ordered the Irrigation Department to study the effects of such activities very carefully and discuss things with the Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment.

However, the Forest Industry Organization is a state enterprise subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. It is involved in business activities involving the forests. He said that if the FIO carries on timber operations in Burma and becomes involved in such activities in the Indochina countries, that is the business of the FIO. He can't give orders. And if the government of that country permits foreigners to fell timber there, that is their policy.

A reporter asked if it is the policy of the Ministry of Agriculture to allow the FIO to fell timber and destroy the environment in neighboring countries. Mr. Nippon said that these are two separate issues. The FIO must carry on business activities, because last year, it lost 200 million baht. And the governments of those countries granted forest concessions. [passage omitted]

#### Spokesman on Charge of Support to Khmer Rouge

93SE0103D Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 22 Dec 92  
pp 1, 20

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] On 21 December, Mr. Aphisit Wetchachiwa, the spokesman attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, was interviewed about the matter of Mr. Claude Cheyson, the former French minister of foreign affairs, charging that Thailand is supporting the Khmer Rouge, thereby blocking the peace process in Cambodia. Mr. Aphisit said that that is the view of



Western countries. They think that Thailand is supporting the Khmer Rouge even though the world community has a negative view of the Khmer Rouge. Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, the minister of foreign affairs, has been trying to clarify this matter. At the recent meeting of ASEAN ministers with representatives from the European Community that was held in Jakarta recently, he said that Thailand does not have any influence over the Khmer Rouge and that we have constantly cooperated with the United Nations.

Mr. Aphisit said that steps must be taken to correct Thailand's image as the backer of the Khmer Rouge, because that is not true. Thailand is trading with all the Cambodian factions, and we are not the only country that is trading with the Khmer Rouge. Also, Thailand is the country that will be affected the most as long as the fighting in Cambodia continues. Taking action on this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is now holding talks, and this should achieve results. This is evident from the fact that the reports of the UN secretary general and the resolutions issued by the UN Security Council differ from the demands of those countries that misunderstand Thailand.

Mr. Aphisit said that the views of that former French minister are broad generalities that have been in existence for a long time. But the point to note is that not even China can exert pressure on the Khmer Rouge, and so Thailand certainly can't influence them. The fact that the United Nations has issued such a resolution indicates that Thailand has achieved a measure of success. The countries that are familiar with Thailand know what Thailand's standpoint is, and they know what UNTAC [UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia] has done and what it has achieved.

Mr. Aphisit talked about the work of UNTAC. He said that the foreign mass media is now saying that UNTAC has failed to achieve anything, and the Khmer Rouge statements about why it refuses to participate in the peace process now carry greater weight.

The government spokesman said that relaxing the enforcement of the UN embargo is a matter that must be negotiated. What will be achieved is another matter. But Thailand will have to act in accord with the agreement with the United Nations, because the long-term interests of the country are fundamental. We cannot place the interests of particular groups above the country's long-term interests. There must be a clear understanding about this. [passage omitted]

#### **Editorials Continue Criticism of UN Sanctions**

##### **Trade with Khmer Rouge Termed Slight**

93SE0102A Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 4 Dec 92 p 3

[Editorial: "Thailand Is Not a Mandate Country"]

[Text] UN Security Council resolution 792, which imposes sanctions on the Khmer Rouge, will affect not only the Cambodians in the Khmer Rouge-zone of influence but also Thailand. It can be said that it is

Thailand that will be affected the most by this. This can be reduced by using Article 50 of the UN Charter and by being united in the effort to restore our country's prestige.

It must be admitted that UN Security Council resolution 792 clearly reflects the decline in Thailand's position in the eyes of the world. It's also very unfortunate that Mr. "Ongter Ardoss," the president of the UN Security Council, never saw fit to discuss matters with Thailand either directly or indirectly even though without Thailand the protracted war in Cambodia would not have stopped and the peace process would not have reached this point.

However, as a member of the United Nations and as a former president of the UN Security Council, Thailand has clearly stated that it will abide by this resolution on condition that the sovereignty, laws, and integrity of Thailand are not violated. This was clearly stated in a written statement—No. 1740/2523 issued on 30 November 1992 by Mr. Nit Phibunsongkhram, the head of the Thai permanent delegation to the United Nations—sent to president of the UN Security Council.

Thailand has clearly indicated that with reference to the resolution prohibiting certain goods from being imported from or exported to Cambodia, the checkpoints must be located in Cambodia. The United Nations must be ready to confront the Khmer Rouge. Thailand will not allow UN forces to be based in Thailand or use Thailand as a protective shield. As for implementing resolution 792, Thailand asks that matters be discussed fully with Thailand in accord with Article 50 of the UN Charter with respect to what can be done and what the obstacles are.

In view of the decision to impose sanctions, Thais do not want anything more to do with the problems concerning the four Cambodian factions. Thailand must remain neutral. Thais should know that Thailand is not a country under the mandate of the United Nations. They cannot enter our country by land, sea, or air without informing us in advance in accord with regulations. We cannot bend again. If they want to fly here, they must notify us at least three days in advance.

What is very upsetting is that there have been reports that Thailand is opposing the resolution by adhering to the laws strictly. The fact is, Thailand's trade with the Khmer Rouge is very small. But the honor of our country is very important. Thus, we repeat, Thailand is not a country under the mandate of the United Nations.

##### **Pressure on Khmer Rouge 'Won't Be Easy'**

93SE0102B Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 8 Dec 92 p 3

[Editorial]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It won't be easy to get the Khmer Rouge to adhere to the peace agreement even though the Khmer Rouge have to rely on Thailand in earning income from trading activities now that China has stopped giving aid. There is only one way to put

pressure on the Khmer Rouge and that is for Thailand to cooperate with the world community in adhering to the UN resolution. Even if that means losing short-term profits, we must do what is best for the country in the long term.

In solving the Cambodia problem, we must use common sense. We must do things carefully so that the nation's interests are affected as little as possible. It must not be forgotten that the United Nations has prohibited trade only with the Khmer Rouge. Thailand can still trade with the other Cambodian factions. And the ban on importing logs from Cambodia does not stem from the UN resolution. Rather, that was a resolution passed by the Cambodian Supreme National Council. Thailand will have to conduct negotiations in order to relax the ban.

#### **Paper Minimizes Extent of Trade**

93SE0102C Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 18 Dec 92 p 3

[Editorial]

[Excerpts] It seems unbelievable but the fact is the United Nations plans to "give" a great danger to this region as a "New Year's gift." After UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] is disbanded and the 20,000 UN troops are withdrawn in May 1993, it's very unlikely that we will see the birth of a new, united Cambodia. [passage omitted]

This stems from the fact that the UN Security Council has not acted carefully in solving the problems involving the Khmer Rouge, who have refused to cooperate with UNTAC and who have refused to allow inspections or lay down their arms. The Security Council passed resolution 792 based only on the reports of Mr. Yasushi Akashi. Those reports did not listen to the Khmer Rouge at all. Instead, it is believed that sanctions will force the Khmer Rouge to take heed. That is a terrible misunderstanding. It can be said that they do not understand Asia.

What is worse, it is mistakenly thought that sanctions won't work because Thailand won't cooperate out of concern for its trade. But the fact is, Thailand's trade with the Khmer Rouge is very small as compared with our volume of trade with the rest of the world. That will not be cause for regret, because on a day-to-day basis, the volume of business with all of Cambodia does not reach the level of that in the Pratu Nam area in Bangkok. We are glad that UNTAC has established border inspection points. The more the better, because that will benefit Thailand.

Stopping the import of logs will solve one of our trade problems. Why does Thailand need to trade in illegal goods in view of the fact that it can trade directly with the other three factions? [passage omitted]

We suggest that the United Nations postpone the elections in Cambodia for a year and replace those in control of UNTAC.

Don't forget that the Cambodia problem will not be solved until all four Cambodian factions reach an agreement with each other. They must not feel that they are

being exploited or oppressed by other factions. Someone acceptable to the four Cambodian factions should be found to replace Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

#### **Balance Sought in Aid to Businesses, Reputation**

93SE0102D Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 17 Dec 92 p 3

[Editorial: "The Government and the Khmer Rouge Problem"]

[Excerpts] The problems in neighboring countries, particularly Cambodia, have still not been solved. In Cambodia, there is still great political turmoil. Even though the United Nations has gone into Cambodia to help solve the problems, things have still not been settled in accord with the plan, and Thailand is being greatly affected by this.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge for refusing to participate in the UN peace process. This has affected some Thai businessmen, because they have invested heavily in the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. [passage omitted]

The government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has clearly stated that Thailand will cooperate with the United Nations in implementing the various resolutions, including the resolution to impose sanctions against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. But the actions taken in accord with the UN resolution must not violate Thai laws. At the same time, the government must consider the interests of the businessmen who have invested in the Khmer Rouge areas.

Concerning the attitude of the Thai Government, another way of saying this is that Thailand will be glad to act in accord with the UN resolution. But at the same time, we must help the Thai businessmen who have invested in logging or gemstone mining activities in the Khmer Rouge zone. This does not mean that just Thai businessmen will protect their interests. It also means that the Khmer Rouge will benefit. But how much they benefit will depend on Thailand's ability to negotiate matters and relax things.

The potential for reaping huge profits in Cambodia is very great. But the various factions in Cambodia are still arguing with each other and opposing each other. Thus, the risks involved in investing there to earn those huge profits are very great, too. At the same time, the government is taking a great risk in trying to protect investors. This has displeased other countries because of the indirect effects of this. This is a fact. In particular, others think that Thailand has played a role in blocking the peace process in Cambodia.

The United Nations formulated a plan and a fixed budget long before it decided to impose sanctions against the Khmer Rouge. A time limit was set for carrying on the peace process in Cambodia, that is, after the general election next year. Other countries are now criticizing Thailand for not cooperating with the United Nations because of the profits to be made in the Khmer Rouge

zone. They wonder if the Khmer Rouge will cooperate with the United Nations and if the peace plan will succeed. They wonder if a new agreement or peace plan will have to be formulated. This is because putting pressure on the Khmer Rouge has failed to achieve the results hoped for by the United Nations, because the Khmer Rouge continue to receive support from Thailand and from investments by Thai businessmen.

The interests of some Thai businessmen are now having a great impact on Thailand's reputation and honor in international circles. This is something that has never occurred before, and it seems that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages when we consider Thailand's overall interests. Thus, the government should find the best way out. But it probably won't be possible to find a solution that benefits the country fully.

### **Elections will Not Eliminate Khmer Rouge**

93SE0102E Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 4 Dec 92  
p 8

[Editorial]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The fact that the UN Security Council has passed a resolution prohibiting trade with the Khmer Rouge is not something that should cause Thais to raise a hue and cry. Thailand's policy is to trade with all factions. If Thais are prohibited from trading with the Khmer Rouge, they should increase trade with officials in Phnom Penh. As far as the government is concerned, it must act in accord with the UN resolution and cooperate with the international community even if this resolution is not the best way to solve the Cambodia problem and bring about a lasting peace.

The Thai Government should make preparations to deal with various problems if the Cambodia problem continues and affects things along the Thai border again because of a new round of fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the other Cambodian factions, who will have the backing of UN forces. These problems include the refugee problem, border smuggling, fighting that may spill over into Thailand, stray shells that may hit Thais, and Cambodian bandits who may come and rob Thais. It should not be thought that such things won't happen.

It should not be forgotten that the weak spot of the UN forces is that it requires huge sums of money to support these forces. How long will large contributors such as Japan and other countries agree to bear this burden? The terrible war between the Cambodian factions will flare up again as soon as the UN forces are withdrawn. Thus, no matter how much the Khmer Rouge are hated, the existence of this group cannot be denied. It will take longer than this to end of the power of the Khmer Rouge. For this reason, if people are thinking about toppling the Khmer Rouge by holding an election, the Khmer Rouge aren't stupid enough to go along with that.

### **Concerns Raised Over Thai Credibility**

93SE0102E Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 1 Dec 92 p 3

[Editorial]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Ever since the dispute between the various Cambodian factions began, the government of Mr. Hun Sen has constantly asked Thailand to stop trading with the Khmer Rouge. And now, the United Nations has imposed sanctions against the Khmer Rouge. But so far, the Thai Government's attitude has remained unclear. People in the private sector, particularly the Thai commercial banks that have opened branches in Phnom Penh, have warned their branches to be very careful and to be alert about what could happen as a result of this dispute.

We hope that the government will clarify Thailand's position so that those in the private sector can take defensive action in time. The present lack of clarity does not benefit either Thailand or those Thai businessmen who have invested in Cambodia.

The international community does not trust Thailand. In particular, if Thailand loses its credibility with the members countries of the United Nations and they charge that we are supporting the Khmer Rouge, that could lead to sanctions against Thailand, which would have a great effect on our country. The Thai business sector that has invested in Phnom Penh will not always be well protected. Thus, it's time for the government to take action on this. It should not be so concerned about internal political problems that it forgets to give attention to international politics. We cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world.

### **Columnist Distrusts Sihanouk Over Preah Vihear Temple**

93SE0104B Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 22 Dec 92 p 5

[Excerpts] I was still very young when Thailand was forced to cede the Preah Vihear Temple to Cambodia in accord with the decision of the World Court. At that time, I was a student at Triam Udom School.

I remember that all of us, both young and old, felt very hurt and were sorry to lose this temple. Today, even though that hurt has gone away, the person I still remember is "Sihanouk." It was Sihanouk who caused us to lose the Preah Vihear Temple. It was that man who caused us so much pain in the past. For this reason, whenever I write about Prince Sihanouk, readers have probably noticed that I do show him much respect. [passage omitted]

The Preah Vihear Temple is located in the Phnom Dong Rek mountains approximately 39 km from the Kantharalak District headquarters in Sisaket Province and about 600 km from Bangkok. It is about 600 meters above sea level. [passage omitted]

Cambodian soldiers still occupy that area, and the flagpole still stands there. But probably out of respect to the Thai people, they do not fly their flag. [passage omitted]

From talking with knowledgeable people, I have learned that the Cambodian forces at the temple belong to the Heng Samrin faction. They charge Thais 50 baht per person to visit the temple. But they charge foreigners 100 baht. Several hundred people visit the temple every day. That is how the Cambodians make some extra money today. [passage omitted]

And in order to benefit as much as possible from this temple and make up for what we have lost, I think that we should help promote tourism there in order to attract as many foreign tourists as possible. They will have to pay only 100 baht to gain access to the temple, but the foreign tourists will pay us for transportation, lodging, and entertainment. We should be able to earn 3-4,000 baht per person. Earning this money should help to ease the pain caused by Prince Sihanouk.

### **Thai Nation Party Leader on Chuan Administration**

93SE0090A Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 14 Nov 92  
p 3

[Interview with Praman Adireksan by Duang-ruthai Siricharoensuksi; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Duang-ruthai] What are the government's weaknesses, and what can it do to overcome those weaknesses?

[Praman] One of the government's weaknesses that the opposition parties and people can see very clearly is its lack of solidarity. This is very important. Even though a government may be composed of several parties, it must have solidarity. The various people and parties in the government can't just do whatever they want. If that is the case, the government won't be able to accomplish anything. I think that what the government is doing is at odds with what the people want. An example is the matter of prostitution in Songkhla Province. The government has announced that brothels will be closed nationwide. But the truth is, there have been prostitutes since ancient times, and no one has ever been able to stamp out prostitution. The only thing is that there have been changes. This is part of the country's income. In Hat Yai, for example, which is an economic zone in the south, this is one of the things that attracts people. In considering whether to suppress this, we must take into consideration the fact that this is, in part, an economic problem. We must look for a comprehensive way to solve this problem instead of simply announcing that this is to stop immediately. If the matter is handled that way, in about a month, the same problems will arise again. If problems arise, you can't simply transfer people, including those who have not been there very long. An example is the case of the governor of Songkhla Province, who was transferred there just a month ago. Transferring government officials is not a way to solve the problems. [passage omitted]

[Duang-ruthai] Which party is the weak link in this administration?

[Praman] I think that it is the Moral Force Party. No one in the government is sure if it will remain in the government. (laughs) That would put the government in a difficult spot. They can't be sure about the Moral Force Party, because it is out to please itself, not us. In the gubernatorial election, some people warned them not to depend on them. But that didn't do any good. They passed laws showing that were out to please themselves. The Moral Force Party may someday say that it is going to withdraw from the government (laughs), and Mr. Chuan Likphai may try to keep them from leaving. I feel sorry for Mr. Chuan. He tries not to offend anyone and to remain balanced as the leader of a government party. "I feel sorry for him. Actually, those of us in the opposition are trying to support him so that he remains in office. Changing the government every two or five months is not good for the country. All of the parties that are now opposition parties have served in the government. Thus, we all know what should and should not be done. We are opposed to changing the government frequently unless you do it yourself. But if they do a good job, we will support them.

[Duang-ruthai] In voting on whether to establish a special committee to consider the work of the Anan administration, the Social Action Party voted with the opposition. Is that a weak spot in the government?

[Praman] No, because they explained their position. This has nothing to do with the Chuan administration. It has nothing to do with the present government. It's just that people wanted to study various matters, such as the telephone issue, and find out what went on during the Anan I administration. There are apparently conditions. And there is the matter of the 2 percent royalty of the oil refinery. Those are examples. Those are major points that need to be considered. That was the intention of the Social Action Party. Even though the opposition won the vote, that will not affect the present government. We still wonder why the Chuan administration opposed that, because it had nothing to lose. Pointing out the weaknesses will benefit everyone. [passage omitted]

[Duang-ruthai] There have been reports that the Thai Nation Party [TNP] is trying to entice a former military leader to become party leader.

[Praman] I don't know how that rumor got started. We are questioning things, but that matter arose suddenly. Other parties may think that the opposition parties are strong and so they are trying to destroy us by associating us with people whom the people hate. If, for example, they say that such a person is going to become the leader of the Thai Nation Party, the popularity of our party will suffer. That's a possibility. But that truth is, there is nothing to that. I don't know how that lie got started. There have been reports, for example, that I and Mr. Banhan Silapa-acha have had lunch with Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin. But I have never met him. In our political system there are the opposition parties and the pro-government parties. If the opposition parties become strong, they will exert pressure. For example, in holding sessions in parliament, postponing motions,

voting in parliament, and so on, the opposition will win sometimes. But that is not the case today, because the government won't allow that. Today, we will lose every time. But that does not upset me. This is a game. That is the way they are playing the game, and so what can we do? If you think about it this way, you won't become too tense. It's like a game of chess. [passage omitted]

[Duang-ruthai] How many years will this parliament survive?

[Praman] As long as the administration. I don't know if there will be a cabinet reshuffle, because the government was formed just two months ago. Even though problems are cropping up now, it may be possible to solve them. I have faith in the capabilities of Mr. Chuan. And I think that the leaders of the various parties may make adjustments, because they all realize what must be done to overcome the weaknesses. I think that Mr. Chuan will be able to solve the problems. I really don't know how long the government will survive. But based on the past history of the Democrat Party, it won't last more than 6 months. (laughs)

#### **New Group of Young Politicians Formed**

93SE0104A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 12-18 Dec 92 p 17

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Within each of the pro-government parties, there have been intra-party conflicts that have developed into conflicts within the government in general. As for the opposition, it is playing its role by opposing everything, even minor matters that the people view as "samlor problems." [passage omitted]

People have grown tired of all of this, because there is no political party on which they can rely. Thus, there has been another turn toward certain political circles in a democratic system, which is similar to what happened 20-30 years ago. Because of people's feelings in today's democratic environment, younger politicians from both pro-government and opposition parties have begun talking with each other. All of them want to develop the present political system so that it lasts and makes progress.

As everyone knows, after the general election on 13 September 1992, a large number of MPs [members of parliament] were elected to the House of Representatives for the first time. Of these, several dozen are young people between the ages of 25 and 39.

The young MPs who are still new to politics or who were recently elected to parliament for the first time belong to a variety of political parties, including both pro-government and opposition parties. They often meet both officially and unofficially to exchange ideas about various matters. Most of them agree that a "good environment" should be created for Thai political circles in a democratic system. At the same time, they want to join forces in order to gain political leverage.

Because of the polarization in pro-government and opposition parties, senior people in the parties frequently don't pay much attention to the younger MPs. These the younger MPs agreed on the need to form an unofficial political group. They call this group the "Group of 18," because this group is composed of only 18 young MPs.

A high-level news source in the Democrat Party said that these 18 young MPs are taking very concrete action. They have put up money to establish an office and carry on various activities. Most of the members of this group belong to the Democrat, National Development [Chat Phattana], Freedom and Justice [Seritham], and Moral Force parties. But so far, the identities of the members have not been revealed. They have begun carrying on political activities in cooperation with other democratic organizations. After the House of Representatives convenes on 20 December, it should be possible to determine in which direction this group will move.

The "Group of 18," which is composed of Young Turks from various parties, is another political phenomenon that is worth watching, because this political group has the potential to bring about major political changes in the near future.

#### **Middle Class Entrepreneur Demographics, Political Views**

93SE0096A Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 4 Dec 92 pp 28-30

[Article by Dr. Anek Laothamthath, Thammasat University]

[Excerpts] Editor's note: This article, "Business on the Democratic Path, Theory and Practice," by Dr. Anek Laothamthath, the director of the Masters in Political Economics program at Thammasat University, was previously presented at the annual seminar held at the Political Economics Centers, Chulalongkorn University, on 10-12 November 1992. [passage omitted]

Who were the businessmen who became interested in politics and democracy during that period? The answer can be found in a study conducted by Dr. Thongchai Wongchaisuwan of the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, who conducted a survey among businessmen in general (rather than at political gatherings or demonstrations) in October 1991.

Dr. Thongchai divided the 640 businessmen surveyed into two groups, that is, business owners and professional managers who are paid a salary by business owners. One of the interesting findings of Dr. Thongchai was that almost all of the businessmen felt that if politics is unstable, the economy will suffer. Eighty-nine percent of the business owners, 92 percent of the mid-echelon managers, and 95 percent of the senior managers said that this has a great or moderate effect on the economy. (See Table 1)

**Table 1: The Relationship Between Business Position and Views on Whether the Present Poor Economic Situation Stems from the Political Atmosphere**

The Poor Economy Stems from Politics	Business Position		
	Business Owners	Mid-Echelon Managers	Senior Managers
Great effect	72 (49.3%)	156 (55.9%)	99 (44.0%)
Moderate effect	58 (39.7%)	100 (35.8%)	114 (50.7%)
Small or no effect	16 (11%)	23 (8.2%)	12 (5.3%)
Total	146 (100%)	279 (100%)	225 (100%)

Source: Thongchai Wongchaisuwan, "Political Views of businessmen, Table 17.

When asked how great an effect the constitutional and election problems have had on investment, 59.9 percent of the business owners, 71.2 percent of the mid-echelon

managers, and 82.1 percent of the senior managers said that these problems have had a great effect. (See Table 2)

**Table 2: Relationship Between Business Position and views on Whether Having a Constitution and Election Will Have a Good Effect on Thailand's Investment Climate.**

Effect of Having a Constitution and Election on the Investment Climate	Business Position		
	Business Owners	Mid-Echelon Managers	Senior Managers
Great effect	88 (59.9%)	198 (71.2%)	184 (82.1%)
Moderate effect	48 (29.3%)	72 (25.9%)	32 (14.3%)
Small or no effect	16 (10.6%)	8 (2.8%)	8 (3.6%)
Total	147 (100%)	270 (100%)	224 (100%)

Source: Thongchai Wongchaisuwan, "Political Views of Businessmen," Table 16

The responses to those two questions show that the percentage of professional managers who want democracy (that is, who think that it is very or moderately important to have a constitution and an election, with the percentages being 71.2 and 82.1 percent respectively) is clearly higher than the percentage of business owners who feel this way (59.9 percent). (See tables 1 and 2)

Thus, when we talk about "businessmen" or "financiers," we must not forget the role of the professional

managers. Their role is becoming more and more important, because Thai capitalism has developed to the point where professional managers are needed to reinforce or replace the business owners or their children.

Dr. Thongchai found that most of the businessmen who saw a relationship between having democracy and the investment climate were businessmen in large businesses or businesses having many international contacts. (See tables 3 and 4)

**Table 3: Relationship Between Size of Business and Views on Whether Having a Constitution and Elections Will Have a Good Effect on the Country's Investment Climate**

Effect of Having a Constitution and Elections on the Investment Climate	Size of Business			
	Below 2 Million/Month	2-5 million/Month	5-10 Million/Month	More than 10 Million/Month
Great effect	43 (50%)	117 (67.6%)	134 (72.4%)	190 (85.8%)
Moderate effect	30 (34.9%)	47 (27.2%)	46 (24.9%)	22 (10%)
Little or no effect	13 (15.1%)	9 (5.2%)	5 (2.7%)	7 (3.2%)
Total	86 (100%)	173 (100%)	185 (100%)	219 (100%)

Source: Thongchai Wongchaisuwan, "Political Views of Businessmen," Table 18



**Table 4: Relationship Between Level of Contact with Other Countries and Views on Whether Having a Constitution and Elections Will Have a Good Effect on the Country's Investment Climate**

Effect of Having a Constitution and Election on the Investment Climate	Level of Contact With Other Countries		
	Great	Moderate Effect	Little
Great effect	273 (81.7%)	173 (88.4%)	49 (51.6%)
Moderate effect	50 (15%)	75 (29.6%)	28 (29.5%)
Little or not effect	11 (3.3%)	5 (2.0%)	16 (18.9%)
Total	334 (100%)	253 (100%)	95 (100%)

Source: Thongchai Wongchaisuwan, "Political Views of Businessmen," Table 20.

When General Suchinda decided to raise the stakes in his life by becoming prime minister amidst opposition from many quarters in April 1992, many businessmen joined the "hand-held mob." The Sociology Association conducted a survey among those who participated in the demonstrations against Gen. Suchinda and found that 76 percent were below the age of 39. Many of these, 36.5 percent, were people who had been working for many years, that is, they were between the ages of 30 and 39. That was about the same percentage as those in the 20-29 year-old age group. Classified by level of income, almost half of those who participated in the demonstrations (45.5 percent) were in the lower and upper middle classes, that is, people with incomes of 10-49,000 baht per month.

In what professions were these people? The answer is that most were in the business sector. Of those who participated in the demonstrations, 13.7 percent were business owners, and 45.7 percent were people who worked for a salary in the private sector. Thus, altogether, almost 60 percent of those who participated in the demonstrations were people from the private sector.

In short, both business owners and professional managers below the age of 39 were an important element in driving Gen. Suchinda out of office.

These data are in line with the results of prior studies conducted by Dr. Thongchai.

How did businessmen participate in the movement?

Based on various newspaper reports, it can be seen that some business owners gave their employees permission to leave work to participate in the demonstrations without loss of pay. Some people provided vehicles to take their employees to the demonstration sites, and some donated hundreds of thousands of baht to buy food to feed the demonstrators. And several corporate presidents with capital of millions of baht participated in the demonstrations in person.

This is the first time in history that large numbers of businessmen participated directly in the struggle for democracy. Thus, the events of "terrible May" were different from the events of "14 October 1973" in the sense that businessmen did not simply provide support from afar and wait to see what the results of the struggle of others would be, which was the case in 1973. Rather,

they played a direct role in forcing the Thai ship of state to return to democratic waters. [passage omitted]

This is also the first time that three institutes of business leaders in the private sector issued statements on political matters without regard as to whether the law prohibits the chamber of commerce and business associations from interfering in politics.

Prior to this, business associations had never expressed political views or voiced political demands. If they issued a statement or were interviewed on matters concerning the state, they spoke only about matters having to do with implementing the country's economic policies that concerned their businesses.

Even though the proposal to dissolve parliament was aimed at curtailing further demonstrations and preventing more clashes between the government and the demonstrators, the result was the appointment of Mr. Anan Panyarachun, who had the support of almost all factions, to the position of prime minister once again and the establishment of a government that had the courage to remove former National Peacekeeping Council leaders from their positions as military commanders and arrange a fair election to restore democracy in the country.

After the situation returned to normal, a number of businessmen supported the development of democracy in various ways. For example, in the name of the "BMS" and "Ploenchit 35" groups, a number of senior professional managers announced that they would "contribute money" to high-quality politicians to enable them to run for election. They also provided financial support for various programs that disseminated information helpful to the people in deciding for whom to vote.

Members of the BMS and Ploenchit 35 groups included Olan Chaiprawat, Thanadi Sophonsiri, Narongchai Akkhonserani, Akon Huntrakun, Chainarong Intharamisap, and Noppaphon Ruangsakun. Some of the common characteristics shared by these businessmen were that they were in their late forties, they had never been involved in politics before (even though some had helped form new parties following the events of 14 October 1973), and they were familiar with Western ideas and the Western way of life.



At Sasin at Chulalongkorn University, after the events of May 1992, Noppaphon Ruangsakun said that he and many of his colleagues had spent many years studying abroad and that they belonged to the "hippie-flower children" generation.

Another interesting group of pro-democracy businessmen is the "Businessmen for Democracy Group." This group did not support anyone in the election. Instead, it tried to promote new political values among villagers. Recently, this group donated approximately 500,000 baht to hold village contests to enable people to understand democracy and elect good-quality representatives free from vote buying. (MATICHON 20 August 92)

The leaders of the Businessmen for Democracy Group are Prasan Marukphithak and Phichian Amnatworaprasoet. Most of the members of this group are about 40 years old, and most participated in the student demonstrations of 14 October 1993 and 6 October 1976.

What caused Thai businessmen to change their attitude from one of indifference to or even support for the National Peacekeeping Council to one of unprecedented opposition?

The answer is that the new generation of middle-class people in Bangkok and the provinces refuse to accept a military government. Their demonstrations led to bloody clashes and great political confusion. Because of this, the formula of those businessmen who think that military rule means political security can no longer be used.

Those who participated in the May 1992 demonstrations were dealt with much more brutally than those who participated in the demonstrations of 14 October 1973 and 6 October 1976. The television pictures that were shown worldwide made people realize that the nation's prestige had declined greatly. In the words of Dr. Prawet Wasi, those terrible actions had the same effect as if someone had caused Thailand to fall and split apart or become a "barbarous land." [passage omitted]

In the view of businessmen, this political insecurity was very important, because it did unprecedented damage to the economy. This is because Thailand's economy is now tied more closely to the world economy than in the past. Businessmen know that international economic circles are much more concerned about Thailand's political stability than we are. [passage omitted]

## MILITARY

### 3d Army Region Commander Profiled

93SE0085A Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 6 Dec 92  
p 5

[Excerpt] Today, DAILY NEWS Square would like to introduce an important military commander. He is responsible for the entire northern region of Thailand. This man is Lieutenant General Yingyot Chotphimai, the commander of the 3d Army Region. A few days ago,

reports stated that he will fly to Burma to hold talks on several issues. Recently, Burma has been acting very strangely. Burmese forces arrested the district officer of Mae Sot District and several other Thais. And most recently, Burmese forces seized Hill 491, which has belonged to Thailand for a long time. They claimed that they were attacking Karen forces. They have held that hill since February. Initially, the 3d Army Region commander planned to go hold talks, but a "higher unit" ordered him not to go, fearing that Burma would use this to delay things.

Lt. Gen. Yingyot was born on 15 June 1935 in Nakhon Ratchasima Province. His father, Lt. Gen. Phanom Chotphimai, was an officer who held the position of assistant commander in chief of the Army. And he was a combat commander. His mother is Phachun Chotphimai.

As for his educational background, he began school in Nakhon Ratchasima Province. He attended "C.Q." When his father was transferred, he transferred to the Phibun Withayalai School in Lopburi. He completed secondary school at the Phaisan Sin School. After that, he attended the Officers' Preparatory School and then the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy as a member of Class 6. Class 6 classmates include Army Chief of Staff General Pramon Phalasin, Police General Manat Khrutchaiyan, and Police Lieutenant General Homwon. Lt. Gen. Yingyot decided to take the infantry course, graduating in 1959.

He has spent most of his career in command units such as infantry battalions, the Infantry Center, and various combat units. He fought in the Korean and Vietnam wars and participated in suppressing the terrorists in the north.

He attended the Army Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, and the National Defense College as a member of Class 31, the same class as General Wirot Saengsanit, Air Chief Marshal Suthep Theppharak, and Admiral Prachet Siridet.

He has served as the commander of the 1st Air Cavalry Battalion, Erawan Camp, Lopburi. He has also served as the chief of staff of the 3d Army Region and the commander of the 3d Corps. In October 1992 he was appointed 3d Army Region commander.

He is married to a Chulalongkorn University graduate. Their oldest son, Kittiphon, earned his B.A. degree in political science from Chulalongkorn University and his M.A. degree in political science from Thammasat University. Their second child, Nonthawat, earned his degree in law from Thammasat University. Their youngest child, a daughter named Chatraphon, earned a degree in liberal arts from Thammasat University.

This commander adheres firmly to the Buddhist principle of "keep your heart pure" because that will bring happiness. [passage omitted]

## ECONOMIC

**Piang Luang Burma Border Trade Prompts Appeal***93SE0111A Bangkok NAE0 NA PHU YING in Thai 8 Dec 92 p 6*

[Around the Golden Triangle column by Siri Antharin: "What Is Happening in Piang Luang?"]

[Text] When the villagers of Piang Luang Subdistrict, which is located in Wiang Haeng Branch-district of Chiang Mai Province and which is headed by a man called "Mr Chanasak Yuwabura", went as a group to petition provincial officials, they had six demands.

They wanted the entry point at the Lak Taeng Pass opened so that there would be free trade between Thailand and Burma, and they wanted the police in their area prohibited from arresting the Thai Yai who came to buy goods in the markets near the border in the area of Ban Piang Luang Village.

The effect had been that they had fled home.

It was important that there be a compromise which allowed foreigners to come to the village for more than three days.

Another demand was that 6,000 water buffalo be allowed in as in the past.

The benefit of this would be an income of 30 million per month which was now lost. One could imagine what the taxes per month would be. The reduction by officials to 1,000 per month was a large reduction.

Province officials took these demands under consideration to see if opening the border entry point at the Lak Taeng pass would alleviate the real problems of the people of the area with regard to making a living inasmuch as the main entry point at Chiang Dao was about 79 km from the area of the Lak Taeng Pass and Piang Luang Subdistrict of Wiang Haeng Branch-district, and the Lak Taeng Pass was 12 km from the Wiang Haeng Branch-district. In addition communications were not as convenient as they should be because in this area the roads were informal and private.

This matter had to be taken under consideration.

It would be done or not done without any argument.

With regard to the village leadership leading the villagers to make these demands, if one considered the issue carefully, it did not matter if garlic was brought from Burma to Thailand. They said it would not affect the price of garlic in the area as much as the garlic which was pouring forth into their markets from the markets of Fang District. But the customs officials in the area would have a hard time.

In addition they wanted the quota for buffalo increased.

There had been rumors about the bringing in of 50 to 100 buffalo per day. Take the figure 4,000 and it multiplies out to the figure for the the money which was mentioned. Now find the percentage...excuse me...find the tariff.

Which pocket has this income ended up in?

The buffalo were transported by truck - the trip took two days. You cannot say that no one saw them on this route in the past.

But if it is said that officials were bribed...believe it!

According to sources there were three units responsible for activities in this area:

One, the administration; two, the police; three, livestock officials.

I would like to inform on them so that something can be done. As for a fourth party I do not know who it might be and do not point any group out.

Go and bring the tired procession of villagers to the province...

**Businessmen, MPs Comment on Cambodia Venture Losses***93SE0097A Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 4 Dec 92 p 22*

[Excerpts] So far, there has not been any final word from the United Nations on what action will be taken with respect to Thailand to ensure that the Cambodia peace plan signed in Paris, France, hits the targets. [passage omitted]

Today, whenever the United Nations, or UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia], takes action there, it has to use Hun Sen troops to provide protection. And people have demanded that the United Nations pass a resolution to close the Thai border.

Looking at the potential losses facing Thai businessmen, it can be seen why many factions want the United Nations to close the Thai border in the Khmer Rouge zone.

Based on data of approximately 20 timber companies that have been granted concessions there, which does not include the hundred or so subcontracting companies that are carrying on operations, Mr. Sophon Kosuma, the owner of the Rung Ruang Pailin and Pailin Rung Rot companies said that as far as timber operations are concerned, each of these 20 companies stands to lose an average of 300-400 million baht for a total loss of approximately 6-8 billion baht.

Mr. Somchai Niyomkit, a Democrat Party MP [member of parliament] from Chanthaburi Province, said that his gemstone mining company stands to lose up to 3 billion baht, and his is not the largest company.

Mr. Phichet Kanchanasutthisaeng, the secretary of the Sawannaphruk Sawmill, said that the Thai Government

will immediately lose 300 leading businessmen along the border if the border is closed. At the same time, losses will average at least 100 million baht per company.

Even though no one knows for sure what the actual losses will be, using the figure of 100 million baht times 300, that means that Thai businessmen stand to lose a total of 30 billion baht.

It's unbelievable that the Khmer Rouge zone is a source of such huge amounts of money. But that is a fact, because almost all of Cambodia's important resources are in that area. The areas controlled by the Phnom Penh, Son Sann, and Prince Ranariddh factions contain few resources, and so it isn't worth it for foreign companies to make large long-term investments.

The Khmer Rouge-controlled zone has up to 10 million cubic meters of timber that can be felled for commercial purposes. Assuming that Thai plywood companies will buy this timber from Thai merchants at a price of 4,500 baht per cubic meter, that timber is worth a total of 45 billion baht. And the potential loss facing that single gemstone mining company shows that the value of the gemstones still in the ground is at least 10 billion baht. This does not include the value of the "oil" sites that are

waiting to be exploited. It is thought that there are oil reserves there of inestimable value.

Everyone wants possession of those very valuable resources and so there is nothing surprising about the fact that the Khmer Rouge refuses to give up its weapons. It has proposed an exchange, saying that the border there can be closed if the border with Vietnam is closed, too. It is well known that Haiphong Port is the exit point for timber that has been processed at the computerized sawmill, which belong to Japanese businessmen, located in Kompong Som. And it is known that once peace is restored in Cambodia, Japanese, Hong Kong, Singaporean, and Korean businessmen will immediately rush in and replace Thai businessmen. Thus, the Khmer Rouge has refused to give in, because if peace is restored, the Khmer Rouge will be dominated by Phnom Penh, and it will lose its role in managing these resources. Also, during the civil war in Cambodia, the world community has condemned the Khmer Rouge for committing various atrocities. Thus, for the Khmer Rouge there is no guarantee that this issue will not be used to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders. [passage omitted]

## POLITICAL

**Vu Oanh on Upholding People's Role in Building Government**

932E0042A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Sep 92  
p 3

[Article by Vu Oanh: "Thoroughly Understand Ho Chi Minh's Thought, Uphold the People's Role in Building the Administration"]

[Text] In the process of carrying out renovation, establishing an economic system according to the market mechanism, building culture, and developing democracy in our country, the administration is playing an increasingly important role.

**Relying on the People and Bringing Their Intellectual Powers Into Full Play [Footnote 1] [All subheads by NHAN DAN]**

In our country, the number-one lesson drawn from all victories from past to present is precisely that of considering the people as the roots. For this reason, in this domain, the party must lead the people, rely on them, and bring into full play their strength and intellectual powers to build, consolidate, rectify, and perfect our state apparatus.

At present, our state is embarking on a new process of building itself into the law-governed state of a socialist democracy. The party's platform adopted by the seventh party congress clearly stated: "We must revise the state organizational system, reform the administrative apparatus, and strengthen law-enforcement organs to efficiently carry out the state's management function." Carrying out these great, complicated, and all-encompassing tasks cannot be the duty of specialized state or party organs alone but also is an undertaking of the entire people, as President Ho Chi Minh put it: "*Renovation and building are the responsibility of all the people.*" (See "100 Statements About Democracy by Ho Chi Minh"—XAY DUNG DANG [Party Building Review], May 1992). Enabling the people to fulfill their responsibility for "renovating" and "building" the state administrative apparatus in all aspects is a principle all democratic states must lay down. President Ho Chi Minh had an even more concrete concept: "Authority and force all rest with the people." (See document cited above). Thus, the people not only are responsible but also have the authority and force (both intellectual and material) to build and improve their own state apparatus. President Ho Chi Minh also pointed out the contents, domains, and even methods for the people to fulfill the role mentioned above. He said: "The government earnestly wishes that our compatriots will help, supervise, control, and criticize it so it can fulfill its duties." He also said that "Let us turn over all problems to the people for discussion and resolution" and that "Let us rely on the people's opinions to reform our cadres and organizations." This is precisely meant to bring into full play the people's right to direct democracy in the field of administration building.

The party must exert leadership to create necessary material conditions for implementing this democratic right of the people. In the immediate future, we must heighten the people's level of intellect because their sense of law and citizenship can be upheld only if their cultural standard is developed. However, if the people suffer privations in their material life and have to constantly worry about making a living, then it would be difficult for them to pay more attention to less urgent matters. Being conscious and capable of—and having the necessary standard for—contributing to building the administration in both the contents of its work and the issues related to the operational methods, behavior, and quality of the administration apparatus and its personnel at all levels, from the center on down to the grass roots... is an aggregate capability that reflects a definite level of comprehensive development of society. This capability—the power to discuss state affairs and control state operations—must be the combined results of an all-out effort in all fields of activities. First of all, it must be translated into perception and sustained programs of action of party organizations.

**The people's participation in controlling state operations**

The people's capability and standard of contributing opinions to and controlling the state apparatus are reflected in the following four levels of activities:

- Expressing one's thinking;
- Presenting one's aspirations;
- Making concrete suggestions and proposals on each issue and each job; and
- Presenting plans and aggregate solutions.

In recent years, in the process of collecting the people's opinions, we have seen that the bulk of their views remained at the level of expressing thinking and aspirations, such as suggesting that the upper echelons should do this, wishing that the party and government would do that.... The value of most of these suggestions remained at the level of public opinion rather than constituting proposals for diverse projects and solutions. What is involved here is both a matter of social conditions and standards and a question of ways and methods used by responsible agencies in bringing into full play the people's role in this domain. The people will actively contribute opinions to building the administration only when their views are really respected and studied in a serious, responsible, and scientific fashion for application.

Second, there should be a system of laws and regulations to ensure that the task of bringing into full play the people's role in administration building is translated into a principle, a regulation, or a mandatory responsibility of the administration at all levels, be it in the administrative or judicial domain, in economy or culture and education. We once had a regulation on people's inspectors, but this document was just an exercise in formalism and had no discernible social effects. Why? First of all, that regulation had not become a kind of legal knowledge of all levels of the administration. It is necessary to

supplement and perfect various regulations and laws aimed at bringing into full play the people's role in building the administration. However, what matters is the capability and responsibility of various echelons for guarding against formalism in implementing these regulations and laws. We once also had a people-receiving system. But there had occurred in not a few places and sectors the state of "starting an undertaking and leaving it unfinished," with the system being implemented in a formalistic, perfunctory manner.

Third, we must actively raise the capability and revise the mode and methods of party work and administrative operations in those spheres of activities bearing on this issue. If we continue to maintain bureaucratism and formalism in the organs of social leadership and management, then it will also be impossible to bring into full play the people's role. If the capabilities of state cadres and personnel are not elevated, if the work regulations and the standardization of legal duties and responsibility for social and state management are not renovated, and if we continue to consider receiving the people's opinions as a formalistic undertaking, it will be difficult for us to accept a new source of energy capable of creating a new capability and standard for our state apparatus. Recently, the people throughout the country contributed millions of different opinions on all domains. We should not be content with merely publicizing our courteous replies thanking them and promising to continue studying their ideas.... Organizing studies and handling of the opinions contributed by the people with an eye to quickly translating them into social results must become an ethical concern, a sense of law, and a content of the work programs of party committees and the administration at all levels, especially the heads of apparatuses of various organs.

#### **Social "Channels" Through Which the People's Right to Mastery Is To Be Brought Into Full Play**

Through which "channels" of society should the people's direct democratic right to building the administration be implemented? There are two important channels to which we should pay attention.

First, through the press. In a modern society, the press plays an increasingly bigger role. For this reason, Karl Marx regarded the press as the ears and eyes, the spirit, the intellect of the people and society. We should see to it that the people could make an ever better and more effective use of the press in the process of building and perfecting their state. The press is reflecting in an increasingly diversified manner the thinking and aspirations of the people, including their criticisms of and suggestions about the shortcomings, weaknesses, and mistakes of cadres and state personnel and of policies... of the administration. We must also do whatever we can to promote publication in the press of an increasingly larger number of strategically important aggregate socioeconomic and cultural projects and measures of the state and nation, and to enable the press to feature not just articles explaining state positions and policies but also

real opinions of various sections of the population endowed with a variety of knowledge in specific fields of activities.

To meet this requirement, on the one hand we must uphold the sense of responsibility, capability, and standard of the contingent of professional journalists, from the task of editing to managing and distributing. Another important matter is that social management organs in any field of activities must be capable and have methods of promptly handling and using all information provided by the people in the press.

Attaching great importance to and making use of the press as a channel for bringing into full play the people's direct democratic right to build, control, and perfect the state system must be regarded as a new standard of capability in our society. Naturally, it is also very necessary and imperative to revamp the information and press organs and overcome by all means the phenomena of unfaithful and untruthful news reporting, exaggerating facts with bad intentions, and even misusing the pen to support activities against our regime, to spread decadent culture to the detriment of the good morals and fine customs of our nation, and so forth.

The second channel is the role of various mass organizations. At present, the mass organizations have formed a very broad and diversified social system. It is precisely because of this that the 1992 Constitution affirms that the mass organizations that are members of the Vietnam Fatherland Front are the political bases of our state.

President Ho Chi Minh once asserted: "Mass organizations are organizations of the people; they struggle on the people's behalf, defend the people's interests, and maintain close connections between the people and government" (See the document already cited above). Among the people's interests are their political rights to discuss affairs of the state and society, to make proposals for new laws and social policies, and so forth. Maintaining close connections between the people and government is aimed first of all, as Ho Chi Minh saw it, at enabling the people to "supervise," "criticize," and "control" their administration apparatus. This is the basic meaning of mastery, because the master is the one who has the rights to supervise, criticize, and control. If these natural rights of the master cannot be exercised, then his mastery exists only in name and as a mere formality. The mass organizations should fully perceive this role of theirs. The party and state should also know how to uphold this role.

#### **The Role of the Various Mass Organizations**

The first thing the mass organizations must do in accordance with their functions is to muster the intellectual powers of the masses, of their members, and of people of various social strata with whom they maintain direct connections to contribute to elaborating positions and policies, which consist of socioeconomic and cultural policies at the macroscopic level and work policies bearing on the people's standard of living at the grassroots level.

Our state should devise good systems and policies aimed at duly bringing into full play the mass organizations' role in this undertaking. People's opinions should be solicited or competitions held to select optimal solutions for socioeconomic or cultural projects and programs of the government and local administrations.

The second thing that can and should be done is to bring into full play the mass organizations' role of social control over operations of the state apparatus. In the immediate future, we should pay attention to the two major defects—bureaucratism and corruption—that remain serious in our administrative apparatus. The government and local administrations must adopt new forms and measures of cooperation to actively and effectively counter these two evils. Bureaucratism and corruption have become stinging ulcers in various sectors and at various levels, and their consequences and harmful effects cannot be made light of. However, this is a complicated and difficult problem. If we do not change our perceptions and work methods and lack regulations of a new legal character, everything will continue to be just an unfulfilled dream. The government and mass organization should reevaluate the implementation of the regulation on people's inspectors and promulgate new statutes to enable the mass organizations to join the state in realizing what Ho Chi Minh had longed for: "Let us rely on the people's opinions to rectify our cadres and organizations."

Of course, if the mass organizations do not improve themselves in terms of learning, ethics, sense of responsibility, and improvement of operational methods, they will not be capable of assuming that lofty and weighty function.

The third thing to do is that the mass organizations, together with the administration (the executive and judiciary branches) should solve court cases—most of them civil cases—in which citizens' interests are hurt by actions of government personnel or agencies. In our country, owing to acute social changes, to insufficient legislation, and to the still low ethical standard and quality of not a few state cadres and employees, many civil cases involving ordinary citizens on one side and administrative agencies on the other side have dragged on, thereby offending the people and lessening the state's prestige. It is the duty of the mass organizations to promptly protect the people's interests, rectify all injustices perpetrated by a component of cadres and personnel of the state apparatus, and make the administration healthy. President Ho Chi Minh once touched on this issue in these terms: Once an injustice is committed, the mass organizations may denounce it to the upper echelons. This is a democratic right of all Vietnamese citizens." (See the document already cited above).

The fourth thing to do is that the mass organizations, by means of their propaganda activities, should work in coordination with the administration at various levels and with various sectors to disseminate positions, policies, and procedures... of the state. Of this task, an

important and regular effort is to educate mass organization members and the people so as to uphold their legal knowledge and the sense of respecting and living and working according to the law.

To bring into full play the mass organizations' role in the task of contributing to building the administration, we must work toward a law on the operations of mass organizations. In this law, the area of responsibility and mode of operation of mass organizations in connection with the administration must be concretely determined. Moreover, the law must also lay down regulations and procedures on the state's management responsibility and investment for the mass organizations' activities in this important domain. If concrete legal and material conditions are lacking, the mass organizations' participation in building the administration will remain just an abstract concept.

Ho Chi Minh's thought on democracy not only upheld the people's supreme power but also affirmed their responsibility and capability in building and defending the administration. Studying and applying Ho Chi Minh's thought to establish regulations and systems and to create more material conditions for bringing into full play the people's great role in this domain is also an important task of ours.

#### Article Reports Various Discussions at Youth Congress

932E0020B Ho Chi Minh City TUOI TRE  
in Vietnamese 17 Oct 92 pp 1, 9

[Unattributed article: "The Youth Union in the New Building Era: If No Renovation Is Carried Out, the Next Congress Will Be Attended Only by Slogan-Chanting Old Delegates"]

[Text] At the center where the topic "Building the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union [HCMCYU] in the New Conditions—Problems and Solutions" is being discussed, nearly all delegates unanimously agreed that the HCMCYU organizational system and cadre contingent are still weak; that the union membership has decreased both quantitatively and qualitatively; and that the union organizations' prestige in society has also diminished. Meanwhile, the fast-changing situation of youths and socioeconomic management mechanism are in conflict with the slow renewal of the organizational structure and the contents and methods of the youth union's operations, and the necessary material bases and funds for the union's activities are still lacking. This state of affairs requires that the HCMCYU should seek solutions to remedy it. But, what measures should we take, and where should we begin? Some opinions held that we should begin with the HCMCYU cadre contingent, while others maintained that we should start by caring for young people's legitimate interests. It was also suggested that we should commence by resolving the question of whether we have a correct or incorrect perception of the HCMCYU building work, because this is the jumping-off point for the process of renovating the union's organization and operations. As Mr. Nguyen Duy Hung,

secretary of the HCMCYU Central Committee, put it: "Viewed from different angles, all these opinions are right; but if we consider the matter as a whole, the HCMCYU building work calls for a simultaneous application of different measures, of which the ideological, organization, and interest factors constitute a single whole and cannot be separated from one another."

Expressing different views from those of the HCMCYU Central Committee, Mr. Thao Xuan Sung, secretary of the Son La Provincial HCMCYU, contended that we should begin with creating the union's cadre sources and should take appropriate care of the cadre contingent. He said: "HCMCYU cadres are the party's most valuable asset. If youth union secretaries are not paid the salaries they deserve, the HCMCYU will disintegrate. Before leaving for this congress, we had contacted more than 500 youth union cadres and members, and most of them suggested the same thing. In the current market mechanism, no one will agree to use his own resources for the performance of public service as before. We now have Resolution 25, but the whole country still lacks a policy in support of its implementation; therefore, at the grass-roots level, the youth unions have to rely mainly on the kindness of the administration for their operations. The building of the HCMCYU should not be talked about in general terms, but conditions and material bases must be created for the union to operate, and these conditions and bases must be institutionalized on the state plane." Partly agreeing with this opinion, Mr. Nguyen Anh Xuan, secretary of the Nong Cong District Youth Union (Thanh Hoa Province), raised the question whether the HCMCYU has set for itself too ambitious targets but conditions have not been created for it to operate. He said: "For example, the HCMCYU is the school of communism for youths, but the conditions for this educational task are too difficult. There are 40 youth union bases in my district and most have to work in the offices of the district people's committee and cooperatives. How can the youth union educate its members and youths when its cadres even lack a place in which to work?"

Concerning this issue, Mr. Le Nhat Tan, member of the Ho Chi Minh City HCMCYU Standing Committee, said the city's youth union did have different views: Youth union cadres must be specialized and standardized. It is unacceptable that, throughout many years of their youth union work, cadres refuse to study and just sit still waiting to be placed according to assignment plans. A representative of the Song Be Provincial Youth Union also maintained: "In my opinion, youth union cadres must have professions, to which they will return after doing youth union work. If these cadres keep demanding for better conditions but refuse to study, then their problems will be difficult to solve. I think that youth union cadres at the grass-roots level should assume different tasks concurrently, and that union cadres at the district, provincial, and central levels should do likewise." According to him, building the youth union in the new period requires a review of the youth union issue through the activities of youth organizations. As young

people's needs become increasingly diversified, the HCMCYU alone cannot satisfy them if it lacks the conditions ensuring the efficiency of its operations. For example, we claim that the HCMCYU is independent and attends to the interests of youths, but what can the union do if the party leadership over youth-related work is not renovated? He also proposed that the HCMCYU Statute should determine that youth union members should join a gifted youth organization or professional association to establish relations with the masses. This is an opinion with which Mr. Le Nhat Tan of the Ho Chi Minh City HCMCYU heartily agreed. He earnestly suggested that the HCMCYU should adopt an open system to create conditions for its members to bring into full play their capabilities and strengths. He said: "We have organized experimental professional and specialized youth union chapters in various population centers, and many of them have operated very well. But, in the schools, while many classroom youth union chapters cannot operate, the youth clubs in which many youth union member participate are doing very well. The same holds true with the Ho Chi Minh Vanguard Teenagers units and groups and with the various clubs of the city's Cultural House, but these youths are not allowed to participate in youth union organizations' activities. Would it not be better if the HCMCYU encouraged the broadening of such professional and specialized youth union chapters to rally and bring into full play the capabilities of those youth union members who wanted to join?"

Only toward the end of the debate did Mr. Phan Viet Thong, acting secretary of the Danang City Youth Union, directly raised the question that, according to him, since nearly all the delegates attending this HCMCYU congress were old, the congress did not typify the union membership but was a congress of youth union cadres (According to a report by the Committee To Review the Credentials of Delegates, of the 796 delegates on hand, only 119 are ordinary union members and only 178 are 15-28 years of age. The youngest delegate at the congress is 15, but the age of the oldest delegate is kept secret). At that point, for the first time an ordinary union member was invited to speak. He was Pham Thai Hung, 18, a member of the Quang Ninh Provincial Youth Union. Hung's statement was short and concise but provoked many thoughts among the delegates. According to Hung, "if the HCMCYU cadre contingent is not rejuvenated, the next congress will probably be attended only by slogan-chanting senile delegates. For this reason, the union must take numerous measures to rejuvenate by creating a proper environment for the younger generation to exert itself. I would like to suggest that, although those union cadres holding key positions may be persons of old age, the rallying and activities of youths should be left to us. To tell the truth, this congress is too dull; just sitting through it gives me a headache." This view was perhaps unique and quickly drowned out by other statements....



## Youth Union Congress Votes To Abolish Central Secretariat

932E0020A Ho Chi Minh City TUOI TRE  
in Vietnamese 17 Oct 92 pp 1, 9

[Article by H.P.L.: "In Its Second Day of Work, the Sixth National Youth Union Congress Votes To Abolish the Secretariat of the Youth Union Central Committee"]

[Text] On the afternoon of 16 October, at the Ba Dinh Conference Hall, the Sixth National Youth Union Congress voted to pass four articles concerning the leadership organ of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union [HCMCYU], the Standing Committee of the HCMCYU Central Committee, and the conditions for a candidate to be considered elected (Articles 8, 12, 15, and 16, Chapter II, the HCMCYU Draft Statute). There were two dissenting opinions. Thus, this Central Committee will only have a first secretary, secretaries, and Standing Committee members, as the Central Committee Secretariat has been abolished. During the afternoon and evening the same day, delegates engaged in lively discussions on the plan for the building of the Sixth HCMCYU Central Committee.

Previously, on 15 October, delegates split up for debates at six centers. Nearly all opinions suggested that party organizations at various levels should review Resolution 25 on youth mobilization work, a state structure in charge of youth-related work should be established at an early date, and a Youth Law should be adopted. The statements read by delegates at the conference hall on the second day of work contained many fairly practical suggestions. In his statement, Nguyen Van Dua, secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City HCMCYU, underlined the need to create jobs for youths. According to him, youths need capital and knowledge of market economy. He proposed that the state should allocate part of funds to the HCMCYU so that it can carry out capital procurement, job training, and placement of youths in a more active manner. He also suggested organizing a young talent sponsorship program, setting up a student study credit fund, and considering the "Return to the Sources" movement a central task of the HCMCYU ideological and cultural work program in both the short and long terms. In particular, the opinion expressed by Ms. Truong Thi Ton, secretary of the Nghia Dan District HCMCYU (Nghe An Province), stirred up strong emotion among delegates attending the congress. She suggested that the HCMCYU Central Committee should work out a plan to promptly overcome the problems left behind by its recent tenure. She also earnestly proposed that the youth union press should feature more reports on economic models and models of HCMCYU activities and fewer sexy pictures.

Today, 17 October, delegates will continue to hold discussions at the conference hall; hear opinions expressed by the leaders of various organs, departments, and branches; and elect the Sixth HCMCYU Central Committee.

## MILITARY

### General Views Problems in Renovating Logistic Supply Methods

932E0022B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese 21 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Major General Dang Huyen Phuong: "Let Us Continue To Improve the Renovation of the Logistic Supply Methods"]

[Text] The new logistic supply methods, which are increasing clearly showing their superiority, progressive character, and suitability for the current economic mechanism, have made their effectiveness felt in the task of ensuring soldiers' living conditions.

However, in the process of implementing renovation, there have appeared a number of problems to which better, more effective solutions should be found to improve the logistic supply methods.

### On the Problem of Rotating Combat-Ready Reserves

When the dual-price mechanism was still in effect, every echelon and unit wanted to maintain great supply reserves; the greater the reserves, the greater their peace of mind. That situation constantly caused artificial shortages in the procurement of logistic supplies and inevitably resulted in the state of soldiers having to consume goods some of which had declined in quality owing to their being kept in storage for a long time. To mention military provisions alone, in the past, since they were provided in kind according to legal norms, Armed Forces units had no control over schedules, quantity, and sometimes even quality (because they were compelled to accept deliveries according to set norms). Now that all their food expenses are monetarized, units can take the initiative in exploiting the sources of grain, foodstuffs, and fuel offered by the multisector commodity economy in the areas where they are stationed. Units authorized to exploit these sources have directly signed contracts with suppliers according to set plans and schedules to have foodstuffs delivered right to their kitchens, thereby reducing the number of intermediary levels, ensuring their good quality, freshness, and tastiness....

The question posed here is how provisions should be consumed on a rotational basis to constantly ensure that food reserves will neither dwindle nor degenerate.

Since early 1992 to date, the storage and rotation of grain and materiel kept in reserve at various echelons have been gradually regularized and stabilized. Many units have arrived at a unified procedure requiring that materiel norms must match expense norms to ensure that these norms are set close to prices prevailing at the provincial (or city) level and confirmed at the grain rotation time, so that fresh supplies can be purchased as replacement to firmly maintain both the quantity and quality of grain reserves. In addition to rotating grain reserves, great importance must be attached to consolidating warehouses and improving packaging according

to the requirements of each kind of commodity kept in reserve. The quantity and pattern of reserves should be studied so that they can be readjusted to suit each form of Armed Forces unit charged with stationary operation and also to readily respond to any situation in different areas.

#### **On Prices and Price Compensation for Articles That Affect Soldiers' Lives**

In reality, in some places and at some time there has arisen the situation that "if troops are to be fed according to their rations, there will not be enough money for it; but if troops are to be fed according to their food expense allowances, they will not be eating enough as their rations permit." The problem here is that food must be bought at the average price level applied at the time of purchase in the provinces (or cities) where Armed Forces units are stationed. Recently, the financial sector have worked in fairly close coordination with the logistic service at all levels to find ways to overcome this problem, thereby contributing to stabilizing troops' standard of living. The two services (logistics and finance) will continue making studies to develop a more scientific and rational price compensation regulation so that compensations will not fall below the average price level prevailing in localities (at provincial or city echelon) and confirmed by the price management agency of the echelon concerned at the time price compensations are paid. On this basis, and depending on the number of troops, the standards and rations these troops are entitled to, and the kinds of goods that local logistic organs are authorized to procure by the upper echelons, these organs will purchase enough food in strict accordance with set standards and quantity and will work out agreements with financial organs to ensure sufficient funding. Only in this way will Armed Forces units be able to take the initiative and will it be ensured that troops will receive supplies of the right standards and in sufficient quantities.

#### **On Organizing Efficient Productive Labor**

Carrying out efficient productive labor is no simple problem that many units are seeking to resolve in a creative and rational manner and with the highest possible efficiency.

When they first switched to the new mechanism, not a few units were confused because there were no subsidies to compensate for losses incurred in the "input" as before. Not until late 1990 and early 1991 did a number of models of efficient production emerge from among units with different characteristics in their situation such as the B24, B16, and B67 Divisions. In 1992, there was a substantial increase in the number of units good at production. The 4th Division, which was only recently moved to a desolate area, now boasts thousands of hectares of luxuriant forests. Many other units, especially provincial (or city) military commands, have known how to bring into full play the strengths of each area; by fruitfully developing other forms of productive

labor and services in coordination with practicing traditional truck farming, pisciculture, and animal husbandry, they have managed to far exceed the targets set for the first year. It is the results of such productive labor and other services that have helped make up for any shortfall in the standards and quantity of supplies and have improved the ability of various units to ameliorate the living standards of their troops.

#### **On the Role of Unit Leaders and Commanders in Satisfactorily Implementing Logistic Supply Methods and Directly Attending to Soldiers' Standard of Living**

Many leadership and command echelons have taken the initiative in making studies and devising the most effective possible measures to lead, organize, and direct satisfactory implementation of the task of ensuring the living standards of their units. These efforts have been combined with ceaseless educational work aimed at elevating the sense of responsibility of their units, bringing into full play their spirit of mastery, and successfully mobilizing their creative labor power to exploit the local strengths and create sources of revenue to help improve soldiers' living standards. These leadership and command echelons have laid down correct orientation for productive labor and other productive services (including the forms, scales, and mode of production), which are efficient and conform to the current mechanism.

To satisfactorily develop his role, a commander definitely needs to have a basic knowledge of the related mechanism of economic management and a firm grasp of the renovated methods of ensuring logistic supplies and finance. We must also pay attention to developing the contingent of basic-level logistic cadres and personnel themselves so that they will become strong and have high professional standards and good operational methods; only in this way will they be capable of fulfilling their tasks.

To scrupulously and constantly implement the democratic system in economy is to create proper conditions for cadres and combatants of Armed Forces units to bring their roles into full play, contribute to developing logistic work, and directly attend to the daily life of their units. It is the contribution and supervision by the masses that will make it possible to promptly check negative practices that affect the quality of unit-building work and the daily life of units.

#### **Situation, Targets of Sea Area Defense in 9th Military Region**

*932E0021A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 92 pp 60-66*

[Article by Major General Tran Minh Phu, deputy commander of 9th Military Region: "The 9th Military Region Develops and Defends Its Sea Area"]

[Text] The 9th Military Region is made up of six provinces comprising 25 districts, two cities, and 105 villages and subwards stretching along a coastal line 743 km long. The sea area of the military region extends over

approximately 150,000 square km (nearly five times its land area), in which are found 151 islands of all sizes and sandbanks; five archipelagoes, namely Hai Tac, Nam Du, Tho Chu, Ba Lua, and An Thoi; the submerged island of Ca Mau; and two island districts: Phu Quoc and Kien Hai (of Kien Giang Province). This sea area is blessed by nature with abundant sources of marine products of a very high economic value and of which there are considerable reserves; many kinds of precious minerals, especially oil and natural gas, of which there are great reserves and which are being explored and exploited by us in cooperation with a number of other countries. The coastal area boasts a benign ecosystem that lends itself to the exploitation and farming of marine products and afforestation. There are numerous wide estuaries with a deep water level favoring the building and expansion of piers of great economic and national defense value. The region also boasts many scenic spots such as Ha Tien, Chau Doc, Phu Quoc Hon Chong... which may attract visitors and tourists.

Owing to its advantageous geographical position and considerable economic potential, the 9th Military Region's sea area holds a strategically important position in the military field: it is a hub of maritime communications with many countries in Southeast Asia and the world, and a gateway controlling the access to and dominating the southern part of the East Sea [South China Sea]. The islands in this area form two lines of positions, one close to and the other far from the coast; some of the islands are located 150 nautical miles from the coast, creating for us an advantageous position in national defense.

However, the southwestern sea area adjacent to Cambodia is a historical body of water placed under the internal waters system of Vietnam and Cambodia according to the agreement signed on 7 July 1982 between the two states. To date, however, the situation in this sea area is still unstable. Moreover, there also are overlapping areas between our country and Malaysia and Thailand in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Our country's territorial waters in general and the 9th Military Region's sea area in particular contain considerable possibility of cooperation in exploring, exploiting, and using marine resources, but at the same time they also harbor contentious factors that may result in regional instability.

Over the past years the situation of the 9th Military Region's sea area has developed in a highly complicated manner, both in terms of the nature and intensity of incidents. There have stood out some noteworthy points as follows:

*Concerning infiltration:* From past to present, various reactionary organizations of Vietnamese exiles, abetted and assisted by the imperialists and hostile forces, have set up bases in some neighboring countries and constantly sought by all means to infiltrate into our country by way of the sea to sabotage our people's national construction. Counting from 1982 to date alone, we have uncovered 38 cases and arrested 281 infiltrators, seizing

dozens of tonnes of weapons, documents, means of operation, and counterfeit money.

*Concerning illegal emigration:* Incited and dragged by reactionaries, over the past years a fairly large number of people have attempted to leave the country illegally by crossing the sea area in the 9th Military Region. During the 1989-1991 three-year period, we discovered 941 cases of illegal departures involving more than 17,000 people, of which 784 cases were broken with 15,229 people arrested; we also smashed 92 cases in which 279 illegal departure middlemen and organizers were detained.

*The order-and-security situation on the sea has also been very complicated,* particularly in the area west of Minh Hai and Kien Giang Provinces. It is estimated that in any given day more than 10,000 ships and boats from various localities throughout the country take part in fishing activities in the 9th Military Region's sea area. The majority of these vessel owners do not comply with regulations and do not register with the local administration and units in charge of sea area management. Many vessels are armed but their command and management are loosely organized, causing negligences allowing criminals to infiltrate and commit a number of homicides and robberies. Trading in contraband, organizing flea markets, and competing in buying and selling on the sea have taken place in great confusion. Particularly serious has been the destruction of fisheries by the use of lighted nets, explosives, electricity..., causing considerable losses of national resources.

*Foreign vessels have also regularly and intensively encroached on our sea area for fishing.* From 1989 to 1991, we detained hundreds of vessels of various countries in the region, mostly of Thailand, which intruded into our territorial waters to fish. During the dry-season months, sometimes up to 200-300 foreign vessels encroached on our southwestern sea area daily, most of them concentrating in the area northwest of Phu Quoc, around Tho Chu Island, and southwest of Hon Chuoi, Hon Khoai, and Hon Thom Islands. These foreign ships have plundered a large amount of our marine products. The vessels of each foreign country are usually organized into fleets of five to 10 or sometimes up to 30 ships each. Supported by early-warning, refueling, and refrigeration ships, they catch and collect marine products for sale on the Hong Kong and Singapore markets. Once the presence of our ships is detected, their early-warning vessels—sometimes even armed Naval warships and helicopters equipped with long-distance radar are used—signal to other ships to flee; at times, they even fight back against our patrol ships.

All the complicated situations mentioned above have caused a constant loss of order and security on the sea, have seriously threatened our people's life and peaceful labor, and have jeopardized the protection of our marine resources and our country's sovereignty over its sea areas. This has posed for the Army and people in the 9th

Military region the urgent task of intensifying the development, management, defense, and control of their sea area.

In view of this real state of affairs, the 9th Military Region Command has taken the initiative to coordinate with the provinces that have a sea area to set forth a number of policies, requirements, and measures to develop, manage, and defend the sea area. Within the past three years, together with the provinces and units concerned, the military region had organized two symposiums on sea area defense to make a correct assessment of the real situation, to review what had or had not been accomplished, and to determine the guiding concept, orientation, steps, and measures to develop, manage, and defend the sea area. These are: *To uphold the sense of self-reliance and mobilize and bring into full play the aggregate strength of the entire political system, the entire people, and the Armed Forces; to closely combine economic building with national defense and security; to thoroughly understand and creatively apply the party's viewpoint of all-people national defense and people's war, and create a strong position and a strong force to develop and defend the sea area.*

Regarding the task of sea area development and management and the measures to fulfill it, the symposiums reviewed many good models and set forth measures to continue carrying out this task in the days ahead by concentrating on the following principal issues:

**1. Consolidating the militia and self-defense forces to serve as the hard core for the entire people to firmly maintain political security and social order and safety, stand ready to fight against the enemy, and defend the sea area.**

The 9th Military Region has militia and self-defense forces stationed along the coast and on the sea and islands. These forces simultaneously engage in productive labor, stand combat-ready, and participate in maintaining public order and security at the grass-roots level.

The 9th Military Region Command *has determined that, in the present situation, the tasks of the militia and self-defense forces are the following:* To work together with the Navy, border defense, and public security forces and with various responsible sectors concerned to protect public order and security and marine resources, thereby contributing to the efforts to defeat the enemy's "peaceful evolution" strategy and his schemes and tricks of causing trouble and rebellions on the sea; to stand ready to fight against the enemy, participate in giving aid to the islands and other tasks in support of combat activities in case of hostilities.

To ensure that the militia and self-defense forces in its sea area can fulfill these tasks, since 1989 the party committees, administration, and military organs at all levels in the entire military region have organized and mobilized the people and bring into full play their role as masters in building the militia and self-defense forces.

Various localities and fishery establishments have mobilized all the people to actively build militia and self-defense forces in accordance with the formula "Let the people discuss, appoint, and feed," with the party committees, administration, and military organs at all levels examining and approving each specific person, and deciding on an organizational form and number of personnel suitable for the characteristics of the situation and task of each establishment and unit. The militia and self-defense forces of various villages, subwards, state organs, and enterprises have been screened in accordance with the guideline of considering political quality as the chief requirement and operational efficiency as the measure of worthiness. Various provinces and districts have considered building coastal and insular militia and self-defense forces as their basic task, paying special attention to the distant islands, critical coastal areas, and vitally important localities. At the same time, they have attached great importance to building militia and self-defense forces for seaborne operations, using the militia and self-defense forces of those state enterprises and production collectives (those still remain operational) as their hard core, and have built up the militia and self-defense forces in the various private economic elements step by step.

At present, the 9th Military Region's *coastal and insular militia and self-defense forces* number around tens of thousands of members, or more than 1.1 percent of the population. Some localities where the seaborne militia and self-defense forces have developed fairly well in terms of quantity are Tien Giang (accounting for 1.55 percent of the population) and the two island districts of Phu Quoc and Kien Hai (in Kien Giang Province), where these forces account for 2.6-3 percent of the population. Each village, subward, state organ, enterprise, and production establishment boasts both broadly organized militia and self-defense forces and mobile combat detachments (serving as the hard-core forces); wherever they are needed, teams and units of specialized armed branches such as fire support, signal, reconnaissance, first aid... have been set up. Although the 9th Military Region's coastal and insular militia and self-defense forces as a whole have decreased quantitatively, their quality has clearly improved. More than 5,500 party members and 16,670 youth union members have joined the militia and self-defense forces; nearly all village and subward unit commanders and cadres exclusively in charge of self-defense forces are party members, many of whom have been elected to grass-roots party committees.

*The militia and self-defense forces of state enterprises and production collectives* in the 9th Military Region that perform their duties on the sea have developed relatively evenly; they currently account for more than 40 percent of the number of laborers working on the sea and include more than 500 party members and more than 1,000 youth union members. State fishing enterprises in (former) Hau Giang and Kien Giang Provinces have

organized seaborne self-defense groups comprising hundreds of seagoing ships with a tradition of high production efficiency and satisfactory participation in the maintenance of public order and security. Other provinces and districts have formed many paramilitary naval units and more than 60 small paramilitary naval detachments comprising more than 700 vessels of various types. A number ship owners of nonstate fishing enterprises and collectives have voluntarily asked the responsible agencies for permission to organize their own militia and self-defense forces in strict accordance with the regulations, principles, and formalities laid down by the military region, thereby ensuring political reliability, the leadership of grass-roots party organizations, and the command of military organs at all levels.

Various localities have attached much importance to political education and military training to ensure that their militia and self-defense forces have political quality, tactical and technical standards, and other necessary knowledge so that they can satisfactorily carry out their combat duties and sea area defense task. In training, aside from fulfilling all the requirements and programs determined by the upper echelons, many localities and units have organized for their militia and self-defense forces to study the Law of the Sea, maritime laws, and methods and procedures of inspecting and detaining foreign vessels violating our territorial waters in strict accordance with Vietnamese and international laws. Various units have also paid attention to training their cadres and combatants in how to act in accordance with the plans to prevent spies and commandoes from infiltrating into our sea areas, coastal zones, and islands. Through defense zone exercises and rehearsals of some combat plans, the political and military standards of the militia and self-defense forces and the leadership and management capabilities of the political system of the various establishments and localities have been further improved.

Over the past years, the militia and self-defense forces in the 9th Military Region's sea area have achieved good initial results in developing their assault role in production and in participating in sea area management and defense. Various units have divided among themselves the task of managing each zone, have regularly carried out patrols and stood guard to tightly seal off the zones under their charge, and have stood ready to act in coordination with friendly forces to satisfactorily deal with complicated incidents. Coastal and insular mobile combat detachments have strictly maintained all on-duty and combat-ready systems; and forces have been made available to protect important places 24 hours a day. Acting in coordination with Navy, border defense, public security, customs, and tax service units, many militia and self-defense forces performing their duties on the sea have promptly discovered, given chase, and detained many foreign vessels encroaching on our sea areas to steal marine products; have countered infiltrators and people attempting to flee the country by crossing the sea; and have broken hundreds of cases of

smuggling and organizing flea markets on the sea, confiscating large amounts of money, goods, and valuable property and turning them over to the state.

Despite these initial results, the organization and building of the 9th Military Region's seaborne militia and self-defense forces still show some limitations. The 9th Military Region's Party Committee and Command worked and are still working in coordination with various localities and units to gradually overcome these shortcomings in order to ceaselessly raise the quantity, quality, and operational efficiency of the seaborne militia and self-defense forces. The coastal provinces are striving to increase the coastal militia and self-defense forces to 2.5-3 percent of the population by the end of 1992 and, at the same time, to prepare reserve forces so as to raise the coastal forces to 4-5 percent of the population if need be, and to augment the insular militia and self-defense forces to 3.5-4 percent of the population. Regarding the militia and self-defense forces performing their duties on the sea, along with consolidating and developing their existing paramilitary naval groups, units, and detachments in a truly satisfactory manner, those provinces and districts that have not organized these forces should study the experience of those localities that have and should continue to build some additional paramilitary naval groups, units, and detachments if conditions permit. Experience should continue to be drawn from from past achievements to develop militia and self-defense forces in private economic elements engaging in large-scale production in strict accordance with established regulations and principles, thereby ensuring political reliability and operational efficiency.

In addition to consolidating and building militia and self-defense forces, the 9th Military Region *has attached special importance to building local forces* to really turn them into the "main force" that will fight in defense of their localities. On the basis of the organizational forms and number of personnel authorized by the upper echelons, local forces units have carried out plans for building and training troops along the guideline of being revolutionary, standardized, and modernized step by step, and in close coordination with the various sea defense plans.

Efforts will be made *to satisfactorily manage and train mobilization-ready reserve forces*, with special importance attached to strictly registering and managing Class-1 reservists in terms of quantity, quality, and military specialty to ensure that they stand ready for mobilization.

Localities have also paid attention to building and consolidating *economic-defense units*. Applying the experience of Tien Giang Province, many localities in the 9th Military Region organized and are still organizing economic-defense units stationed permanently in various coastal places and on islands to carry out agricultural production, aquatic product farming, and afforestation, and to exploit and process marine products, while contributing to building national defense and security disposition and increasing fresh combat forces on the sea.



**2. Organizing division of labor and close coordination among coastal, seaborne, and insular forces, and developing aggregate strength to manage, defend, and exert mastery over the sea area.**

Units in charge of security duty, combat readiness, and productive labor in the 9th Military Region's sea area include many different forces: militia and self-defense forces, local forces, economic-defense units, the military region's main forces, the Navy, border defense forces, public security service, and other economic branches. Each force has its own function and task, but all are responsible for safeguarding order and security on the sea and standing ready to join the fight against enemy infiltration in any forms and on any scales. However, a large force acting without coordination and a clear-cut division of labor and responsibilities can easily lead to confusion and prompt each unit to operate at will, thereby readily causing oversights which the enemy and bad elements may exploit to infiltrate into and sabotage our sea area. For this reason, in addition to each force applying itself to performing its duties well, it is very important that all forces must closely coordinate and cooperate with one another to jointly manage and defend the sea area under the centralized leadership and command of the military party committees (or the party affairs committees) and the unified commands of the localities concerned.

To overcome the state of dispersion and the lack of unity in the past, and to create a new position and force in developing and defending the sea area, the 9th Military Region Command, acting in coordination with various localities, sectors, and units concerned, and basing itself on the task and capability of each force, has organized the coordination and division of specific duties for each zone and each direction of operation, has determined the mode of cooperation... among various forces operating on the sea.

In the western sea area of the 9th Military Region (the sea area of Minh Hai and Kien Giang Provinces) in particular, owing to the abundant sources and large reserves of marine products, there is a fairly heavy traffic of Vietnamese fishing boats and ships. In the immediate future, pending the promulgation of a common regulation by the state, the provinces in the military region have unanimously agreed to consider Minh Hai and Kien Giang as the center for issuance of a temporary regulation on the operations of Vietnamese vessels in the sea area managed by the localities concerned. This is to achieve unity in registration and the handling of violations.

In normal time, the forces engaging in productive labor and sea area defense on each line and in each zone follow different operational schedules, while it is required that the sea area should be constantly and continually managed and defended in order to avoid any negligence. To avoid the state of the sea area "being left unoccupied" occasionally, the military region has coordinated with the provinces, sectors, and units concerned to rationally adjust the operational schedules of various seaborne

forces through a strict and clear-cut division of labor and responsibilities in order to ensure satisfactory management and defense of the sea area anytime, anywhere.

Along with the division of labor and duties, the 9th Military Region has pressed ahead with organizing a unified command system to guide and manage all activities of the Armed Forces. At present, all coastal provinces and districts and offshore islands have set up a unified command made up of representatives of the local administration and Armed Forces and various sectors concerned such as the public security service, the border defense forces, the customs, the tax service, the fishery control authority... and other Armed Forces in the localities. Everyday, the unified command monitors and closely keeps abreast of the local situation; each week and each month, it holds consultations and news conferences; each quarter and each year, it organizes preliminary and final reviews of experience in guiding the development, defense, management, and control of the sea area. All coastal and insular districts (or cities) and villages (or subwards) have assigned to the people's committee vice chairmen in charge of internal affairs the duty of directing sea area development and defense. The Military Region Command has assigned one of its deputy commanders to be exclusive in charge of sea area development, management, and defense. Concerning the militia and self-defense forces operating on the sea, the provincial military commands are entrusted with the management, command, and administration of the militia and self-defense forces of paramilitary naval groups and units, while the military commands of districts (or cities) assume the command and administration of ship and boat detachments on the sea.

Early in 1992, the military region had strengthened its own contingent of naval cadres and those of its provinces, consolidated the command system once again, and worked together with the provinces to make the most of the military and civil communications networks to ensure liaison among paramilitary naval groups and units, liaison from sea and islands to shore, and liaison between forces operating in different directions and the unified command, with provincial and district military command organs serving as communications centers. The provinces and districts have striven to keep abreast of the situation in the sea area and of the forces operating on the sea, and to scrupulously abide by the system of making reports to the Military Region Command.

**3. Intensifying the building of the defense disposition along the coast and on the islands to support the Armed Forces in taking the initiative together with the entire people to cope with any situations.**

This is a very important theme of the plan to build defense zones on the sea. Acting in accordance with the formula of closely combining economic building with national defense and security, over the past years various localities in the 9th Military Region have worked out relatively comprehensive, well-coordinated short-term and long-term plans to gradually create an advantageous battle disposition on the sea area defense line.

A clear manifestation of this policy is that various provinces and districts have successfully transferred an important component of the population to areas hitherto sparsely populated or uninhabited along the coast and on important islands such as Phu Quoc and Tho Chu and some other islands. At the same time, various localities have built and shaped coastal and insular economic clusters such as state farm-forestry complexes, aquatic and marine products farming and processing enterprises, warehouses, and service-technical stations, thereby creating new population and urban centers. Many economic establishments for the purpose of exploiting marine resources on a medium- or large-scale were and are being built such as the ones in Duyen Hai District (Cuu Long Province); Long Phu and Vinh Chau Districts (Soc Trang Province); Ganh Hoa, Song Doc, and Nam Can Districts (Minh Hai Province); Rach Soi, Hon Chong, and Hon Khoai; the estuaries of Tien and Hau Rivers, and so forth. These economic establishments boast a fairly large work force practicing many trades, which help create fresh sources of manpower for the building of on-the-spot Armed Forces and standing ready to serve national defense if need be.

In conjunction with shaping population points and new economic zones along the coast and on the islands, all localities have attached great importance to building up the new establishments politically, gradually making these organizations operate in strict accordance with the regulations and laws. Various districts and villages have paid special attention to fostering and building their contingents of key cadres such as party secretaries, people's committee chairmen, military and security commanders... to make the leadership apparatuses of the party, administration, and mass organizations at the grass-roots level really pure politically, stable and strong organizationally, and capable of satisfactorily managing the socioeconomic development task and national defense and security work in their localities. Various localities have broadly carried out educational work to enable the masses to clearly understand the economic and national defense value of the sea, and to launch an all-people movement to participate in building new native places and in managing, defending, and controlling the sea area. Various people's security and people's military intelligence organizations have been widely set up in city blocks, hamlets, state organs, and enterprises and have become a reliable network working together with the Armed Forces to safeguard public order and security in the localities concerned and to struggle to prevent foreign ships and boats from infiltrating into our territorial waters.

Along with consolidating their political establishments, various localities have concentrated on developing, gradually stabilizing and raising the people's material and spiritual life, with priority being given to remote areas and distant islands. Attention has been paid to building peacetime socioeconomic and cultural establishments capable of meeting wartime requirements. The concentration of efforts by various coastal and insular districts

and villages on building sea dikes, planting and protecting coastal and insular forests, building roads along the coastline and between the inland and the coast, building power grids, water supply systems, public health facilities, warehouses, and public welfare projects... has both directly served the economy and the people's welfare and has contributed to creating a new position and strength for national defense. In 1991, the coastal villages built more than 70 km interdistrict roads, constructed tens of kilometers of sea dikes, and planted more than 20,000 hectares of forests to serve production and the people's life and to meet defense and combat requirements.

The people in various localities have contributed much effort and resources and have worked together with the Armed Forces to build permanent defense works along the coast and on islands lying in the vital directions. The administration at all levels has also paid attention to ensuring provision of suitable equipment and material bases for the distant islands to make the people and Armed Forces there strong enough to fight in defense of their localities when assistance is hard to get. Plans have been made and forces prepared to enable those sectors charged with providing direct support for the Armed Forces in combat such as the marine product, communications and transportation, postal, grain and food, public health services... to meet the Armed Forces' needs when fighting breaks out.

The localities and units located in the direction of the sea have also elaborated and regularly supplemented and improved their basic defense plans, plans to counter trouble-making and rebellion-causing activities, sea area defense plans, plans to prevent and counter enemy seaborne landing and airborne raids, plans to counter spies and commandoes, and so forth. Various provinces, districts (or cities), and defense-combat clusters have organized rehearsals of some plans in important areas to gain experience, overcome shortcomings, and gradually improve quality in all aspects to meet the need to organize firm defense and protection of the southwestern sea area in any circumstances.

### Province Outlines Measures To Develop, Defend Border

932E0022A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN  
DAN in Vietnamese Sep 92 pp 67-72

[Article by Vo Hong Nhan, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, secretary of the Dong Thap Provincial Party Committee: "Dong Thap Strives To Develop a Strong, Peaceful, and Friendly Border"]

[Text] Dong Thap is one of the three provinces of the 9th Military Region that share a 52.3 km-long border with Cambodia. Eight of the villages of our Hong Ngu and Tan Hong Districts border seven villages of three districts of the Cambodian Province of Prey Veng.

Since the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese Army volunteers in September 1989, which was followed by



the signing of the Paris Agreement on Cambodia on 23 October 1991, the situation at the Vietnamese-Cambodian border has undergone complicated developments. Hostile forces at home and abroad have schemed to take advantage of our negligences and those of our Cambodian friends to oppose and sabotage the Vietnamese revolution.

As the terrain at the Dong Thap's border is flat, it greatly facilitates cross-border movements between the two countries. While favoring communications and trade between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples, this topography also makes it easy for reactionaries and spies to infiltrate and operate, for cross-border smuggling to develop, and for other related social evils to spread at the expense of the maintenance of public order and security at the border.

Border defense is a sacred duty of all sovereign states. But border is traditionally a complicated and sensitive political issue between neighboring countries. For this reason, the party committees and administration at all levels in Dong Thap always assert the position and importance of the task of border development and defense in order to firmly maintain the initiative in any situation. The fifth congress of the Dong Thap Party Organization, when discussing the national defense and security task, clearly affirmed: "The border must be urgently developed into a comprehensive and strong defense zone capable of taking the initiative in coping with any situation."

Specifically, in carrying out the task of border development and defense, we have determined that the following points must satisfactorily implemented:

**1. In developing and defending the border we must thoroughly understand the viewpoint of respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of both our country and Cambodia, and must actively contribute to developing the Vietnamese-Cambodian border into one of peace and friendship.**

While implementing its external policy of broadening relations of cooperation and friendship with all countries in the world, our party and state have always adhered to these principles: respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; nonencroachment on each other's territory; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, regarding Cambodia, a neighboring country living together with us on the Indochinese peninsula and having a tradition of age-old solidarity and friendship with our country, when the four Cambodian factions were just beginning to implement the Paris Agreement on Cambodia, our party and state already made clear that "it is Vietnam's consistent policy to support the process of national reconciliation and concord in Cambodia and its advance toward building a peaceful, independent, and nonaligned Cambodia that has friendly relations with all other countries in the world, especially with its neighbors, so as to contribute to peace, stability, and cooperation in Southeast Asia and

the rest of the world."<sup>1</sup> We have expressed our desire to consolidate and further strengthen the traditional relations of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation between the two nations in conformity with the interests of the two peoples. Dong Thap has clearly affirmed that, when carrying out border defense work, our army and people must thoroughly understand and satisfactorily implement this external policy of our state, thereby actively contributing to developing the Vietnamese-Cambodian border into one of peace and friendship.

An important condition for building a border of peace and friendship is that both the Vietnamese and Cambodian sides should administer border management according to the present border, which responsible agencies of the two countries have surveyed and unanimously determined by a system of markers based on the "Agreement on Delineation of National Borders Between the Two Countries" signed on 17 December 1985 and ratified by the two countries' national assemblies. (Both sides have completed the planting of markers in the section of border located within Dong Thap Province).

On the basis of this viewpoint, Dong Thap has attached great importance to enabling all levels and sectors in the province, especially the administration, responsible forces, and people at the border to clearly understand and respect this border and clearly perceive and satisfactorily implement the border management regulations laid down by our state as well as those issued by Cambodia in the new situation, thereby avoiding any violations, giving up arbitrary practices, and refraining from causing bad relations at the border just for the sake of personal and parochial interests. To satisfactorily carry out this task is precisely to show respect for the sovereignty and border territory of the two countries and to take the initiative in nipping in the bud all border disputes and conflicts.

Bringing into full play the longstanding fine tradition of solidarity between the peoples of Dong Thap and Prey Veng Provinces, we wish to continue firmly maintaining and developing these relations of solidarity and friendship, and strengthening the mutual understanding between the peoples of the two provinces, especially those living in the adjacent districts and villages on both sides of the border, on the basis of respect for the law of both countries. We have expressed our desire to continue the meetings between the border authorities and responsible forces of the two sides to compare notes, exchange views on the situation, join each other in working out plans for cooperation and firmly maintaining political security and public order at the border in the interest of the peoples of both countries, and promptly settle all disputes that may arise.

Proceeding from the current new situation and scrupulously abiding by the border management regulations of our state, Dong Thap has made studies to renovate border management to ensure that the strictness of the law will be upheld and, at the same time, to show the goodwill for peace and cordiality of our state and people. The province has revamped household registration and

management at the border and has reorganized the issuance of entry and exit documents and management procedures at border checkpoints, thereby placing the cross-border movements of the peoples on both sides of the border within the confines of the law while avoiding causing difficulty and trouble to both peoples.

It is necessary to anticipate the possibility of untoward developments; on this basis, we should educate and guide our cadres, people, and Armed Forces so that they will know how to apply clever methods of struggle that accord with both reason and sentiment and conform to principles in dealing with violations of our border management regulations and territorial sovereignty. In all cases of dispute, we should persistently use the method of negotiating and rely on the basis of law and historical evidence to explain things and persuade our interlocutors. We should clearly distinguish between right and wrong to correctly implement the agreement on border delineation. We should guard against falling for the provocative schemes of bad elements, which may lead to regrettable conflicts.

**2. Building border districts and villages that are stable and strong in all respects—political, socioeconomic, cultural, national defense, and security.**

This is to give expression to our thorough understanding of the viewpoint of developing aggregate strength in our party's military line.

In its building efforts in the political domain, Dong Thap has applied itself to organizational development and consolidation; steering party, administration, and mass organizations toward operating in strict accordance with regulations and laws; and step by step satisfactorily implementing the mechanism of the party leading, the administration managing, and the people exercising mastery in all local building and defense tasks. It has paid attention to selecting and assigning the right people to the right jobs and working out plans to satisfactorily train the contingent of cadres of its political system, in particular those holding key positions such as party committee secretary, people's committee chairman, Vietnam Fatherland Front committee chairman, and military and security chiefs, especially at the hamlet and village levels. The province has resolutely replaced weak cadres with ones who hold firm and steady political views; who thoroughly understand and are keen on taking in the renovation position and policy of the party and state; who show revolutionary enthusiasm, have suitable capabilities for their positions and pure ethical quality, and are trusted by the masses. It has directed all activities of the political system toward mobilizing and developing the strength of all-people unity to satisfactorily fulfill the tasks of developing and defending the border and firmly maintaining political stability. At the same time, through these efforts Dong Thap has increasingly strengthened the party, administration, and mass organizations.

On the other hand, Dong Thap has attached great importance to raising the people's cultural standard and

has applied itself to educating all citizens at the border so that they can fully understand the lines, positions, and policies of the party and state, maintain unfailing confidence in socialism, uphold their love of the country and socialism, bring into full play their will to be self-reliant, do their utmost to fight for the cause of renovation, and contribute to successfully implementing the resolutions of the seventh party congress and the local party organization in their border native places.

With its citizens living on the border frontline, Dong Thap has also paid attention to educating the people so that they can clearly understand the new situation in Cambodia at this juncture and the possibility of its affecting our border in both ways, clearly understand the situation and tasks of each locality in border development and defense, uphold their sense of sovereignty over the fatherland's border territory, and clearly realize the honor and responsibility of citizens living at the border for the security of the whole province and the entire country. Dong Thap has educated the people so that they would develop a sense of treasuring and diligently cultivating the traditional solidarity, friendship, and good neighborliness between the two peoples at the border, and, at the same time, would uphold vigilance and resolutely oppose all schemes of any enemy aimed at driving a wedge between Vietnam and Cambodia, carrying out sabotage and land-grabbing activities, and committing aggression against our national territory.

In the socioeconomic field, in combination with the Plain of Reeds development program, and to bring into full play the strengths of its border area, Dong Thap has advocated giving priority to further speeding up economic development at the border. It has continued to step up agricultural production with rice as the main crop, has combined grain production with the processing and maintenance processes, and has comprehensively developed rural economy step by step in conjunction with building the new countryside. The chief measures applied are intensive farming, expanding the summer-fall rice area on most of the winter-spring rice fields, continuing to open new land to further expand the agricultural area, continuing to perfect the water conservancy system, stepping up the implementation of the agriculture promotion policy, quickly applying scientific and technical advances in agriculture, and rearranging crop-planting schedules to ensure completion of the summer-fall harvest prior to the arrival of the peak annual flash flood season. Dong Thap has made the fullest use of idle laborers and by-products generated by agricultural products processing to develop livestock and poultry raising and expand fresh-water fish and shrimp netting and farming. It has applied effective measures to protect cajuput forests from fire to get timber while safeguarding the environment. Thanks to this, over the past five years (1985-1990), Dong Thap has increased the value of agricultural production by 9.45 percent on the average; has raised paddy output from 641,500 tonnes (1985) to 1.26 million tonnes (1990), surpassing the 460,000-tonne target set by the province; and has boosted the average per capita grain consumption from

400 kg (1985) to 924 kg (1990), and to 1,200 kg in the Plain of Reeds in particular. Since 1990, each year Dong Thap has been able to provide the market with 700,000-800,000 tonnes of commodity paddy, 100,000 tonnes of soybeans, nearly 20,000 tonnes of raw sugar, and more than 20,000 tonnes of meat and fish.

To serve economic development and the people's life at the border, Dong Thap has continued to make adequate investment for the development and upgrading of the land and water communications networks. It has upgraded 88 km of asphalt roads and built 60 km of new feeder roads to the Plain of Reeds. The bulk of the rural communications system has been upgraded. Concerning posts and telecommunications, 100 percent of the provincial telephone network have been automated; construction of 39 km of 110-kilovolt and 360 km of 15-kilovolt power lines has been completed; and the national power grid has extended to nearly all villages. The province has consolidated and upgraded the health care and school networks; has built cultural houses, marketplaces, and necessary commercial and technical service centers.... It has gradually created favorable conditions for the people at the border to steadily improve their diet, housing, travels, education, health care, goods trading and exchanges, and to enjoy cultural activities. In short, within the space of five year (1985-1990), Dong Thap has increased the value of annual gross social product by 14.4 percent on the average and has raised national income by 13.95 percent annually. The people's material and spiritual life has steadily improved, thereby narrowing the gap in the standard of living between the border area and the inland region.

Experience gained over the past few years in Dong Thap has showed that when there are relatively favorable conditions at the border for efficient production, and when the material and spiritual life there is stable and steadily improving, the people living further inland will readily respond to the state policy of labor and population redistribution and will zealously move to the border area for permanent resettlement. Only in this way will people and increasingly larger and stronger forces be available for economic development and for the defense of the border area. This is precisely the source of the strength of national defense and security at the border.

Along with political building and socioeconomic development, we must apply ourselves to consolidating national defense and security to make them stable and strong so that we will have sufficient strength to constantly and firmly maintain political security and social order and safety and stand ready to frustrate all enemy schemes and acts of intruding into, causing trouble at, and encroaching on our border and invading our territory. At the border, a strong national defense and security system is not solely aimed at defending the inviolability of our border sovereignty and our national territorial integrity, but also constitutes an essential condition for ensuring that our people will settle down and step up production with peace of mind. If border security is not guaranteed and the people are restless, it

will be difficult to achieve economic development. Obviously, at the border, national defense and security, socioeconomy, and politics are very closely linked to one other.

**3. On the basis of the provincial defense zone, we should closely combine economy and politics with national security and defense to actively develop a stable and strong border.**

Over the past years, benefiting from the guidance and assistance of the central echelon, and owing to the great efforts of the local army and people, Dong Thap has initially accomplished a number of important tasks in developing its defense disposition.

The province has elaborated a basic defense plan and a plan to build itself into a solid defense zone in accordance with Political Bureau Resolution 02. These plans have been approved by the upper echelon and are being urgently implemented step by step in line with the formula of closely combining them with the socioeconomic development plans already put into effect over the past years. Border defense plans and rebellion suppression plans for lower echelons have also been mapped out; important localities have organized rehearsals of these plans to gain experience.

Dong Thap has initially developed and shaped combat hamlets and villages, combat clusters, defense clusters, and defense zones in the border districts. It has established various lines of defense, with the border villages and districts forming the frontline and the villages and districts just behind them serving as their direct rear echelon, while the entire province gives support and stands ready to aid the border both in its current building efforts and when fighting breaks out.

After receiving approval from the Council of State, Dong Thap has split Hong Ngu District into two new districts (Hong Ngu and Tan Hong), has divided a number of villages into smaller ones, and has established some new villages to create more convenient conditions for administrative management, national defense and security building, and socioeconomic development.

Dong Thap has taken a step forward in implementing the labor and population redistribution plan and has succeeded in moving a fairly large component of the population from various inland areas to the border for resettlement and production. It has established a number of new economic zones, new population and urban centers, some state farms, state forests... in places that had been uninhabited or too sparsely populated for a long time, thus creating for itself a new position in terms of population to control, develop, and defend the border.

In addition to being aimed at serving the economy and the people's welfare, the considerable investment made by Dong Thap to build new irrigation canal systems and to dredge old ones, and to build or upgrade the roads linking the inland area to the border and connecting the border districts and villages to one another, and the province's building of the power grid and development

of the posts and telecommunications, health care, and school systems, technical service stations, and so forth, also have a great significance in that they have created a new national defense and security disposition at the border.

By combining concentrated afforestation in some areas with the planting of scattered trees along various routes and canal banks, Dong Thap has initially greened some sections of the border that had remained barren and wild for a long time, thereby serving the economy well while also serving national defense.

Of course, these are only initial results. Dong Thap will continue to press forward with building its national defense disposition and people's war disposition in a sustained effort to keep pace with socioeconomic development at the border.

**4. Building local Armed Forces that have a reasonable number of troop strength and high quality and are politically reliable and strong enough to serve as the hard core for the entire people in the task of developing and defending the border.**

Concerning the building of local armed forces, since this issue of TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN already features an article by the comrade deputy chief of the Dong Thap Provincial Military Command, I would like not to touch on this subject again. At present, Dong Thap is applying various measures and policies to contribute to building the local armed forces at the border area. Despite a very limited budget, in 1991 and the first six months of 1992, the province had allocated a large sum of money for various national defense and security projects at the border, consolidated various border defense posts, built army barracks, and increased the personnel of the standing national defense and security forces at various border villages. The party committees and administration at all levels had paid attention to implementing the Army's welfare policy, had launched movements to build houses for and give gift savings accounts to war veterans, and had actively resolved cases of Army's welfare policy beneficiaries that had remained unsettled from the past wars of resistance.

**5. Uniformly bringing into full play the mechanism of the party leading, the administration managing, the military organ serving as the staff, and the mass organizations and people exercising mastery in carrying out the task of developing and defending the border.**

As the experience gained in Dong Thap over the past few years has clearly showed, in the face of any difficult and urgent task of national defense and security work in general and of border development and defense in particular, if the aforementioned mechanism is satisfactorily implemented, good results will be obtained. This means that party committee echelons must pay attention to exerting leadership and issuing correct and comprehensive resolutions. This means that administration agencies must correctly fulfill their managerial role by institutionalizing party resolutions, issuing legal documents, promulgating necessary policies and guidelines,

and effecting a clear-cut division of responsibilities and duties among various responsible departments and branches of the administration apparatus. This means that military organs must satisfactorily bring into full play their roles as the staff of the party committee echelons and administration by devising concrete plans, clearly determining their contents and the necessary methods and steps to carry out the national defense tasks laid down for them (in the plan-making process, the military organs must solicit the suggestions of various departments, sectors, and mass organizations). Once approved by the party committee echelons and administration, these plans should be disseminated to the mass organization and each citizen, and proper conditions should be created for the people to discuss and contribute opinions to the plans to closely relate them to the concrete situation at the grass-roots level, thereby correctly implement formula "Let the people know, discuss, carry out, and control." In the process of carrying out our duties, we must also attach great importance to supervision and inspection, maintain close contact with the grass-roots level to help them resolve difficulties, and, at the same time, satisfactorily make periodic preliminary and final reviews of experiences to help speed up fulfillment of our tasks. Recently, Dong Thap has considered border development and defense one of its central tasks, a task that is pressing and has basic, long-term significance at the same time. It is owing to Dong Thap's attaching due importance to implementation of the mechanism and striving to gradually turn the application of this mechanism into a regular practice from the province on down to the districts and villages according to the orientation mentioned above that the province has satisfactorily brought into full play the aggregate strength of its localities to develop and defend the border and has obtained good initial results.

Also for the purpose of strengthening the leadership and guidance of the party committee echelons and administration over the task of border development and defense, Dong Thap has set up the Provincial Committee for the Guidance of Border Development composed of a number of key cadres of the Provincial Party Committee's Standing Committee, Provincial People's Committee, Provincial Military Command, Provincial Public Security Service, and some departments of the Provincial Party Committee.... At the same time, Dong Thap has paid attention to perfecting the organization—and promoting an increasingly regular operation—of the unified commands at all levels and in each area, in particular important areas at the border.

#### Footnote

1. Statement by Vo Van Kiet, chairman of the Council of Ministers, at the 12 May 1992 reception for the State of Cambodia government delegation headed by Prince Chakkrapong, vice chairman of the State of Cambodia Council of Ministers, which was paying an official visit to Vietnam.

**Building Reserve Forces Requires Uniform, Rational Policy**

932E0044B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese 29 Oct 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Pham Minh Chau: "Building Reserve Forces Through the Draft Requires Uniform, Rational Policy"]

[Text] The reality of our building the reserve forces through the draft in the last 10 years showed that although we obtained some results, we also showed many weak aspects in such fields as management, staff organization and education, and training. There were many reasons behind these weaknesses, but most important was the lack of a system of uniform and rational policies, which led to many obstacles, the failure to take many actions that had been recommended, or poor results obtained from the actions taken.

However, it was impossible to recommend from the very beginning any accurate policies, procedures, and measures to organize implementation, which could be perfected only through learning from realities. As we look back at the last 10 years, we realize that at the start of the efforts to build the reserve forces, the leading organs of the Ministry of National Defense, particularly the Mobilization Organization Department, always worked closely with the basic level, localities, and units; made timely adjustments and changes in many procedures, policies, and staff organization models; and defined more clearly the responsibilities of localities and units. As a result, the work aimed at building the reserve forces is showing signs of good development. Currently the model that shows the brightest prospects for success is the one that designs organizing all-around reserve units in different localities.

Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Quang Ninh, Hanoi, and a number of other localities recently experimentally organized complete staff of an infantry battalion for a group of villages and created favorable conditions for management, mobilization, and organization of training. Reality shows that this kind of model is very suitable for a reserve force serving as a complement to the local armed units. If management is tight and there exist annual training plans, following mobilization and staff participation the reserve force will be able to fulfill its task within only a short period of time. As to the reserve forces that serve as a complement to main-force units and various arms and branches of service, it is totally possible to organize all-around staffs in different localities; however, here the needs are more complicated, and there must be a close coordination between localities and units (frame A) if we want to succeed. The experience in the management and organization of training of the reserve units that Corps [Binh doan] Q and the localities jointly organized confirmed the fact that when units and localities clearly recognized their responsibilities, all difficulties could be resolved. In the last 2 years, Corps Q actively organized joint conferences with localities to discuss and organize the work involving organizing staffs, conducting reexamination, and training reserve

forces in three provinces—Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, and Nam Ha—and obtained very good results. Through its actual work, it was able to bring localities and units closer together and to make them understand the common difficulties and seek the most rational ways to resolve them, which included budgetary problems that both sides succeeded in finding a joint formula to resolve. These results were confirmed in the two cases of mobilization and checking in connection with the tank and artillery battalions of Gia Vien and Hoa Lu Districts in Ninh Binh Province. As to the two tank and artillery companies that had been retained for training, within only 10 days they were able to obtain good results from practical combat exercises. We met the cadres and soldiers of Hoa Lu District's reserve artillery company on the training grounds of Group H08, Corps Q, and found that they had a very serious understanding of their task and had made suggestions as to how to make procedures and policies more complete, uniform, and rational. For example, the fact that there were no uniform rules regarding the pay (of salaried cadres) and allowances of reserve cadres and soldiers during training and localities consequently paid them differently led to worries and doubts. Although they underwent the same training, some people were paid 10,000 dong a day, others only 5,000, or some people received 4 kilograms of paddy, others only 2 kilograms. The reason was that each village and each organ took care of the spending by itself and spent only as much as it could afford to pay. Proper attention was not paid to promoting reserve officers to higher ranks, either. Among 27 reserve officers of the reserve artillery battalion of Hoa Lu District, Ninh Binh Province, their ranks remained the same since they had left the army and joined the reserves.

As to the regulations ensuring rear service for reserve units during training, many matters that are far from rational still exist.

A difficulty in the management of the reserve troops today results from the fact that their economic conditions are poor, they have to be scattered all over the country to work for their living, and their life is not stable. Therefore, to maintain good management and to regularly organize ideological and educational activities regarding the situation of the country and the task of the Army, it is very necessary to create favorable conditions for providing local reserve troops with stable jobs. This is a difficult matter, but it needs to be studied and resolved. The reason is that the reserve forces built through the draft are those of young people and play a key role in local production and that if they are organized properly, they will greatly benefit the economy, society, as well as national defense, and security. The most important thing of the policy system is that we must clearly define the responsibilities of local sectors and units (frame A) in regard to spending, managerial responsibility, regular education, and procedures for annual reexamination and complementary training. Only when we have state policies or legal state documents that clearly determine these matters, we will be able to ensure uniformity in organizing implementation and to avoid



the situation in which people evade responsibilities, fail to do the work they are supposed to do, do duplicate work, and waste energy and efforts without getting any results. We think that the experience in building the reserve forces in the last 10 years and the party policies and resolutions on the national defense-security task in the new situation can jointly serve as a basis for drafting a set of uniform and rational policies on building the reserve forces through the draft and fulfilling the need for defense of the fatherland today.

### Facts Regarding Sovereignty Over Tu Chinh Reef

932E0044A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese 19 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Phan Hai Nam and Huynh Minh Chinh: "Tu Chinh Reef in Vietnam's Continental Shelf"]

[Text] *Editor's note: The editors of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN have recently received many letters from its readers raising questions about the geography, legal base, and state management of Tu Chinh Reef. To help satisfy the need of the majority of these readers, we now introduce to you the following article on the reef written by Phan Hai Nam and Huynh Minh Chinh.*

Tu Chinh Reef, located in an area that includes the reefs called Phuc Tan, Phuc Nguyen, Huyen Tran, Que Duong, Vung May (also called Ba Ke), and so on, lies from 7 to 8.5 degrees latitude north and from 109.14' to 112.30' degrees longitude east, beyond the islands of Hon Hai and Con Dao (in Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province), and 84 nautical miles from the base line used to calculate the width of Vietnam's territorial sea. These reefs, the peaks of which are submerged in depths varying from 5 meters to nearly 20 meters, are the natural extension of the continental shelf that gradually goes downward from the coastline of southern Vietnam to a depth of 1,500 meters, are inside Vietnam's continental shelf, and belong to the zone where Vietnam has its exclusive economic rights. Because between the Spratly Islands and this zone there is a trench about 2,000 meters deep, the area that includes Tu Chinh Reef, which some foreign countries call "An Bac-21," lies outside the area of Spratly Islands.

On 12 May 1977, our government issued a statement on the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic rights zone, and continental shelf of Vietnam that clearly stated as follows:

"The continental shelf of the SRV includes the sea floor and the land underneath it that are part of the natural extension of the Vietnamese landmass extending beyond Vietnam's territorial sea to the outer edge of this landmass; wherever this outer edge is less than 200 nautical miles from the base line used to calculate the width of Vietnam's territorial sea, the continental shelf is extended by 200 nautical miles from this base line.

"The SRV has the full rights to explore, exploit, protect, and manage all natural resources in Vietnam's continental shelf, which include minerals and nonbiological and biological resources of the kinds that permanently exist there."

That statement made by our state was totally consistent with the articles on the continental shelf of the 1982 Law of the Sea UN Treaty.

Item 1 of article 76 of this treaty states: "The continental shelf of a maritime state includes the sea floor and the land underneath it outside its territorial sea, over the entire natural extension of its land territory extending all the way to outside the edge of the landmass, or to 200 nautical miles from the base line used to calculate the width of the 200-nautical-mile territorial sea in the case the outside of the edge of this state's landmass is within a shorter distance."

Article 77 of the treaty states:

"1. Maritime states have sovereign rights over the continental shelf in regard to exploring and exploiting their natural resources.

"2. The rights mentioned in item 1 are exclusive ones, i.e., if maritime states do not explore the continental shelf or do not exploit the natural resources in the continental shelf, nobody has the rights to carry out such activities without their clearly-stated consent.

"3. The rights of maritime states over the continental shelf are not dependent on any actual seizure or capacity, nor on any obvious statement."

Consequently, from the standpoint of international law, the area that includes the reefs named Phuc Tan, Phuc Nguyen, Que Duong, Tu Chinh, Huyen Tran, Vung May, and so on clearly is part of Vietnam's continental shelf and exclusive economic rights zone where Vietnam has sovereign power over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, including oil and gas, and where no country is allowed to carry out such activities without Vietnam's consent.

Exercising this sovereign power, on 5 July 1989, the SRV Council of Ministers decided "to build a number of floating facilities in the reef area being part of the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone in Vietnam's continental shelf (from 7 to 8 degrees latitude north and from 109.14' to 112.30' degrees longitude east) in order to start the establishment of an economic-scientific-and-technical complex. In this economic-scientific-and-service complex, state-operated installations will be organized to carry out the double task of catching, purchasing, and processing sea products before shipping them inland, and providing rear-service support for ships and boats of the state and fishermen in the region." "The State Science and Technology Commission and the sectors concerned, to which the chairman of the Council of Ministers has assigned the task, are coordinating their work with the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone in order to study and draft plans for this economic-scientific-and-service complex." This decision

was made public in the 14 August 1989 issue of NHAN DAN. This complex is called Oil and Gas Zone I, which includes Phuc Tan, Phuc Nguyen, Huyen Tran, Que Duong, Tu Chinh, Vung May (also called Ba Ke), and other reefs.

Following the decision of the Council of Ministers chairman, the assigned organs, along with the (former) Vietnam Oil and Gas General Department, shipped here hundreds of tons of raw materials, materials, machinery, and equipment to build a number of sea platforms. Presently, in the Oil and Gas Zone I, there are many strong platforms built on Phuc Tan, Phuc Nguyen, Que Duong, Huyen Tran Reefs. At night, each of these platforms becomes a beacon serving as a warning light for boats to avoid hitting underwater rocks. In the months when the weather is good and the sea is calm, almost everyday there are fishing boats of fishermen from Phu Quy Village (and Khanh Hoa, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, and Kien Giang Provinces) coming to this area to catch fish, particularly shark, dogfish, and "mu" fish. These platforms really are the source of confidence and support for fishing boats in the open sea and during storms. Located on these platforms are meteorological and hydrographical stations that take measurements of tide, wave (height), temperature, humidity, pressure, frost, fog, rain, sunshine, wind, degree of lack of air, and so on. These data are transmitted on a daily basis to the Meteorology and Hydrography General Department for use not only in studies but also in forecasts to let inland areas, ships and boats traveling in the area, and international organizations know the weather and hydrological conditions there. The hydrological stations have announced that they would take part in the international network. Scientific stations are also located on the platforms for studies of the sea, sea current patterns, and sea ecology in the area, particularly studies of sea products aimed at knowing very well the potential of the area in terms of the special products it offers.

And so prior to 1989 and mostly since the middle of 1989, Vietnam has had many activities aimed at conducting scientific studies of the sea, hydrography, and oil and gas; has caught and obtained sea products; and has built many platforms on the reefs to serve as the advance observer in the southern part of Vietnam's continental shelf guiding not only Vietnamese vessels but also internationally recognized commercial ships traveling in the area.

The newspaper, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, in its 19 July issue, published an article by its reporter, Maeyam, who wrote: "This area (Tu Chinh Reef) lies close to the offshore blocs of the Dai Hung oil field, which Vietnam hopes would provide a lot of oil, and within Vietnam's 200-nautical-mile economic zone."

At the 6th Asian-Pacific Round-table Conference held in Malaysia on 21-25 June 1992, Professor Max Valencia of East-West Center, U.S., also affirmed that the area (Tu Chinh Reef) by its depth is a continuous extension of Vietnam's continental shelf and, in terms of its geographical location and depth, is totally separated from

the Spratly Islands. This is true, of course, and agrees to Vietnam's argument to the effect that this area lies on Vietnam's continental shelf.

Thus on a legal basis, consistent with the definition of continental shelf in the 1982 Law of the Sea UN Treaty, and in terms of the activities of our state so far in this area in managing and exploiting the sea resources there, Tu Chinh Reef is part of the continental shelf and sovereignty of Vietnam.

## ECONOMIC

### Calls Seen for Improvement of Army's Activities

932E0045B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese 23 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Senior Colonel Tran Duc Viet, deputy director the General Department of National Defense Industry and Economy, by unidentified QUAN DOI NHAN DAN correspondent; place and date not given]

[Text] [QUAN DOI NHAN DAN] Comrade, would you please tell us about the Army's principal achievements on the front of external economic relations in recent time?

[Viet] In recent time, owing to the open-door policy of the state, Army units have enjoyed many favorable conditions in their external economic activities. Various units have taken the initiative in looking for joint-venture partners through several channels of information and a large number of diverse foreign companies have come to Vietnam, thus enabling the Army's economic forces to obtain significant results. To date, nine projects have been licensed by the state and put into operation and six others have been evaluated at the sectoral level. In addition, the paperwork is being completed on 12 projects for evaluation and for submission to the state for licensing.

The contingent of cadres in charge of external economic relations has strongly developed in quantity and has gradually improved in professional standards to meet the requirements of its tasks. This contingent has gained initial experience in resolving problems concerning formalities and in compiling documents and files for various projects under the guidance of UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization]. It has also begun to use the economic effect evaluation and selection method according to COMFAR [expansion unknown], thereby gradually improving the quality of its transactions with foreign countries.

[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN] The results of export activities have remained low compared to the existing potential. What are the difficulties and obstacles that have limited these results?

[Viet] In the first nine months of 1992, the value of exports amounted to \$25 million, up by 133 percent compared to the corresponding period last year. This value is still very low compared to our potential. The main reasons for this are the following:



The state mechanism has been broadened, but a number of obstacles still remain in various ministries and sectors, such as the stipulations that coal export must be processed through a single company, namely COAL-IMEX [Coal Import-Export Corporation], and that eucalyptus timber export must be done through the Ministry of Forestry. Directive 90/CT on banning round log export is a correct decision, but it also prohibits the re-exportation of timber from K and C [expansion unknown]. This has resulted in the Army units that do economic work in K and C having a large backlog of temporary imported timber, thus causing heavy losses to them, reducing their revenue in foreign currency, and affecting their operations.

The output of the Army's export items has not yet been stabilized and steady consumers have not been found. Therefore, exportation of such items has often been carried out as one-shot operations and a direction for long-term development is still lacking.

Means of cargo handling and transportation are lacking and of poor quality, and cargo handling and transportation techniques remain backward, therefore it is still impossible to meet customers' demand.

**[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN]** What are the difficulties being encountered in economic cooperation with foreign countries in the forms of joint venture and association?

**[Viet]** Numerous difficulties are being encountered in our economic cooperation with foreign countries in the forms of joint venture and association. Since this is a new area, our Army investors still lack experience in doing business with foreign countries. Owing to their lack of knowledge of the Law on Foreign Investment and various related regulations and guidelines, a number of investors become passive and confused and are unable to express any sound opinions when holding talks, discussions, and negotiations and when signing agreements with their foreign partners.

Some investors are still reluctant to make contact with foreign countries, contending that it is difficult to enter into joint ventures with them and that such activities would only incur more expense without any immediate economic result.

Capital itself is very limited (including self-procured capital and capital borrowed from the Ministry of National Defense); we normally have only land, houses, and workshops to contribute as capital to our joint ventures with foreign countries. Our equipment and infrastructure are old, dilapidated, backward, and almost unusable; for this reason, the percentage of our capital contribution is usually very low, and this has resulted in some cases where foreign countries showed a lack of confidence in our capability.

The locations of joint ventures are often far from industrial centers, communications are inconvenient, information hard to get, and formalities slow to complete, thus causing foreign partners to become discouraged.

**[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN]** To broaden the Army's external economic activities and improve their efficiency, in the days ahead what should be done, and how?

**[Viet]** To broaden the Army's external economic activities and improve their efficiency in the days ahead, we would like to suggest that the state and ministries and sectors concerned support the Army and adopt preferential policies to help it carry out external economic activities in a number of special areas. The Ministry of National Defense should create favorable conditions for providing investors with part of the capital needed to enter into joint ventures and associations with foreign countries. Plans should be made to train the contingent of cadres in charge of external economic activities. Permission should be given for the expansion of areas of joint ventures and associations such as the hotel industry and other foreign currency-earning services, and so forth.... The execution of formalities for foreigners to visit Vietnam for on-the-spot fact-finding purposes, which is still being done slowly, thus causing many difficulties to visitors, should be improved and sped up.

#### **Australian Comments on Oil-Gas Potential**

932E0039B Hanoi NHAN DAN CHU NHAT  
in Vietnamese 13 Dec 92 p 4

**[News item: "Vietnam's Oil-Gas Potential"]**

**[Text]** Mr. Charles Johnson, an Australian minerals specialist, has this to say about the initial oil potential of our country: Vietnam has an oil deposit ranging from 1.5 to 3 billion barrels. Vietnam can become a mid-size oil producer in the world (as Australia). He also anticipates that by the years of 2000-2005, Vietnam will be able to produce from 300,000 to 500,000 barrels a day. (Data of Vietnam Oil and Gas General Corporation)

#### **Column Describes Two Oil Fields, White Tiger , Big Bear**

932E0039C Hanoi NHAN DAN CHU NHAT  
in Vietnamese 13 Dec 92 p 4

**["Do You Know?" column: "'White Tiger' and 'Big Bear,' Which One Is Larger?"]**

**[Text]** The Bach Ho (White Tiger) and Dai Hung (Big Bear) oil fields lie in the center of, respectively, the Mekong and Nam Con Son Troughs in our country's southern continental shelf.

In 1975, the American company Mobil came to Bach Ho, drilled a well, BH-1, to a depth of 3,206 meters, and found two commercial oil deposits at the Lower Miocene stratum. At that time, the company also reached the top of the Dai Hung oil deposit as the drill bit went down to a depth of 1,750 meters, about 250 meters from the roof of the first oil reservoir there. In the spring of 1975, as the South was totally liberated, they dismantled their drilling platforms and left.

We later built the Vung Tau oil-gas port facility, but because of the American trade embargo against our

country, the ships of a number of foreign companies that came to our country after 1975 for the purpose of exploring and searching for oil had to leave.

On 31 December 1983, the Vietnamese-Soviet Oil-Gas Joint Enterprise opened the first well in the Bach Ho area. In early 1985, exploratory drilling at the BH-4 well showed that oil not only existed at the Miocene stratum as we had known but also at a deeper Oligocene stratum, where the deposit was several times larger. In late 1986, the BH-6 well, which was 3,530 meters deep, offered this conclusion: Vietnamese oil came not only from the Oligocene sand stratum but also from the "phong hoa" foundation (bottom rock stratum). On 6 September 1988, the joint enterprise decided to move the drill bit down to the foundation layer (well MSP1-1). This well offered a steady oil flow of 700 tons a day.

Currently the Bach Ho field provides the fatherland with from 15,000 to 16,000 tons of crude oil.

In every 24-hour period, the oil platforms in the Bach Ho area must burn a rather large amount of gas that comes with the oil. The work of collecting this gas and bringing it ashore for utilization is being done.

Dai Hung also showed many interesting signs. By 1990, as the exploratory work had been completed and the testing was being done at three wells of this "Big Bear" field, two wells were found to provide commercial oil flows. Dai Hung was asserted to contain large oil deposits at all four strata from the lowest depth up.

The results of surveys, with parameters being fed to computers, indicated that "White Tiger" and "Big Bear" had the same strength. We hope that when extraction starts in the Dai Hung field, our country's crude oil production will possibly jump to a much higher level.

#### **Problems With Antismuggling Work at Northern Border Noted**

932E0019A Ho Chi Minh City TUOI TRE CHU  
NHAT in Vietnamese 18 Oct 92 p 8

[Article by Le Tho Binh: "Antismuggling Work at the Northern Border: A Hard Nut To Crack?"]

[Text] Asking any official in charge of antismuggling work at the Sino-Vietnamese border what he has done to suppress contraband and we would receive an answer sounding generally like this: The border provinces have shaped an array of interconnected positions from the inland to the border comprising hundreds of control stations and task force units and patrols who exert control and set up tight road blocks at strategic places; the measures applied consist of overt control and secret investigations designed to discover smuggling channels, to stop smuggled goods at their sources, and so on, and so forth....

#### **Smuggling Steadily on the Rise**

All this, however, has not led to a drop in cross-border smuggling cases. According to the statistics of the antismuggling organs of Lang Son and Quang Ninh, the two

provinces considered to be the scenes of the briskest trading activities at the Sino-Vietnamese borders, the number of smuggling cases have increased fast. If in 1989 (the first year of implementing Directive 405/HDBT [Council of Ministers]) antismuggling forces in Quang Ninh Province uncovered 1,254 smuggling cases and seized contraband worth nearly 2.5 billion dong, initiated action in 60 cases and against 70 suspects, then in 1990 the number of smuggling cases busted had shot up to 2,260 with 3.5 billion dong-worth of smuggled goods confiscated and legal action initiated in 65 cases and against 92 suspects. However, in the first six months of 1991 alone, Quang Ninh Province's public security forces had broken 2,115 cases, seized contraband worth 1.3 billion dong, and initiated proceedings in almost 80 cases and against 108 suspects. According to responsible officials in Quang Ninh, to date the province has made arrests in more than 8,000 smuggling cases. This is indeed no small number at all.

Those engaged in the smuggling of banned goods include people from all walks of life. According to the statistics of Quang Ninh Province's antismuggling organs, private individuals account for nearly 94 percent of the number of banned goods smugglers. Trade articles managed by the state through quotas allocated to state-operated and collective economic units and Army units account for almost 74 percent of the contraband (27 percent of this amount imputable to private individuals operating under the name of collectives). As showed by the cases already admitted by the court and investigated, 50 percent of the smugglers are state cadres, workers, and officials (nearly 15 percent of them party members); 11 percent are peasants; and 34 percent are traders or people with no occupation.

#### **Why Is It That Antismuggling Work Still Yields Poor Results?**

To talk about smuggling is to talk about the power of money; at the border, money is even more powerful. The border region is like a giant magnet attracting all kinds of goods from North, Central, and South Vietnam; once here, these goods will "cross the border illegally" into China, while there also is a reverse flow of goods from China into our country. It is no exaggeration to say that this border is a market where "anything can be bought, anything can be sold." There are fairly substantial price differentials in both buying and selling. How can such transactions not be attractive when a table fan bought for 100 yuan (1 yuan is worth 1,750 Vietnamese dong) at Dong Hung (China) can be resold for 210,000 dong at the Mong Cai market, a mere 1 km away, or for up to 280,000-290,000 dong in Hanoi. A bottle of Chinese beer bought for 1.15 yuan at the Lung Nghiu market will fetch 3,200-3,300 dong when resold in Lang Son City. When I raised the question of motivating the people for antismuggling work, a responsible cadre at Marker 16 (Tan My - Lang Son) border checkpoint sighed: "Agitating the people to take part in crime suppression is easy, but mobilizing them for antismuggling work is really

difficult when many of them still face great difficulties in daily life, are short of cash, unemployed...."

The more vigorous the administrative antismuggling measures, the more sophisticated the smugglers' activities. The tricks they use are overt or secret and take the forms of hiding contraband among ordinary goods when going through control stations, surreptitiously transporting smuggled goods across the border, acquiring legal documents and fulfilling legal formalities, using money to bribe control forces....

The border is criss-crossed with hundreds of trails, the sea with scores of channels. These are cracks that are very difficult to plug up. Because of the attractive profits, not a few people have directly or indirectly helped the smugglers by secretly carrying contraband, serving as guides, or acting as middlemen. If Vietnamese are stopped, Chinese will take their place. The large army of porters at the border are ready to carry anything, any time, for a fee. It can be said that at the border the forces lending a helping hand to smugglers far outnumber those assisting the responsible organs in antismuggling work. This is why the surreptitious flow of goods across the border cannot be stopped.

Another relevant problem causing a surge in contraband is the fact that there have been no few cases in which smugglers were in cahoots with cadres and personnel in charge of control work and licensing. This is not hard to prove. Ask any trader at the border and he will "pour out his confidences" to you about this matter. Contrabandists plying their trade on the Quang Ninh smuggling line have a common saying that for "business" to be done smoothly, one must "make law" with control cadres ("making law" here means bribing). Smugglers in Lang Son, however, use another term to refer to this kind of bribery: "mechanism"—one must deal with those gentlemen (meaning antismuggling cadres) in accordance with the "mechanism" if everything is to go swimmingly.

There have been no few cases in which some control stations arbitrarily reduced commodity taxes to far below the official rates determined by the state. For example, in late August 1992, Control Station K. at Marker 15 (Tan Thanh - Lang Son) border checkpoint, collected 100-150 dong on each bottle of beer while the official tax table determined a rate of 600 dong per bottle. Asked about the reason for the discrepancy, the station chief answered unequivocally: "Better to collect 100 dong per bottle than nothing at all. If the tax is too high, low profits will drive all traders into illegal activities; and there are hundreds of routes at the border, how can we control them all?"

It's true. Only by paying a visit to the Sino-Vietnamese border will one be able to realize that the more one is inclined toward applying administrative measures, the less efficient antismuggling work will become. Those trade articles banned by us are allowed free circulation by the Chinese side. Those activities branded by us as smuggling take place openly on the other side of the border. This is to say nothing of the highly valuable

articles banned by us such as timber, precious raw materials... for which Chinese have raised their purchasing prices four to five times.

Smuggling must be completely suppressed? Yes, of course. But how to make antismuggling work efficient? This is a question we would like to defer to the responsible organs for an answer.

### 'Deplorable Real State' of Regions Described

932E0045A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese 22 Oct 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Hoang Dien under the rubric "Socioeconomic Issues": "The Mountain and Highland Regions: Deplorable Real State of Affairs"]

[Text] Our country's mountain and highland regions account for about two-thirds of the national land area, stretching over 32 provinces, including all the northwestern, central, northeastern, and Central Highlands provinces, and the mountain and highland districts of the Northern and Central Trung Bo and Eastern Nam Bo Provinces. These regions, with their highly complicated topography and terrain, are the watersheds of 2,860 rivers and springs (if only those longer than 10 km are counted) and share up to 4,827 km of common borders with neighboring countries (1,463 km with China, 2,067 km with Laos, and 1,317 km with Cambodia) [figures as published], which stretch along 333 villages and 10 cities of 98 districts in 20 provinces. As much as three-fourths of the border localities are remote, inaccessible mountain and highland areas.

The mountain regions have great economic potential and abundant, greatly diversified resources including forest land, living creatures, hydraulic power, minerals, medicinal herbs, industrial plants, fruit trees, special forest products, wild animals, and so forth.... These are diversified, rare biological resources that are highly essential for life and socioeconomic and cultural development nationwide. They also constitute a precious "gene" depository that should be protected and developed. However, most of these resources have not yet been fully and efficiently exploited and brought into full play.

Forests are an important resource but, for diverse reasons, have been seriously depleted to an alarming level. In the Da River watershed area in the northwest region, only about 11 percent of the forests are left while more than 50 percent are required. Meanwhile, the forests in Northern Trung Bo and in the Central Highlands have also been shrinking at a vertiginous rate.

There are still numerous coal, iron, tin, gold... and other mines, but weaknesses and deficiencies in management and exploitation guidance have resulted in many regrettable accidents.

Grandiose scenery, historical and cultural relics, wholesome summer resorts such as mineral water springs, national parks, forest reserves, and so forth, could

become popular tourist attractions but have been almost forgotten and are still being wasted.

The mountain and highland regions have been for ages the habitat of more than 50 ethnic minority groups who live together or separately in fairly clearly delineated mountain ranges and basins. The population of all these regions account for approximately one-third of the total national population. Compared to the delta provinces, the mountain and highland regions are "large but thinly populated" in terms of natural conditions, but are still very poor and backward economically (some localities still suffer from food shortages and hunger), with life still depending heavily on an "autarkic mode of production" and "natural conditions." In these regions, some ethnic groups have but very few members left and are in the danger of seeing their populations being further depleted quickly. Among such groups are the Ro-mam (212 members) and the Brau (182) in Kon Tum Province; the Cong (600 members) and the Si La (300 members) in Lai Chau Province; the O-du (200 members) and the Co Lao (100 members) in Ha Giang Province; the Ruc (200 members) in Quang Binh Province.... Every one of these ethnic minority groups, whatever the size of its population, has its own history, traditions, customs, and pride, but they have not yet been protected, cared for, and developed.

A common target that has been set is that efforts should be made under a few five-year plans to enable the mountain and highland regions to make, by the late years of the first decade of the 21st century, a big stride so as to catch up with the plains and to become relatively prosperous. This is to make it possible for the people of all ethnic minority groups to eat their fill, to enjoy good health, to have a higher level of civilization and culture, and to enjoy more comfortable living conditions thanks to the building of new towns and cities, the development of more convenient communications facilities, and so forth. This is also to enable the mountain and highland regions to take a significant step forward to turn themselves into regions that do fairly well economically and that are firm politically and strong in national defense and security; and to really become an inseparable component of the strategy for comprehensive national economic development.

Therefore, the content of economic development in the mountain regions cannot consist simply of combining agriculture with forestry or agriculture with forestry and industry. Nor can the movement for settled life and settled farming be carried out separately. The problem is that *socioeconomy and culture must be developed in a comprehensive, aggregate, and uniform fashion*. In short, we must build and develop the mountain and highland rural areas into prosperous, beautiful, and civilized regions.

This undertaking is fraught with difficulty and complexity and should be persistently carried out in a self-reliant spirit and with high resolve of the entire country, especially the people of various ethnic minority groups in each region and locality. This should not be a

short-lived "shower-like" effort, nor should it be conducted in a piecemeal, patchy, and disjointed fashion by any single sector or locality; on the contrary, it should be done uniformly, comprehensively, and concretely to achieve success step by step, with one success paving the way for the next, thus promoting continuous advance.

First of all, the Committee for Mountain Regions and Ethnic Minorities must have the capital and materials necessary for formulating an unified strategic guideline, to devise plans, and to organize and direct the implementation, from start to finish, of mountain-and-highland-region socioeconomic development plans in a comprehensive and uniform manner, thus eliminating all intermediary, overlapping organizations.

There should be investment to provide funding for this task. It might be necessary to set up a separate bank (a mountain regions development bank) to which the delta provinces are dutybound to make contributions in appropriate forms. All investment must be made according to feasibility studies and supported by specific bank accounts to prevent capital from being used for general purposes, which may easily cause money to "evaporate." As an immediate and urgent measure, we would like to suggest that the state carry out inspections and provide capital for people who formerly lived in the Da River reservoir area and who have been forced to leave their birthplaces, so as to help them quickly stabilize their living conditions and production activities.

We should urgently work out plans for all the mountain and highland regions to serve as the basis for the formulation of a long-term socioeconomic development strategy. In these plans we must clearly determine the targets, volume, and pace of work, as well as the steps and measures to organize their implementation. Each district and village (and even each hamlet) should formulate their own master plans for development to serve as the basis for organizing implementation efforts and for calling for investment by the entire country, including investment by foreign countries and nongovernmental charitable organizations.

## SOCIAL

### Sport Newspaper Staff Disciplined

#### Editor in Chief, Staff Appeal Action

932E0049A Hanoi NHA BAO VA CONG LUAN  
in Vietnamese Oct 92 p 21

[Article: "Back to the THE DUC THE THAO Incident"]

[Text] Three months have elapsed since the editor in chief of THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City and some members of the newspaper office's secretariat filed a complaint about a series of disciplinary measures that were excessively harsh, unjust, and at variance with the Press Code taken against them by the director of the

Ho Chi Minh City Sports and Physical Education Service. Yet, the city's responsible organs have still not drawn conclusions from their grievances and settled them definitively.

At present, THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City still remains in a state of instability. Over the past three months, the newspaper has been operating with neither an editor in chief nor a deputy editor in chief. Currently running the publication is a four-member secretariat (not appointed by its editor in chief) that includes two members who are reassigned from other agencies and who have not practiced journalism for a single day in their lives, and one who is a young rookie reporter. The bank account of the newspaper is still frozen at the request of the director of the Ho Chi Minh City Sport and Physical Education Service (?). A prestigious periodical of mass circulation, THE DUC THE THAO has received a lot of complaints from its readers about the unprecedented decline in both quality and quantity it has suffered following the topsy-turviness in its editorial office.

The incident at THE DUC THE THAO is attracting public attention not only in Ho Chi Minh City.

The Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports and the Vietnam Journalists Association have sent official messages to the party and People's Committees and various responsible organs of Ho Chi Minh City suggesting that they take measures to direct the agencies concerned to consider this problem and resolve it justly and according to the law. The message from the Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports also proposed that "the city's People's Committee conduct an inspection; if the state of the its organization is not sound, the newspaper should be allowed to stop operating temporarily and should resume publication only after its has been consolidated and all formalities have been complied with."

The Journalists Association of Ho Chi Minh City sent an official message to the Sports and Physical Education Service suggesting that it should clarify this matter. The association also appointed a working team comprising three members of its executive committee to work with the Sports and Physical Education Service and with association members who have lodged complaints. A report presented by this working team to the Ho Chi Minh City Journalists Association on 17 August 1992 clearly pointed out:

After 10 years of publication, THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City, headed by Comrade Editor in Chief Mai Xuan Cam and under the direct guidance of Comrade Le Buu, director of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service, has become a prestigious newspaper with a large circulation. But despite its many good points, it also has developed shortcomings that should be examined in a serious, objective, and comprehensive fashion to gain experience, as directed by Directive 08 of the Party Central Committee Secretariat, in order to develop the newspaper into an ever stronger publication. What happened at THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi

Minh City was nothing approaching the level of a "grave crisis," of "being commercialized," "metamorphosed, and turned into a tool for self-seeking of a group of people... as the management of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service remarked recently. Expressing his views at a meeting held on 17 January 1992 to review the work of THE DUC THE THAO in 1991, Comrade Le Buu himself also made the assessment that "THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City has developed constantly, meeting the demand for information and propaganda and timely satisfying the masses' demand, especially during major sporting events."

The one-issue late publication by THE DUC THE THAO of an article marking Uncle Ho's birth anniversary was "an oversight from which experience should be drawn" as the city's Culture and Ideology Department has observed and not "a serious mistake" as remarked by the comrade director of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service when deciding to discipline the secretariat and editor in chief of the newspaper.

The dismissal by the city's Sports and Physical Education Service director of Comrade Mai Xuan Cam from his editor in chief position, which was not ratified by the city's People's Committee in writing and was not reported to and approved by the Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports, was a violation of the Press Code and Council of Ministers Decree 133-HDBT.

The disciplining and dissolution of the secretariat of THE DUC THE THAO and the appointment of a new secretariat not based on its incumbent editor in chief's recommendation were also transgressions of the Press Code.

In its Official Letter No. 63-92/HNB dated 18 August 92 and its Notice No. 68-92/HNB dated 9 September 1992 and addressed to various responsible organs at the center and in localities, the Journalists Association of Ho Chi Minh City asserted:

"Conclusions should be drawn that accurately correspond with the true nature and extent of the good points and shortcomings of Comrade Mai Xuan Cam and other comrades in the secretariat of THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City. Only on this basis will it be possible to issue decisions on disciplinary measures that are appropriate, conform to both reason and sentiment, and accord with the law.

"There should be an examination of the responsibility for the management of THE DUC THE THAO of the Ho Chi Minh City Sports and Physical Education Service in its capacity as the organ in charge as determined by laws."

Public opinion is awaiting a fair, correct settlement of this affair by the agencies concerned in Ho Chi Minh City. It wishes to see an early return of stability to THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City so that the newspaper can prove itself worthy of its readers' long-standing confidence.

### City Leaders Meet on Incident

932E0049B Hanoi NHA BAO VA CONG LUAN  
in Vietnamese Dec 92 pp 2-4

[Article: "Some Noteworthy Issues Around the Incident at the Newspaper THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] Editor's note: *In early November 1992, the comrade leaders of Ho Chi Minh City held a final meeting to consider the incident at the newspaper THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City. The comrade standing members of the city's Party and People's Committees reached conclusions on the good points and shortcomings of Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, editor in chief of THE DUC THE THAO, and of the management of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service. They unanimously agreed on the following form of disciplinary action: warning to Comrade Mai Xuan Cam. They also agreed to let the city's Sports and Physical Education Service reassign Comrade Mai Xuan Cam to another job (the Sports and Physical Education Service had originally proposed removing him from his editor in chief position and reducing his salary by one step). Their proposal has been forwarded to the Ministry of Culture and Information Sports for advice as stipulated by the Press Code.*

*We would like to inform you of the basic features of their conclusions and bring up some noteworthy issues concerning this incident.*

#### Editor in Chief Mai Xuan Cam's Good Points and Shortcomings

At the meeting in early November 1992, the comrade deputy chairman of the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City made the following assessment of Editor in Chief Mai Xuan Cam's good points and shortcomings (which was agreed with and supplemented by the standing member of the city's Party Committee and its Culture and Ideology Department):

**Good points:** Over the past nearly 10 years, the editorial office collective of THE DUC THE THAO has developed the periodical from a news bulletin into a weekly newspaper, raising its publication from one to two issues a week, adding a Thursday supplement to the main edition, and increasing its circulation from 10,000 to 70,000 copies. During the first eight years, the editorial office had made efforts to gradually improve the quality of the newspaper, closely adhering to its guiding principles and aims, and contributing to promoting the development of the sports and physical education movement in Ho Chi Minh City.

The editorial office has striven to cover its own expenses, to build its material bases with its own means, and to ensure funding for the operation of the newspaper. It has also gradually increased the income of its personnel.

These good points are attributable to the efforts of leadership of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service, to which Editor in Chief Mai Xuan Cam has made very significant contributions for several years in succession. Comrade Mai Xuan Cam's good points are basic.

**Shortcomings:** During the past two years, THE DUC THE THAO has manifested a gradual separation from its original guiding principles and aims. This alienation has been reflected in the following aspects:

—The newspaper has carried few articles about the masses' sports and physical education movements and about the activities of various sports and physical education federations. Instead, it has devoted numerous articles to reporting on foreign soccer and sports and physical education activities, showing a tendency to run after business alone.

—In the past years, on the occasion of Uncle Ho's birthday anniversary, the newspaper always featured articles about him with the sports and physical education movement. In its issue on this year's 19 May [Ho Chi Minh's birthday] anniversary, despite the preparations it made, the newspaper, citing illegitimate excuses, ran no articles on the event. This deed reflects a poor sense of politics.

—There have been mistakes in financial management and revenue and expenditure accounting, such as: failure to comply with the model charts provided by the financial sector; still unclear financial settlement concerning the "Golden Racket" championship, and the phenomenon of establishing private funds (although the remaining sum of has not been touched and there has been no phenomenon of corruption and embezzlement).

—Internal affairs have been managed according to personal feelings, not to organizational principles.

—Editor in Chief Mai Xuan Cam failed to sincerely and seriously review his shortcomings once they had been committed, and even tried to justify himself.

As editor in chief, Comrade Mai Xuan Cam has committed some shortcomings, but these are limited and have not had any serious consequences and have not become deeply ingrained in his conscience.

**The Sports and Physical Education Service of Ho Chi Minh City has carried out deeds at variance with the Press Code and Council of Minister Decree 133**

Section 3, Article 33 of the Press Code clearly states: "The chief of a press organ... is accountable to the head of the agency in charge and to the law for all operations of the press organ concerned." Yet, the comrade director of Ho Chi Minh City's Sports and Physical Education Service, with the consent of the service's management and Party Committee, has directly done several things in contravention of the Press Code and regulations. They were:

On 12 June 1992, he suspended the secretariat of THE DUC THE THAO's editorial office. On 23 June, he appointed a new secretariat. On 23 June and 4 July, he set up inspection teams to check on the finances and assets of the newspaper. On 26 June, he ordered that the newspaper's bank account be frozen. All these decisions



were signed by the Sports and Physical Education Service director at a time when Comrade Mai Xuan Cam was still serving as editor in chief, but the service director made no comments on the editor in chief's recommendations. Nor was there any state of "emergency" allowing the service director to disregard the editor in chief's responsibility and directly discipline the newspaper's personnel.

In the dismissal of THE DUC THE THAO's secretariat for its mistake of not publishing an article marking Uncle Ho's birthday anniversary, two of its three members had nothing to do with this affair but were still disciplined together with the head of the secretariat. Comrade Tho Quang (who died recently) in particular was only a layout artist; after filing a complaint about being unjustly punished, he was disciplined by the Sports and Physical Education Service for a reason different from the original one.

The newly appointed five-member secretariat includes a chief and a member who are not journalists and who have never attended any school of journalism. Especially, one of the secretariat members was a cadre of the Science and Education Department of Ho Chi Minh City's Party Committee who was reassigned to the Sports and Physical Education Service without a decision by the head of the Science and Education Department and without the knowledge of the deputy secretary of the city's Party Committee, who oversees this department.

Over the past four months, THE DUC THE THAO has operated without either an editor in chief or an acting one, yet the responsible agencies in charge of press management have still agreed to allow it to be published regularly, despite the fact that the Press Department of the Ministry of Culture and Information has drawn their attention to this phenomenon. How could a newspaper without a head be allowed to be published? Perhaps to avoid this mistake, the city's Sports and Physical Education Service appointed to the position of editor in chief and concurrently head of the secretariat a person who, contrary to the regulations of the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Culture and Information, had never received training in journalism and had never practiced this profession.

The management of Ho Chi Minh City's Sports and Physical Education Service disciplined a number of cadres of THE DUC THE THAO on account of the newspaper's failure to publish articles about Uncle Ho on the occasion of his 19 May birthday anniversary, considering this "a serious offense." But when the editorial staff realized its mistake and offered to carry another article about Uncle Ho with the sports and physical education movement, the service's management issued an order banning its publication. The failure of the newspaper's editorial staff to feature an article about Uncle Ho was a professional mistake and a lack of political acumen; but banning an article about Uncle Ho (which may be published any time of the year) was a blameworthy shortcoming and prejudiced act on the part of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service.

Most recently, the Party Committee of Ho Chi Minh City's Sports and Physical Education Service instructed the head of THE DUC THE THAO editorial office's secretariat to notify the city's Journalists Association that Comrade Mai Xuan Cam (secretary of the THE DUC THE THAO branch of the city's Journalists Association) and Comrade Tho Quang (Journalists Association member) were not authorized to attend the congress of the newspaper's Journalists Association branch because they were being temporarily suspended. After the city's Journalists Association made its views known, Comrade Tho Quang continued to be barred from the congress for the reason that "he has been transferred to the Organization Office of the Sports and Physical Education Service"(!). As for Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, he was allowed to attend and was elected a delegate to the upper-echelon congress with a number of votes equal to two-thirds of the branch delegates. Besides Comrade Cam, two other comrades of the Journalists Association branch's secretariat still worked at THE DUC THE THAO; why didn't the Sports and Physical Education Service let these two comrades manage the association branch instead of giving the head of the secretariat (who was not an association member) to direct the activities of the newspaper's Journalists Association branch? Moreover, as Comrade Cam and Comrade Tho Quang had not been expelled from the Journalists Association, why should they be banned so hastily?

Comrade Mai Xuan Cam's good points and shortcomings have been made clear and disciplinary measures have also been determined. But what are the offenses of the other comrades? This is a question that the Sports and Physical Education Service should continue to clarify so that both the one who has died and those still living can really stop wondering about their shortcomings and about the disciplinary measures taken against them.

We can ask: Did the Sports and Physical Education Service of Ho Chi Minh City take the aforementioned measures because it did not understand the law or because it deliberately ignored the law?

#### What are the causes of this state of affairs

For 10 years in a row, the comrade director of the city's Sports and Physical Education Service (who was once editor in chief of THE DUC THE THAO) had worked in the same party chapter and workers union with Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, and had received responsibility allowances paid by the newspaper up to 22 April 1992, the day he withdrew from the newspaper's party chapter and workers union to join the activities of the party chapter and workers union of the Sports and Physical Education Service. Yet, only 50 days after that, Comrade Mai Xuan Cam was blamed for a great many things (that he had allegedly done for two years in succession) and was suspended. The comrade director and other comrade leaders of the service are credited with very great services in developing and leading THE DUC THE THAO, but they must also bear no little responsibility for the newspaper's shortcomings.



There are also people who call the incident at THE DUC THE THAO an "implementation of Directive 08 of the party Central Committee's Secretariat." This is a nonserious attempt at self-justification. The Sports and Physical Education Service should have organized for the newspaper's editorial office to study Directive 08, then let the editor in chief, other cadres, and reporters to carry out self-criticism, which should have been followed by an appraisal of the right and wrong of the editorial office and editor in chief. If the editor in chief's shortcomings proved to be serious, he should be disciplined. In reality, disciplinary measures were taken too hastily, not in the normal order, and not consistent with the nature of the shortcomings. Such an approach is unusual. The comrade deputy chairman of the city's People's Committee considers those deeds to be actions taken "not in conformity with the norm and the law, and not in the order stipulated by the party." As for the comrade leaders of the Cultural and Ideology Department of the city's Party Committee, they regard them as "actions taken by one individual against another, with both praise and criticisms being inappropriate," and as "a display of touchiness, a lack of magnanimity and compassion toward one's erring subordinates."

At a plenary meeting held by THE DUC THE THAO's editorial office to hear Comrade Mai Xuan Cam present a review of his deeds, before expressing their views on his shortcomings, nearly all comrades of the editorial office made the appraisal that Comrade Mai Xuan Cam was a competent editor in chief who was industrious, dedicated, and close to his colleagues. Before the day they issued the decision to suspend Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, even the comrade leaders of the Party Committee and management of the Sports and Physical Education Service themselves had not pointed to any major shortcomings committed by him. Comrade Mai Xuan Cam was elected to the Party Committee of the Sports and Physical Education Service in December 1991. In a recapitulative report (signed on 17 January 1992) the comrade director of the service made the following evaluation: "THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City has constantly developed, successfully meeting the demand for information on, dissemination of, and guidance in the science and technology of sports and physical education for readers... timely satisfying the masses' demand, especially on the occasion of major sporting events." At a meeting of cadres, workers, and civil servants in April 1992, the comrade secretary of the Party Committee of the Sports and Physical Education Service reached the following conclusion: "Over the past 10 years, THE DUC THE THAO has never made a mistake." Yet, in recent months both the management and Party Committee of the service have pointed out rather serious shortcomings of Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, which were said having occurred not after January or April 1992, but "two years ago" (?) Even when they proposed disciplining Comrade Mai Xuan Cam, the comrade leaders of the service's Party Committee and management deliberately avoided bringing out any good points of one of their cadres who has worked actively

throughout the past 10 years. What had happened was not a major incident, and what should have been done was nothing difficult, but the affair suddenly turned complicated, requiring up to 20 meetings to be held continually and drawing even the standing member of the city's People's Committee, the standing member of the city's Party Committee, the Journalists Association... into the fray.

#### The necessary lessons

From the incident at THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City, we can draw a number of lessons which also reflect the causes of the regrettable actions against our colleagues at the newspaper's office.

*The first lesson is:* The agency in charge and the leader of a newspaper should not work in a family, casual, and unprincipled fashion; should not rely too much on mutual trust; and should not fail to exert serious control and to resolutely struggle against and promptly rectify shortcomings. Otherwise, once an incident has occurred, they may easily become touchy, lose their cool, and resolve problems hastily, not in the normal order and not according to the law, which will eventually result in the loss of their sense of justice and mutual affection.

*The second lesson is:* A newspaper must not stray from its guiding principles and aims, from the subjects of its reporting, and from its readership. It must not aim for business gains alone and fail to comply with the direction of the agency in charge and the party committee echelon concerned. If the editor in chief of a newspaper as active as THE DUC THE THAO lacks close relations with the agency in charge, serious consequences are bound to result.

*The third lesson is:* All citizens, especially the persons in charge of the press organs, must have a firm grasp of the Press Code to avoid making even the simplest mistakes. When punishing one's subordinates, one must abide by the law, no matter how serious their subordinates' offenses are, authority being no substitute for law. Comrade General Secretary Do Muoi said: "Nobody is allowed to trample upon the law."

*The fourth lesson is:* When considering the incident at THE DUC THE THAO, the comrade leaders of Ho Chi Minh City were very fair and correct in assessing the right and wrong of their subordinates; they also showed strictness and acted with both reason and feeling when considering disciplinary measures against cadres. But for the serious attitude of the comrade leaders of Ho Chi Minh City, we would never know how far the incident at THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City would have developed.

The Vietnam Journalists Association and the Journalists Association of Ho Chi Minh City, by implementing Article 16 of the Press Code—namely: "To protect the legal rights and interests of journalists"—has adopted a correct and calm attitude in considering the complaints lodged by the editor in chief and secretariat of THE DUC THE THAO, and has promptly petitioned the

city's leadership, the Sports and Physical Education Service, and various responsible organs concerning the incident at THE DUC THE THAO of Ho Chi Minh City.

## BIOGRAPHIC

### Information on Personalities

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[Editorial Report] The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. An asterisk indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.

#### Nguyen Canh Dinh [NGUYEENX CANHR ZINH]

Minister of water conservancy; he was born on 14 June 1934 in Yen Thanh District, Nghe An Province; he joined the revolution in 1951, graduated from college as an engineer in water conservancy, and worked many years in this field; he became vice minister of water conservancy in October 1973 and minister in January 1981; he currently is a member of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited sources. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Dang Vu Chu [DAWNGJ VUX CHUW]

Minister of light industry; he was born in 1940 in Xuan Truong District, Nam Ha Province; he joined the revolution in 1960, earned an M.A. degree in sciences; in 1987 he became vice minister in charge of technological science and capital construction; he became minister of light industry in March 1990; currently, he is member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Tran Dinh Hoan [TRAANF DINHF HOAN]

Minister of labor, war invalids, and social welfare; he was born on 20 October 1939 in Kim Dong District, Hai Hung Province; he has a doctorate degree in economics and labor; for many years he worked in the labor sector; he was appointed vice minister of labor, war invalids, and social welfare in November 1983 and became minister in May 1989; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 1992 p 7)

#### Ngo Xuan Loc [NGOO XUAAN LOOCJ]

Minister of construction; he was born on 10 June 1940 in Nam Ninh District, Nam Ha Province; he joined the revolution in 1958, has a degree in construction engineering, and worked in the construction field for many years; he was director general of the Song Da General

Construction Company; he became minister of construction in October 1989; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Bui Danh Luu [BUIF ZANH LUWU]

Minister of communication and transportation; he was born on 28 August 1935 in Tam Thanh District, Vinh Phu Province; he joined the revolution in 1954, earned an M.A. degree in science and technology, and worked for many years in the communications field; he became vice minister of communication and transportation in November 1982 and minister in June 1986; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Tran Lum [TRAANF LUM]

Minister of heavy industry; he was born in 1932 in Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province; he joined the revolution in 1947; he earned an M.A. degree in machine invention in Czechoslovakia; he worked in the engineering branch for many years; in 1978 he was appointed vice minister of engineering and metallurgy; in April 1990 he became minister of heavy industry; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Thai Phung Ne [THAIS PHUNGJ NEE]

Minister of energy; he was born on 24 May 1936 in Tuy Hoa District, Phu Yen Province; he joined the revolution in 1954, earned an M.A. degree in hydroelectricity; for many years, and worked in the electric power field; he was chief of the Hoa Binh hydroelectric construction project; later, he became director of the management board of the same project. since 1989, he has been acting as special envoy for the minister of water conservancy; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Do Quoc Sam [DOOX QUOCS SAM]

\*Minister; chairman of the State Planning Commission; he was born on 29 May 1929 in Dong Anh District, Hanoi; he joined the revolution in 1946; he earned an M.A. degree in technological science; he worked for many years in management, taught at the Construction and Polytechnic College, and was chairman of the State Commission for Capital Construction; in April 1989 he was appointed first vice chairman of the State Planning Commission and became chairman in June 1991; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee. His name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

#### Nguyen Cong Tan [NGUYEENX COONG TANJ]

Minister of agriculture and food industry; he was born on 6 January 1935 in Thai Thuy District, Thai Binh

Province; he joined the revolution in 1958; he graduated from college as an agricultural engineer; in 1977 he was deputy chief of the Crops General Department; in 1978 he was vice minister of agriculture; in 1986 he was vice chairman of the People's Committee and deputy secretary of the CPV Committee in Hanoi; he became minister of agriculture and food industry in February 1987; currently he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

**Ho Te [HOOF TEES]**

Minister of finance; he was born on 10 January 1934 in Huong Tra District, Thua Thien-Hue Province; he joined the revolution in 1947; he received a college degree in finance in the Soviet Union; he worked in the financial field for many years; he was appointed vice minister of finance in November 1983; later, he became permanent vice minister in the same ministry; in May 1992, he was appointed minister of finance by the Eighth National Assembly; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 1992 p 7)

**Nguyen Ngoc Tran [NGUYEENX NGOCJ TRAAN],  
Professor, Ph.D.**

\*Director of the CPV Central Committee for Overseas Vietnamese; he was appointed to this position in October 1992 by decision of the prime minister; previously, he was deputy director of the CPV Central Committee for Overseas Vietnamese and vice chairman of

the State Sciences Commission; with the new appointment, he was relieved of the latter two positions. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 19 Nov 92 p 24)

**Nguyen Tan Trinh [NGUYEENX TAANS TRINHJ]**

Minister of marine products; he was born on 20 December 1936 in Tam Ky District, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province; he joined the revolution in 1952 and earned an M.A. degree in science; he worked many years in the agricultural and marine products field; he became vice minister of marine products in November 1978 and minister in January 1981; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

**Dau Ngoc Xuan [DAAUJ NGOCJ XUAAN]**


\*Minister; chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment; he was born on 3 February 1927 in Nghi Xuan District, Ha Tinh City; he joined the revolution in August 1945; he is a college graduate, a specialist in economic research; he became vice chairman of the State Planning Commission in September 1980 and chairman in March 1988; in 1989 he was appointed minister and chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment; currently, he is a member of the CPV Central Committee; his name was on the list of the new government published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City THOI BAO KINH TE SAIGON 8-14 Oct 92 p 7)

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